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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### ***Political Affairs***

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# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

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### CONTENTS

23 May 1991

#### NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Bakatin, Ligachev, Shatalin Speak at 'Perestroyka' Conference [Yu. Lepskiy; TRUD, 7 May 91] ..	1
KGB Document on Workers' Movement Published [Y. Shchekochikhin; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 15, 17 Apr 91] .....	3
Domestic Reform, Better Foreign Ties Said Linked [A. Abramov; NOVOYE VREMYA No 16, Apr 91] .....	4

#### REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

##### Baltics

Communist Leader Remains in Politburo [T. Tammerk, L. Oll; THE ESTONIAN INDEPENDENT, 7 Feb 91] .....	7
Interfront Fights for the Union [A. Sai; THE ESTONIAN INDEPENDENT, 7 Feb 91] .....	7
Attempt To Reestablish Latvian Komsomol Focus of Controversy [SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH, 20 Apr 91] .....	9
Vagnorius, Doguzhiyev View Progress of USSR-Lithuania Talks .....	9
Vagnorius Interview [G. Vagnorius; PRAVITELSTVENNIY VESTNIK No 14, Apr 91] .....	9
Doguzhiyev Comments [V. Doguzhiyev; PRAVITELSTVENNIY VESTNIK No 14, Apr 91] .....	11
USSR: Young Political Group Explains Position [Vilnius Radio] .....	12
USSR: Lithuanian Polish Region Coordinating Council Meets [TASS International, 8 May 91] ...	12
Vilnius Mayor Discusses City's Problems, Damage From January Events [V. Bernatonis; VECHERNIYE NOVOSTI, 13 Feb 91] .....	13

##### RSFSR

'Nothing Unusual' in Russian CP Leaders' Army Contacts [I.K. Polozkov; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 7 May 91] .....	14
Decline of Local Party in Kuzbass Viewed [A.A. Filatov; PRAVDA, 23 Apr 91] .....	14

##### Western Republics

Moldovan Decree on Normalizing Situation in Republic [SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA, 30 Apr 91] .....	15
Moldovan Communist Party Ousts Dissenters [SELKSAYA ZHIZN, 11 Apr 91] .....	16
Hungarian Consul General on Relations With Ukraine [A. Paldi; KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA, 19 Mar 91] .....	17

##### Caucasus

Armenian Law on Republic Referendums [GOLOS ARMENII, 9 Apr 91] .....	19
Armenian Consumer Goods Hoarded in Warehouses [A. Grigoryan and V. Balyan; AVANGARD, 24 Jan 91] .....	25
Armenian Supreme Soviet Renames Villages [HAYASTAN, 11 Apr 91] .....	28
Omanidze Made First Deputy Chairman of Georgia [SVOBODNAYA GRUZYIA, 19 Apr 91] .....	30

##### Central Asia

Goals of 11 Kazakh Pressure Groups Outlined [QAZAQ ADEBIYETI No 52, 28 Dec 90] .....	30
New Kazakhstan CP Charter [KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 27 Dec 90] .....	33
New Tajik Cabinet of Ministers Deputy Chairman Appointed [KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA, 10 Apr 91] .....	39

Niyazov on Turkmen Republic Policy	[S. Niyazov; NEDELYA No 18, 29 Apr 91]	39
New Uzbek Communist Party Charter	[PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 27 Dec 90]	42

## NATIONALITY ISSUES

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Mari	[SOYUZ No 7, Feb 91]	54
-------------------------------------	----------------------	----

## LAW AND ORDER

Changes in Moscow Drug Trafficking Patterns	[V. Tverskoy; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 19 Feb 91]	55
Moscow Airport Viewed as Trafficking Transit Point	[A. Potanin; TORGOVAYA GAZETA, 26 Mar 91]	55
Gdlyan-Ivanov Affair in Uzbekistan Revisited	[A. Sadri; VETERAN No 9, Feb 91]	56

## MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

Baltfax News Agency Described	[T. Erilayd; VECHERNIY TALLINN, 17 Apr 91]	63
USSR: Rado Vedo To Begin Broadcasts 20 May	[Moscow Radio]	63
Bulk of Leningrad TV Shares To Be Held Locally	[N. Volynskiy; PRAVDA, 9 May 91]	64
Turkmen Decree on Registration of Mass Media	[TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 20 Mar 91]	64

## ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Chernobyl Clean-Up Workers From Internal Affairs Ministry Form Association	[V. Feldman; PRAVDA UKRAINY, 18 Apr 91]	66
Ukrainian Official on Chernobyl Victim Resettlement	[G.A. Gotovchits; PRAVDA UKRAINY, 12 Apr 91]	66
Ukrainian SSR Law on Territory Contaminated by Chernobyl	[PRAVDA UKRAINY, 22 Mar 91]	69
UkSSR Law on Status of Citizens Affected by Chernobyl	[PRAVDA UKRAINY, 28 Mar 91]	74

## SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

Official on New VUZ Admission Rules	[A. Zverev; IZVESTIYA, 8 May 91]	90
-------------------------------------	----------------------------------	----

**Bakatin, Ligachev, Shatalin Speak at  
'Perestroyka' Conference**

*91UN1454A Moscow TRUD in Russian  
7 May 91 pp 1, 2*

[Article by Yu. Lepskiy, TRUD political commentator:  
"We Write 'Yes,' but We Think 'No:' What the Conference,  
'Perestroyka: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow,' Shows"]

[Text] When I was a young specialist, and would leave the dormitory in the morning and set out for work on foot along the arrow-straight street, the first thing that met my still-sleepy gaze was a huge portrait of Lenin, painted on a gigantic plywood panel. Ilich would look down on me with his sly, squinting eye, his hand at salute on the bill of his cap. Under the leader's portrait were written the words, as if he was saying them to everyone: "You are taking the right road, Comrades!"

Signboards appealed to me in principle, in form and in content; they gave me confidence in the correctness and meaning of life. There were only two things that bothered me. First of all, one often took Ilich's cheerful phrase literally, since city transportation did not function well and citizens were forced to travel on their own two feet. Secondly, the signboard was constructed so cleverly, that Ilich was depicted on the reverse side as well, saying the very same thing. And so, late at night when I would return to my dormitory room from work, perhaps owing to my youth I would wonder about when I was taking the right road, in the morning or in the evening? After all, my directions in the morning and evening were exactly the opposite... But now I understand that the meaning of this ingenious visual agitation lay in convincing me to live peacefully and confidently, regardless of the direction in which the higher party leadership turns the rudder.

Incidentally, since that time there have been fewer signboards on the streets of our cities, which is a good thing; but at the same time this has hardly added to our confidence as to whether we are following the right road. Moreover, all that has taken place in recent months at times leads one to think that the "mustang" in our government, under the energetic shouting and goading of the latter, has altogether lost its way in the boundless steppes.

Where are we, where are we going, and where is the road? These are questions to which we must find the answer, or we will be unable to go further. But who can answer them? Perhaps (as our colleagues from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA decided, the "National Agreement" Committee, or the Washington-Paris-Moscow Independent University), Vadim Bakatin, Yegor Ligachev, Gavril Popov, Nikolay Petrakov, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Stanislav Shatalin, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy and Eduard Shevardnadze will be able to answer them? Look closely at these names. With the exception of two—Popov and Khasbulatov—all are well-known and respected people in our country who have recently left their high posts. The rank of the retirees, in addition to everything else, provides them

distinctive qualities: independence from their functional positions, freedom from the hierarchical structure of power and, consequently, independence of views. Add to this the fact that these people are well-versed and well-informed, and the reason for their participation in the conference, "Perestroyka, Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow," I think, becomes clear. Very well, let us listen to them now.

**Vadim Bakatin:**

I would call what we are going through now a crisis of coming out of a crisis. Why did it arise? Well, because we are totally unable to overcome the fundamental Marxist dogma of the incompatibility of socialism and private ownership of the means of production. But even if we found in ourselves the strength to cross that threshold, we must clearly understand this: nationalization can be achieved in one night by means of decrees and revolutionary sailors; but privatization is a long-term process, which cannot be provided by decrees and masses of people ready for revolution alone. Here, the question of the nature of power inevitably arises, and the mechanism through which the state will be able to carry out the reforms. To this day our power has been maintained, figuratively speaking, by fear of losing one's party card. In fact, the party has been at the helm, while the Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet fulfilled decorative functions. The Central Committee was occupied with everything: from milking cows on the farms to clearing snowdrifts from railroad tracks. And this system of power used to operate firmly and reliably. Now, with the repeal of Article Six of the USSR Constitution, there is no such system of government, and we have not yet created a new one as reliable as the former. Therein lies the problem...

**Yegor Ligachev:**

I do not belong to those who assert that in 1985, at the beginning of the changes in our country, we inherited a weak, sickly state. That is not so. The fact of the matter is, the state was strong and guaranteed military-political parity, which was the most important condition for constructive dialogue with the USA. Then what happened? I am convinced that for the first three years, things were on the upswing for us. From then on, perestroyka has been subject to improvisation and has been behaving like a frightened horse. The greatest mistake was committed in 1988, when the decision was made to force the introduction of market relationships. We began this madness without making any preparations, neither in a legal nor an economic respect. We successfully destroyed the planning system, but at the same time "forgot" to destroy the administrative-command system. And that well-functioning system has torn up all our attempts to introduce market relationships. What to do? I am convinced that society must return to that with which we began, and then gradually, without haste, move to a market based on a social form of property.

**Gavriil Popov:**

I am coming to the conclusion that we shall not accomplish transition to a market economy by traditional means. After all, the experience of six years of perestroika has proven that a special kind of administrative power is necessary for the transition period. This power must be firm, steadfast and continuous. Its regime must be accompanied by a limitation of authority of the representative organs of parliament and Soviets at all levels. This regime must be capable of protecting the public from the excesses of the market; but, on the other hand, it must be able to protect the market from excessive social guarantees given to the public. One might ask, but what guarantee is there that this special administrative regime will not grow into a totalitarian regime? In my view there are several such guarantees. First of all, periodic election of the leaders; secondly, a powerful popular opposition party. Next, an independent mass information system. And finally, departization of the army, the KGB and the governmental organs. However, such a regime should exist only during the transition period.

**Nikolay Petrakov:**

Here are some disturbing figures. As of today, social production has fallen 8.0 percent, national income 10 percent, and consumer goods production by 6.0 percent. In this situation the Cabinet of Ministers is presenting an anticrisis program, which consists mainly of political declarations. What is more, it is demanding as the necessary conditions for its realization, stabilization of socio-political life, a moratorium on strikes, halting the war of laws, strict subordination of lower-ranking to higher-ranking organs, and a special regime of centralized distribution of resources. As you see, they are proposing to carry out the reforms, not under the real-life conditions of today, but in a situation of six to seven years ago, to which the Cabinet is trying to return us. At the same time the program is completely enchanted with the validity of the market route. I believe that this is nothing more than an attempt to convince our western neighbors that we are now deserving of trust, as before, as proponents of market relationships. It would be well if we could take the energy with which we are trying to convince ourselves and others of the fact that we are going to a market economy, and put it to use for the main thing—the battle with growing inflation. But in order to do this, one has to be able to see its real sources. In my view, there are two such sources. The first is the military-industrial complex [VPK], which abrogates to itself the most skilled workers. Enjoying an enormous quantity of resources, the VPK has absolutely no desire to switch to market relationships. It is successfully torpedoing the conversion, it does not wish to emerge from secrecy, and thirsts for new capital investments from the people's pockets. The Cabinet cannot honestly tell the people that they must tighten their belts. Not being popular, it is trying to flirt with the people, but in the final analysis has not completely fulfilled any of its promises. If these two

sources are not quenched, the crisis will in my view grow until the entire economy is degraded...

**Stanislav Shatalin:**

Let us ask ourselves an honest question: Is it possible for us to come out of the crisis within the framework of the existing socio-political system? And now let us answer it just as honestly and boldly: No. I believe that the new anticrisis program of the Cabinet of Ministers is, we write "yes," but we are thinking "no." They understand just as well as I, that the market mechanism is provided by private property. Thus far, the measures which the government has taken cannot be called market measures. The price reform is absolutely not the market because it has called up a whole complex of measures and individual ones for roll call and is nothing other than a feverish attempt to plug the holes in the budget at the expense of the public...

**Grigoriy Yavlinskiy:**

We have very little time in which to resolve a minimum of five problems: the budget catastrophe; the drop in production; unemployment; inflation; and the deficit in the foreign balance of payments. I suppose that we have three or four months in which to act, no more. I do not want to think about what will happen if we do not solve these problems. However, when I see that privatization, for example, is not working with us for political reasons, that today's national leadership is on the whole not able to speak the words, "private property," then I begin to doubt that we shall get to the market with such political articulation...

It goes without saying that this is not all that was said at the conference. I have attempted to present a spectrum of opinions from various people. It goes without saying that these people argued among themselves and disagreed more often than they agreed. However, I believe that we will find more interesting what they agreed on.

A policy of political exorcism—that is what we will call it: everyone lays all the blame on the actions of the nation's leaders. What are we talking about? What kind of policy is that? Why, this is such a special policy that there are none like it anywhere in the world: in order to build developed socialism, it is sufficient to declare that it is built, and that is all. It is true, our ideologues have not completed everything: they did not manage to declare communism built. But, if they had declared it, what could you do—you would believe that you were living under communism. The meaning of such a policy lies in the fact that here ideology is not serving life, but it is as if life "adjusts itself" to the ideology. And whatever does not fit the conventional pattern of ideas is not needed. Even today you will hear: "The market, yes; but private property? Spare us; that is not appropriate for us." It cannot be because that is not the way it is supposed to be. It's like a shaman's circle of enchantment. And so, will they not tell us in the near future, that

"on the whole" market relationships have been introduced here, even though the shelves are empty?.. Take away the ideological blinders from the economy—that is what the conferees were able to agree on. Well, what else?

And who in the final analysis will lead the country out of the crisis? The functionaries of the state apparatus? The CPSU? The Government? The Soviets? Radical democratic forces? Thus far not one of the organizations and structures enumerated can boast of success on this path. And every participant in the conference had his own opinion on this account.

And still, I think the essence of the question is not the form of power, but the mechanism for realizing the powers authorized. Is there such a mechanism? There is. Today only one organization possesses it (and here Vadim Bakatin is right)—namely, the CPSU: it has a separate structure of levers of power and, hierarchical subordination from the Central Committee to the obkom, from the obkom to the raykom, and thence to the primary organization. True, today this "armored train" is standing on a sidetrack; however, it is still quite well-greased, the fire in the firebox has not gone out, it has steam up, and even has enough machinery... Well? What's holding things up? Perhaps we should once again gather at the summit and decide where and on what dates to plant peas, and where to plant carrots? We shall issue decrees, pass them down to the obkoms, who will pass them to the raykom, and in no time at all, the raykom secretary will hop into his smart little UAZ and pay a call on the kolkhoz chairman. There they stand, in a plowed field, you see, and the secretary, as if giving advice, quietly says to the chairman, "Look, Prokopich, how about giving the rayon a hand? Why don't you, Prokopich, plant what the center wants here? OK?"

Bakatin is also right in the fact that this painfully familiar procedure is called the party-state mechanism, and that it is in essence the backbone of the administrative-command system. Using it means that we shall consciously return to the past. "Well, what to do?" sigh the "armored train troops," "it will not turn out any differently, we have already tried it, and that's that..."

What's true is true: they have tried the whip on the economy, they have held its reins, and they tried persuasion—and it won't go. The "mustang" has lost its way; it is up to its knees in the snow... We must, consequently, turn around.

This is the logic of retreat. But there is also a logic of forward motion. According to this logic, one can hide the whip and one can let go of the reins—which in fact is what a coachman lost in a blizzard would do. And the "mustang" would find the road by itself, as long as no one holds it back, nor whips it, nor pulls on the lead rope. They say that the market has the capacity of self-regulation, if only one does not hinder it (but help would be fine!) from recovery, nor pull on it, nor whip it, nor issue decrees, nor surround it with ideological incantations. You must give it a chance to stand up on its own

feet, and to take what is truly the right road. I repeat, this is the logic of forward motion, which was acknowledged by an absolute majority of both the economists and politicians who took part in the conference.

This rare unanimity among one and all testifies, at a minimum, to the fact that politicians have grown weary of an ineffective economy, just as the economy has grown weary of incompetent politicians. It is interesting, at the same time, that neither the one nor the other have hastened to proclaim sovereignty for the economy, for they understand the present critical need for competent politicians in the economic life of the country.

As I recall, about seven years ago one of our political strategists coined a striking political slogan: "The Economy Must be Economical." This was deemed to be in the order of things, since until then for many years the economy had been explained in terms of what it should be like from the point of view of this or that political figure. But the time of competent politicians is coming. And the best slogan that could be offered is, in my view, that "the economy must be economical."

#### **KGB Document on Workers' Movement Published**

91UF0658A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 15, 17 Apr 91 p 2

[KGB document followed by commentary by USSR People's Deputy Yuriy Shchekochikhin: "KGB as a Mirror of the Workers' Movement"]

[Text] A few days ago a USSR KGB officer gave the editors a document, which, in his opinion, should be made public.

#### **"USSR Committee for State Security**

"From 30 April to 2 May, the First All-Union Congress of Independent Workers Movements took place in the city of Novokuznetsk, Kemerovo Oblast; among the participants were representatives of strike committees from Vorkuta, Kuzbass, Donbass, Karaganda, and other regions. Among those who showed excessive interest toward the work of this congress were foreign correspondents who are accredited in the USSR and who are involved in the activities of enemy special services; representatives of the Polish Solidarity; open members of the NTS [People's Workers' Union]; and informal organizations of an anticonstitutional bent such as Sajudis, Rukh, and others.

"In order to render practical help in organizing the implementation of certain measures, officers of the USSR KGB's Sixth Directorate and of the USSR KGB Directorate for Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System, together with covert sources, were detached to the Novokuznetsk City Office of the KGB.

"As a result of implemented measures, subversive enemy aspirations to collect negative information on the situation among the workers had been localized. Joint actions

in managing the sources present at the congress as deputies, consultants, and guests (emphasis mine—Yu.Sh.) made it possible to avert the adoption of extremist decisions and actions on the part of some workers' delegations and their leaders, and to sabotage the formation of a centralized leadership of the strike movement in the country and its subjugation to radically-minded political adventurers and organizations of an anticonstitutional bent.

"For personal initiative and persistence, high professionalism, and political maturity shown in implementing a set of operational measures in regard to foreigners and certain Soviet citizens among the representatives of informal political organizations during the period of the so-called First Congress of Independent Workers Movements, and for achieving positive results, we believe it desirable to reward, by the order of the USSR KGB chairman, the following personnel...

"[signed] Major General Ye.F. Ivanov, chief, USSR KGB Directorate for Protection of the Soviet Constitutional System

"Major General Savenkov, chief, USSR KGB Sixth Directorate

"3 July 1990."

I would prefer not to intrude now into the area of the KGB professional activities and to discuss what they have a right to be involved in, and what they do not... I hope that the law on the KGB (albeit developed in the bowels of the KGB itself) will finally guarantee the safety of society and of the people from the security service.

However, as someone who has spent his entire life dealing with words, I could not help being surprised by the vocabulary of the chiefs of the two KGB directorates. It is too incompatible with the perestroika vocabulary we have gotten used to: from "anticonstitutional bent such as Sajudis, Rukh," to "so-called First Congress of Independent Workers Movements."

Words reflect a way of thinking (please forgive me for this banality). But even more banal, in my view, is the self-confidence the KGB leadership displays in still thinking of themselves as the only moral power in our complex political life.

Today, almost a year after this document was produced, in a country shaken by the scope of the workers' movement, I am not calling on the KGB personnel that "sabotaged" it to return their rewards and bonuses. But I hope they will not be tempted by a reward to find the person who passed this unique document to the editors.

The editors have the list of names of those who (in the opinion of the two generals) deserved to be rewarded with valuable gifts and monetary bonuses.

### Domestic Reform, Better Foreign Ties Said Linked

91UF0719A Moscow *NOVOYE VREMYA* in Russian  
No 16, Apr 91 pp 28-29

[Article by Aleksey Abramov, doctor of historical sciences: "Three Pillars of a Besieged Fortress"]

[Text] By the kind of practices the state establishes within the country people will judge its foreign policy aspirations also.

Under the conditions of the intensifying domestic crisis the Soviet Union needs more than ever a favorable international atmosphere, economic assistance, and a curbing of the arms race. But it is not, essentially, all turning out this way.

Since the high point—the Paris meeting of the heads of state of Europe and the United States and Canada—international affairs have moved downhill, as it were. An uncertainty in the development of political relations with the most important powers has emerged.

The euphoria in connection with the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR is being replaced in the West by disappointment—it is evaluating certain of Moscow's actions as relapses into the old political thinking. With us some people are depressed by the fragility of the foreign policy achievements of recent years, which even recently seemed irreversible, which has been manifested. Others are angered by the fact that after so many Soviet concessions and goodwill gestures increasingly new steps in the same spirit are being demanded of us and that people are unwilling to take into account the difficulties of the domestic situation. There are also those who are rubbing their hands with glee: we are finally stopping "waiving principles."

### Being a Rival to Everyone Is Impossible

Yet there is nothing surprising about this. Deep-seated inner mechanisms independent of people's hopes or illusions and the individual miscalculations of policy or the subjective desires of this leader or the other are at work. Also, in general, in accordance with the fundamentals of Marxist theory.

What is called the administrative command system has historically been supported on three pillars. The first is the supercentralized command economy geared not to satisfaction of the needs of the people but the establishment of the power of the state, primarily to service of the giant military-industrial complex. The foundations of this system embedded in Stalin's industrialization and collectivization were openly and unambiguously tied to the needs of defense by way of the development of heavy industry and mechanical engineering at the expense of other sectors of the economy.

The second is the totalitarian political system with its roots in boundless punitive measures both against the "socially alien" and against the "socially native" in the

twenties, thirties, and forties. The suppression of dissidence, intolerance of alternative opinions, flagrant manipulation of information, and all-embracing secrecy became the norm in the Khrushchev-Brezhnev decades.

And the third is the unitary state which wholly subordinated the republics and national minorities to the center. The results of such subordination were the criminal actions of "disenfranchisement" and the banishment of entire peoples and the arbitrary recarving of territory. The disregard for their culture and national dignity and the predatory exploitation of labor and natural resources with the severest demographic and ecological consequences.

Naturally, this economical-political-national monolith could have existed only in a particular external environment: in "hostile imperialist encirclement" and in a state of permanent military and ideological confrontation with the surrounding world.

While recognizing the vicious nature and aggressiveness of the Stalin regime, we cannot either, of course, idealize those who in the world arena resisted it, endeavoring to secure for themselves political influence and achieve their mercenary interests with the aid of the threat of force and its direct use in regional conflicts. The aggressive paranoia and ideological passion of one side aroused the bellicosity mixed with fear, together with messianic ambitions, of the other, unwinding the flywheel of the "cold war" and the arms race.

Fortunately, a thermonuclear clash has been avoided for four decades. But, in spite of our sacramental proposition of those years, the correlation of forces in the world in its main gauges has changed, on the whole, not in favor of "developed" or "real" socialism, despite Moscow's achievement of nuclear parity and the acquisition of a number of unstable outposts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

No state could have supported infinitely rivalry with all the leading powers of the world. The three-in-one monolith which was created for confrontation and which was cemented by this confrontation began to crumble beneath the press of global opposition, which was too much for it.

#### Feedback Law

The perestroika initiated by the new leadership of the CPSU in the mid-1980's set the task of giving the state a second wind, accomplishing domestic transformations, and changing relations with the surrounding world. On this path Mikhail Gorbachev and his associates went much further than the reformers of the end of the 1950's and start of the 1960's. What is no less important is that this movement was taken up from below by a country which had grown up and had shed its former illusions. Movements and displacements in all the ossified components of the administrative command system began: first in foreign policy, then in ideology and domestic political life, and subsequently in the economy and

international relations. Unfortunately, not in all spheres was the leadership capable of implementing fruitful reforms, but the interrelationship of the changes that had occurred was manifested increasingly obviously.

Renunciation of the policy of global confrontation and the principle of class struggle in international affairs, the important breakthroughs in disarmament, and the aspiration to have done with economic self-isolation demolished the long-standing "besieged fortress" structure within the state. It was this which was the main meaning of the new political thinking, not simply a desire to redistribute resources from external to internal needs, as it has been interpreted abroad.

Proclamation of the priority of principles common to all mankind outside immediately put these principles on the agenda of domestic political life, including generally recognized democratic liberties, pluralism of opinions, and freedom of the press. This immediately made the focus of debate the evolved system of a supercentralized economy, disastrous for people and nature, the political monopoly of the CPSU, the inordinate defense budget, and the expediency of the maintenance in peacetime of a vast military machine.

The principle of freedom of choice for other countries was immediately seized upon by the peoples of the Soviet Union, and processes of democratization in a number of republics brought to power new and often very heterogeneous political forces. They opposed the economic and political omnipotence of the center and the location on their territory and without their consent of defense enterprises, proving grounds, and military facilities. This infrastructure frequently caused economic and environmental damage and had no precise legal status conforming to the sovereignty of the republics.

The incapacity of the top leadership to rapidly and decisively introduce under these conditions fundamentally new mechanisms of statehood, economics, and interethnic relations, the practice of half-measures, miscalculations, and the chronic lagging behind events created a real danger of a loss of control over processes in the country. Endeavoring to restore its authority, the government has as of the fall of 1990 moved not forward but backward and has begun to hamper perestroika under the "stabilization and consolidation" slogan. This has inevitably entailed chaos in management, intensified the economic crisis, and given rise to social upheavals.

It has been manifested once again as graphically as could be that in our system the economy, domestic political conditions, national relations, and foreign policy are inseparably interconnected. Whatever end one takes, progressive reforms rapidly induce changes in other spheres. And, conversely, attempts to take a step back bring about collisions in other components of the system via feedback.

In the wake of the January events in the Baltic the president posed the question of a suspension of the Press

Act, but all things taken together, this had noisy international repercussions. Attempting to justify the irrational action pertaining to the exchange of banknotes, Prime Minister V. Pavlov discovered an "external enemy," accusing foreign banks (from which we have requested credit) of "financial aggression"—an aspiration to destabilize our economy. Advocating a revival of the unitary state-cum-empire, a clampdown on democracy, and a buildup of military power, Deputy V. Alksnis and his colleagues, naturally, assailed the disarmament treaties, called for support for Saddam Husayn, and launched a campaign concerning the increased "military threat" on the part of the United States and NATO.

There are no nor could there be any accidental coincidences here, the iron laws of the relationship of different components of a single system are operating.

If for the sake of the establishment of the supremacy of the center there is a clampdown on the sovereignty of the republics, prohibitions on democratic liberties immediately follow (we recall 28 March in Moscow). And measures to restore the command methods of management of the economy on a Union scale are adopted as a lever.

If there are demands for an end to democracy and glasnost, people are, consequently, striving for a revival of the monopoly of the party-economic bureaucracy. But it is supported by a supercentralized economy incompatible with the sovereignty of the republics.

The aspiration to reanimate the centralized economy—the basis of centralized political power—is inseparably connected with a strengthening of the dominating positions of the military-industrial complex at the heart of heavy industry and machine building. And this presupposes suppression of the rudiments of market relations, the imposition of increasingly new taxes, price rises, and the running of the printing presses at top speed. In response—attempts on the part of the republics to save their own economy, workers' strikes, protest demonstrations, and an explosion of criticism in the press.

This, in turn, brings about measures pertaining to an infringement of the sovereignty of the republics, glasnost, and political pluralism. And under the conditions of the growing domestic role of the Army there is no longer any question of profound military reform and conversion, and a reduction in military spending and a cutback in defense potential to a reasonable sufficiency recede into the background.

#### **Dangerous Turnabout**

Could all this contribute to international trust and the development of civilized relations with the surrounding

world? Promote accords on disarmament and integration in the world economic and financial system? Stimulate political cooperation with other states in respect of the settlement of crises and help the building of collective security in Europe, Asia, and other areas?

Of course, these relationships work indirectly and have a certain "clearance." The new foreign policy initially outpaced domestic restructuring. A backward turn within does not immediately bring about a return to "cold war" outside, and the inertia of policy is extinguished slowly.

A transition to market relations in the economy and a rise in the people's well-being are inseparable from a dismantling of the centralized command system, a reduction in military spending, and the profound conversion of defense industry and the elevation of the remaining sectors of military production to a new qualitative level. Such a path undoubtedly demands a reduction in the numbers of the armed forces, their reforming on a basis of professionalization, and an orientation exclusively toward external assignments.

Contrary to certain assertions, it is not the Army that is the basis of the state (as long as this is not a militarist-type state) but a healthy dynamic economy, the moral-political unity of the people, and a strong legal base. Only in such a society does the Army occupy an honorary and worthy place capable of reliably providing for the country's security.

It is not those who are championing the market, democracy, and the sovereignty of the republics who are demolishing the Union. It is the feverish attempts of circles of the right to put pressure on the Union leadership for the purpose of having done with perestroika and the demands under the present, qualitatively new conditions for a return to the command economic system and a restoration of totalitarianism which are leading to collapse. But only a market economy creates the sole firm basis for a union of sovereign republics and their formation of an efficient central mechanism for interaction in the spheres of defense, transportation, power engineering, and the environment and in the humanitarian sphere. This, in turn, presupposes political pluralism and a broadening of the democratic rights and liberties of the citizens and nations.

All this is directly related to foreign policy. Unswerving and accelerated transformations in the economy, domestic political arrangement, and interethnic relations of our Union—this is the sole possible prerequisite of the development of the new political thinking in international affairs. Only such a course of events within will afford a possibility of political interaction and economic cooperation with the civilized world, new, even more radical disarmament accords, and affirmation of the legal provisions of international life.

## Baltics

### Communist Leader Remains in Politburo

91UN1446A Tallinn THE ESTONIAN  
INDEPENDENT in English 7 Feb 91 p 3

[Article by Tarmut Tammerk and Lya Oll: "Estonian Communist Leader Remains in Politburo"]

[Text] [photo caption: Independent Estonian Communist Party Leader Enn-Arno Sillari: "We have useful contacts with the Soviet leadership".]

**In a sign of a fresh power struggle within the Soviet Communist Party leadership, several members recently demanded the dismissal of the head of the pro-independence Estonian Communist Party from the Politburo.**

The hardliners failed to get enough votes, allowing Enn-Arno Sillari to remain in the Politburo. However, Lembit Annus, a conservative and chief of the pro-Moscow faction of the Estonian Communist Party, was voted in.

For the first time ever, Estonia is represented by two people of opposing views in the highest organ of the Soviet Communist Party. The independent Estonian Communists have 5,000 members in contrast to 40,000 members claimed by the pro-Moscow party. However, the second figure is probably exaggerated since people who have not resigned are counted as members even if they do not pay dues.

The proposal to drop Mr Sillari from the Politburo was made by Vladimir Malkovski, a pro-Moscow Communist leader from Estonia at the January 31 plenum of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

In his address to the plenum, Mr Malkovski demanded Mr Sillari's dismissal for "destroying the Soviet Communist Party from inside." Mr Malkovski said the pro-independence Communist Party of Estonia has kept its name, unlike similar parties in Latvia and Lithuania, "for tactical reasons." In the two other Baltic republics, the communist parties have renamed themselves Democratic Labour parties.

Countering the proposals to include Mr Annus in the Politburo, a member of the independent Estonian Communist Party, Kalju Komissarov, told the plenum that to vote Mr Annus into the Politburo would mean the same as to vote in a former aide to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. Mr Annus was an aide to Karl Vaino, chief of the Estonian Communist Party during the Brezhnev years.

Speaking on Estonian Radio after the plenum, Mr Sillari described the atmosphere there as "aggressive and threatening." Despite the criticism, Mr Sillari said he had no plans to resign. "Being in the Politburo is an important way to influence events in Estonia," he said.

Mr Sillari said, the independent Estonian Communist Party was crucial in maintaining "a dialogue" between Estonian leaders and the Kremlin after the Soviet crackdown in Lithuania. Estonian Supreme Soviet Chairman Arnold Rüütel was the first Baltic leader to be received by President Mikhail Gorbachev on January 21. Shortly before that, Mr Gorbachev had a meeting with Mr Sillari.

### Defining Role

Following the crackdown in Lithuania and Latvia, where the Army acted "at the request" of the local pro-Moscow communists, the independent Communist Party of Estonia has performed public relations work emphasizing its role in averting trouble in Estonia.

During this crisis, the party has been able to disseminate accurate information to Moscow, Mr Sillari told journalists after a four-hour meeting with communist leaders of Latvia and Lithuania in Tallinn on January 28. This is why the situation in Estonia is calmer than in the other Baltic states, he said.

"Breaking relations with Moscow would not be a wise move for the Estonian Communist Party right now," Mr Sillari said at the party's 21st congress in Tallinn on January 26. "The role of the Estonian Communist Party must be to influence development in the Soviet Communist Party in the direction of democratization," he said.

### Interfront Fights for the Union

91UN1446B Tallinn THE ESTONIAN  
INDEPENDENT in English 7 Feb 91 p 2

[Interview with Arnold Sai, one of the founders of the pro-Moscow Interfront, by Claes Delin of the Swedish News Agency and Bradley D. Woodworth of THE ESTONIAN INDEPENDENT on January 31: "Interfront Fights for the Union"]

[Text] *Arnold Sai is one of the founders of the pro-Moscow Interfront, a group that actively opposes Estonian independence. The three-year-old group claims about 150,000 supporters but this is impossible to confirm since there is no official membership.*

*Mr. Sai, an ethnic Estonian, was born in 1936 near the Siberian town of Omsk. An engineer by profession, Mr. Sai moved to Estonia in 1978 and is a deputy on the Tartu City Council.*

[photo caption: Arnold Sai: "Estonia is not capable of being independent."]

[Correspondent] What were the reasons for founding the Interfront?

[Sai] When the Popular Front was established in 1988, it was clear that it was to be an autocratic organization, and this put non-Estonians on their guard. Words like

"immigrant" and "invader," which insulted the non-Estonians, began to be used. So in August 1988 we began the Interfront.

In Estonia 80 percent of factory workers and nearly 90 percent of construction workers are Russians, and they have a lower standard of living than Estonians. Have you ever heard of a country in which the so-called "invaders" have a lower standard of living than the original inhabitants?

[Correspondent] What are the goals of the Interfront?

[Sai] The Estonian Supreme Soviet has passed legislation that infringes upon the rights of non-Estonians. What we want are equal rights for everyone living in Estonia.

One goal of the Interfront was to give the non-Estonians the chance to express their collective opinion. From the time the Popular Front took political power in Estonia, the Interfront has not been allowed to make its positions clear to everyone in Estonia, since the Popular Front has control of television, radio and newspapers. This is why we began broadcasts from our own radio station, Nadezhda.

[Correspondent] What is your vision of Estonia's future?

[Sai] We want Estonia to be a sovereign republic within the Soviet Union.

[Correspondent] Why don't you want Estonia to be independent?

[Sai] I don't think Estonia is capable of being independent. If you look at its history, you see that the 20 years it was independent shows that it can't be. It is practically impossible for Estonia to find an economic niche in international markets; it can't survive economically without the Soviet Union. Estonia was part of Russia for two hundred years, from 1721 until early this century. The best thing is for Estonia to be a nation within the Soviet Union.

The German barons who used to rule here said: "The Estonians are a savage and wild race." The Germans kept them under control with the whip.

[Correspondent] Do you mean that the Russians must keep the Estonians under control?

[Sai] I have lived among Russians and can say that they don't want to suppress any other nation. Russians are patient and are really very good people. To be convinced of this you need only look at Russian culture and read the works of the great Russian philosophers.

[Correspondent] What disagreements do you have with the current Estonian leadership?

[Sai] The popular Estonian nationalist movement is making use of Nazi and fascist principles, and minority groups are being oppressed.

[Correspondent] Do you think the Estonian government too is using these principles?

[Sai] Well, I can say the government is oppressing minorities by legislative means—by passing laws which discriminate against them. The laws on language, immigration, citizenship passed by local legislatures are clearly discriminatory. For example, to get a flat in Tallinn you must have lived in Estonia for 25 years.

Officers demobilized in Estonia can't find a place to live with their families. Quotas on resident permits are such that officers can't officially live with their wives and children with their parents.

Without resident permits people can't even get coupons for food, and so they are being denied the means of their own existence. These are clear examples of violations of human rights.

[Correspondent] Are you willing to use violence to achieve your aims?

[Sai] We are against violence and oppose the use of the Soviet military to solve political problems. We will always use political means only in pursuit of our goals.

The strikes held in Estonia in January were an extreme measure. Normally we are against strikes, but given the recent extraordinary situation, we felt this measure was necessary.

[Correspondent] How is it that what happened in Vilnius and Riga didn't happen here in Tallinn?

[Sai] The strikes we held here enabled us to keep things under control. We told people not to give in to provocations. However, provocations from the Estonian Home Guard continue against the Worker's Militia. Sentries at Army bases continue to be harassed by the Home Guard. We call for the Estonian government to take steps to control the situation. If we work together there won't be any bloodshed.

We can't be sure that what happened in Lithuania and Latvia won't be repeated here, but we will do all we can to avoid it. Only provocations from the Home Guard could cause that to occur here, or especially if the Army is provoked.

[Correspondent] What do you think about the Estonian referendum?

[Sai] We are against the future of Estonia being decided by a small clique of nationalists and we call for and support the all-Union referendum.

[Correspondent] Do you think Estonia will ever be able to be independent?

[Sai] Estonians are civilized people, but there are people in local parliaments that are under psychiatric care. This is one reason the Army is being provoked—it's being done by sick people.

It is the restraint of the Army that has kept things calm. This is what has saved Estonia from violence so far. If the Army is removed from Estonia, bloodshed will be the result. Different Estonian groups would immediately clash with one another. The Army is the guarantor of human rights.

It would be a catastrophe for Estonia to leave the Union. However, if the people really want to leave the Union, they have the constitutional right to do so, by a two-thirds majority vote.

\*Editor's note: According to the Estonian Statistics Department, as of January 1989, 55.4 percent of industrial workers and 39.3 percent of workers in the construction industry were non-Estonians.

### **Attempt To Reestablish Latvian Komsomol Focus of Controversy**

91UN1436A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH  
in Russian 20 Apr 91 p 1

[Reports prepared by column editor Andrey Vorontsov under the rubric "Party Life": "Young Successors Mature..."]

#### **[Text] Students and Pupils Union of the Latvian SSR**

The Students and Pupils Union of the Latvian SSR held its scheduled conference in the former House of Political Enlightenment of the Latvian Communist Party. The participating representatives from 18 schools, a total of 59 people, saw their main task as the rebirth of the Latvian Komsomol and the preservation of its best traditions. The meeting was sponsored by Latvian Communists, who not only provided financial support, but also helped ensure security for this event. In this regard, we would especially like to recognize Natalya Kiriienko, who introduced herself as an instructor of the Latvian CP Central Committee, whose vigilance during the conference ensured that no "agent" of the enemy Latvian Youth Union for Progress could sneak in. The communists hope that the youth of the Latvian SSR, headed by their recognized leader Comrade Timmermanis, will finally climb out of the trenches. Colleagues from the Lithuanian Komsomol also provided assistance in holding the above mentioned conference.

#### **Latvian Youth Union for Progress**

Having discovered the "splitting" activities of young Komsomol members from the Students and Pupils Union of the Latvian SSR, the SPML [Latvian Youth Union for Progress] leadership made the following statement:

"Starting this April, employees of the Latvian CP Central Committee, through the party apparatus, have redoubled their efforts to split the Latvian Youth Union for Progress and to create a Leninist Communist Youth League [LKSM] of Latvia. The republic center of the Lithuanian LKSM also participated in this work. Having

resolved all the problems besetting Lithuanian youth, the center employees visited the organizations of the Latvian Youth Union for Progress and financed the founding conference of the Latvian Komsomol.

"The Latvian Youth Union for Progress always supports the right of young people to create their own organizations that answer their varied points of view. We understand the Latvian Communist Party's interest in creating a youth organization that would work under its complete and immediate supervision. However, the Latvian Youth Union for Progress considers it absolutely inappropriate for the republic center of the Lithuanian LKSM to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign youth organization of another republic."

The reaction of the Lithuanian Komsomol members and the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee is not known at this point.

### **Vagnorius, Doguzhiyev View Progress of USSR-Lithuania Talks**

#### **Vagnorius Interview**

91UN1405A Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY  
VESTNIK in Russian No 14, Apr 91 pp 8-9

[Interview with Lithuanian Prime Minister G. Vagnorius by V. Zarovskiy in Vilnius; date not given: "We Need Honest Dialogue"]

[Text] [Zarovskiy] How would you describe present relations between Vilnius and Moscow?

[Vagnorius] Unfortunately, there are none. We have repeatedly sent telegrams to the center and tried to telephone the country's leadership but have been able to achieve nothing. We need to start talking. It is possible gradually to resolve all the problems, including military problems affecting the strategic interests of the USSR. There is no confrontation, but there is also no mutual understanding. If we fail to get talks started, tension will increase and the problem of Lithuania may assume another, not just regional, character.

[Zarovskiy] Many people both within the country and abroad link your appointment to the post of prime minister to changes in both the domestic and foreign policies pursued earlier by the K. Prunskiene cabinet.

[Vagnorius] That is not so. K. Prunskiene did not have a policy as such. There was confrontation between the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Council; you cannot have two policies in the one state, if we talk about Lithuania as a state. The more so since the program of reforms that the old cabinet was pursuing was drawn up in the parliament itself with our direct participation.

[Zarovskiy] Does this mean that you have full mutual understanding with the Supreme Council?

[Vagnorius] We are the executors of power and have to resolve state issues, while the parliament can support us or not.

[Zarovskiy] In connection with the price increases in Lithuania, can your cabinet not expect the same fate as the old government?

[Vagnorius] Prices must be raised. Everyone understands this. However, considerably more assets have been allocated for compensation for increased prices than in early January, and the prices are a little lower. In January, because of the lack of new wholesale and retail purchase prices the republic's budget deficit was 1.5 billion rubles [R]. We are trying to regulate income and expenditure in such a way that we can live according to our means. There is a budget—the first one formed independently in the postwar years. About half of it is made up of the subsidies and compensation for the production of and demand for food. They will become the first stage along the road to the market. Prices for other goods will be regulated and restricted by the maximum limit of profitability. We still cannot get by without enforced administrative methods. The total goods sold in the republic must correspond to the volume of wages.

[Zarovskiy] But the Union government is taking those same steps. Why does Lithuania not use the work done by the center?

[Vagnorius] In my opinion the work has not been done. We have been making preparations for the market for a long time. The parliament has issued a block of resolutions on the economy. Everything is ready to start up the market mechanism, but in order to avoid undesirable distortions in pricing we are prepared to participate in the work of the Union organs and commissions, and even somehow balance prices in the republic with prices in the country.

[Zarovskiy] What happens then with respect to Lithuania's sovereignty?

[Vagnorius] Over these past decades our economy has become so integrated with the economy of the USSR that talk about developing economic relations with the USSR is not serious. And indeed we are not talking about this at the state level! The links are not only in place, they are being expanded. And as for sovereignty... Well, you see, the countries of East Europe also depend on the USSR for raw materials. Of course, their position cannot be compared to ours, but they are nevertheless sovereign. Lithuania is interested in the Union market and its expansion. It is also possible to reach agreement on removing trade barriers, and on the free movement of the population. Introduction of our own Lithuanian currency also depends on the stability of the USSR's economic policy. The ruble should be the money. Moreover, if the center avoids further financial upheavals, the money in circulation decreases, and people's savings and interests are cared for, then we will not now alter the monetary unit, but everything is ready for this.

[Zarovskiy] Can your words be taken to mean that the border and customs services now being set up in Lithuania will not exist?

[Vagnorius] They will exist but not as they exist now with respect to, for example, Western countries. These services are essential to prevent the export or import of certain defined goods of which we have few, or whose sale would upset the price balance.

[Zarovskiy] But in recent additions to the republic's Penal Code there is an article "On Unlawful Crossing of the Border." The punishment envisaged is not small—several years of imprisonment, confiscation of property...

[Vagnorius] What it does not state there is that it is probably criminals who will be punished. Moreover, no timetable is set for putting the additions to the Code in force.

[Zarovskiy] Obviously at the planned talks not only the economic issues you are talking about will be dealt with but also problems pertaining to national relations within the republic.

[Vagnorius] Perhaps. The negotiations commission met recently and concluded that it is necessary first of all to hold consultative meetings between the two sides, that is, outline the range of problems for the first round of negotiation. But the issue of the army subunits that are still holding the television center, the television tower, the radio, and so forth in Vilnius is not one for negotiation. As far as the national minorities are concerned, we are prepared to refer those laws and decrees that affect their interests for examination by international organizations, and if they find that there are human rights violations, to amend them giving due consideration to their observations.

[Zarovskiy] Your position with respect to the "Eastern situation," as the USSR is often referred to in the Lithuanian parliament, is, in my view, very definite. What is preventing Lithuania from taking advantage of the law on secession from the USSR?

[Vagnorius] But Lithuania has never been a part of it. The leading world powers are also of the same opinion.

[Zarovskiy] But how can state independence be achieved when there is economic dependence?

[Vagnorius] If it becomes necessary Lithuania will survive alone. The issue lies elsewhere: What will this cost it? But I repeat that we are not in favor of breaking links with the USSR. We are even calling for the creation of a common market and the removal of economic barriers in our relations. Lithuania calls on the USSR for dialogue.

**Doguzhiyev Comments**

91UNI405B Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY  
VESTNIK in Russian No 14, Apr 91 pp 8-9

[Article by V. Doguzhiyev, first deputy prime minister of the USSR and head of the delegation to discuss a range of social and economic issues with the Lithuanian SSR: "Without Prior Conditions"]

[Text] Our position with respect to the talks with Lithuania remains the same—no prior conditions. If Lithuania sets the condition, for example, of the withdrawal of troops, then we can also set our own conditions: First, why is the USSR Constitution not being observed in the republic? Second, there must be a moratorium on all acts by the republic stemming from the declaration of 11 March last year as defined by the Congress of People's Deputies and presidential ukase. But we have been removing and removing conditions for one purpose, namely, to sit down at the negotiating table and try to find a solution to issues.

The Lithuanian side, however, is insisting that talks can start only when, as they put, "the buildings seized by Soviet troops are freed." But surely it has already been made clear that the center had no hand in those events—that is unambiguous! We have proposed that even this issue can be placed on the agenda. There was a telephone conversation with member of the Lithuanian delegation C. Stankevicius, who again raised this issue. I confirmed that we are prepared to start talks without any kind of prior conditions.

I have made no secret of the fact, nor do I now, that in the talks we are trying to convince the Lithuanian delegation, and perhaps the Lithuanian people, that it is not in their interests to secede from a renewed Union. Although I do understand that the aim of the Lithuanian delegation is the reverse—to achieve recognition of the fact of Lithuania's secession from the USSR. We say this: Let us sit down at the table and look into all disagreements and then reach a conclusion about what to do next. The more so since the entire subject matter of the talks was scheduled last year: human rights, the status of the Army, and other matters...

And then, seeing the reaction of the Lithuanian leadership to all our proposals, I ask this question: Does it want the talks? To judge from last year, it might be suggested that if we again set out on the road of consultations then no concrete advances will be made. But people expect concrete decisions from us.

The meeting that took place on 27 February and was attended by several representatives from Lithuania led by C. Stankevicius unfortunately also failed to move us forward to the start of talks.

We can make endless references to the historical and legal interpretation of particular events, but we are only

wasting time, but if we start the talks we could discuss them from the start in expert commissions, and then at the level of the delegations.

A strange situation has taken shape: The Union has not excluded Lithuania from the system of material-technical supply, but Lithuania is making no contributions to the Union fund and is not signing any agreement to do so. Is this fair to the other republics? Moreover, the interests of enterprises of Union subordination located on the territory of Lithuania are being systematically encroached upon. This should also evidently be a subject at the talks.

And it is necessary to consider the fate of the people. If they want what is good for people it is necessary not just to say this but to act in a way that will not make things worse for them. The republic leadership believes that Lithuania can survive alone, without links with the Union. Perhaps, probably, but how will its people live? For Lithuania's imports exceed its exports. If mutual deliveries are made at world prices then the difference could become overwhelming for an isolated Lithuania. As indeed it would for the other Baltic republics. And so it cannot be said that these republics could survive without economic links with the Union.

This would be the position: Here, we are seceding from the Union; you agree to this and we will talk. What would there be to talk about? We already have a law on procedure for secession from the Union.

And what about their side? We do not even receive responses to our proposals. I telephoned Vilnius and a telegram arrived, signed by V. Landsbergis—they are sending a delegation again for agreements. Again there are no talks. And again, round in a circle. A telegram from Lithuanian Prime Minister G. Vagnorius states that he is unclear about the powers of our delegation and the aim of future talks... And of course, the "buildings in Vilnius seized by the Soviet side." And again a working group is sent for preliminary clarification... The impression is being created that they like obstacles.

In a telephone conversation C. Stankevicius stated this: Well, how can we hold talks when troops have seized a number of buildings—you are pressuring us. I told him once again: If we had not wanted talks we would have imposed the condition that a moratorium be introduced and that all actions at variance with the USSR Constitution be halted, and then we would again engage in a lengthy "tug-of-war." But we are not doing that. We are open to dialogue.

As far as the status of our delegation is concerned, it is the successor to the earlier one and its powers were defined last year in a presidential ukase. The aims of the talks have been clearly set forth.

Our position is this: Talks should start in the very near future. And if necessary, the working groups could meet two or three days before the talks in order to refresh themselves with respect to the initial material that has

already been prepared. And since we agreed last year that the next meeting would signify the start of official talks, that is what we should do. Once the talks are under way, introduce a moratorium on legislative acts that are at variance with Union law.

The talks should be held in Moscow but the groups of experts can work both here at the center and in Vilnius.

We have proposed that we sit down at the table on 26 March, but have received no response. This means that we shall be ready to work. Postponing the dialogue is in the interests of neither side.

#### As The Issue Was Being Typeset

It became known before this issue went to press that Moscow has again proposed to Vilnius that they start the talks, this time on 4 or 5 April 1991.

The ball is in the Lithuanian court.

#### USSR: Young Political Group Explains Position

LD0805231391

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian at 1110 GMT on 8 May carries a 60-minute recorded interview with three prominent members of the youngest Lithuanian political group, the Forum of the Future of Lithuania. They are Krescensijus Stokus, Kestutis Jeskelevicius, and Rimantas Karazija. These people are well-known figures in Lithuania, but are not identified as they speak.

The first question is: "What is this Forum of the Future? Is it a rising new party, or is it a new Sajudis, its alternative? How can you describe it?"

Answering the question, the participants say: "The birth of this forum is an attempt to slow down—if this can be done—or at least to influence the process of division in the society, which in our point of view is very pernicious. The division poses the threat of a new Karabakh. We realized this a long time ago and think that the situation has not improved."

The presenter asks if the new political group will be registered, to which a positive answer is given. Then a question is raised about the forum contributing to the acceleration of the process of a division in society, even though it claims that the objective of the group is just the opposite. One of the participants says that right from the start the group did not want to be a severe opposition. He says: "We proposed to hold dialogues, discussions, and talks" and that many conflicts could be given as examples of things that are unnecessary, like the conflict between the government and the parliament or the conflict between the government and the farmers' union. He adds: "You know when the conflicts with the military began and you know what rallies had been organized. Who did they serve? Who needed them? Who needed the demonstration at the military townlet? All this surprised us. We could not find any explanation for all of this."

Following this, he says that now "it is clear that this situation is obviously perilous; therefore, the most radical opponents must try to come together. We are trying to be the mediators in these meetings. However, we are not succeeding in this."

The speaker says that instead the group is being labeled as communists because some of the participants in the group are former members of the CPSU. He says that "the enemy must be destroyed and the opponents must be persuaded; therefore looking for enemies presupposes that the Lithuanian Future Forum must be destroyed. In what sense? To drive them out of the society or to make them emigrate? How many people would have to emigrate from Lithuania? I am not sure if anyone would be left here in Lithuania."

Another speaker says: "The Forum of the Future stands for an independent Lithuania. The Future Forum is not on the other side of the barricades. We are supporting Lithuania. However, while setting up an independent democratic Lithuania, the opinion of the majority must be taken into consideration. We want to have a dialogue among all political forces of Lithuania so that only one opinion will not prevail."

Another participant says: "We have the impression that today those who are in power would like very much to push us over to the other side of the barricades. I would like to assure them that they will not succeed. We will be on the side of the barricade on which all Lithuania is." He adds that attacks on their new political group in the press have no basis and accusations are unfounded. He says that the outline of the activity of the Lithuanian Future Forum was published in the newspaper TIESA on 24 April and that the program of the Forum is being prepared. One of the participants notes: "The fact that information on the conference of the Forum of the Future brought by Lithuanian CPSU members who were present at the conference to the television of the Lithuanian Communist Party," means that "forces hostile to Lithuania are happy that a force is emerging to oppose the government and the parliament, but this is a one-sided look at it."

The participants then answer listeners' phone-in questions.

#### USSR: Lithuanian Polish Region Coordinating Council Meets

LD0905074291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1900 GMT 8 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Kazys Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius, 8 May (TASS)—The congress of deputies of all levels from Wilno region [Vilenskiy kray] will be continued on 22 May in the town of Salcininkay. This decision was adopted today at a sitting of the coordinating council on the formation of a Wilno Polish national-territorial region that was held in Vilnius Rayon.

At the previous stage of the congress, held in October last year, the deputies adopted a decision to create a Polish autonomous region inside Lithuania. This was seen within the republic as "an attack on integrity and sovereignty" and as "the schemings of Moscow". Parliament, however, has still not expressed its official viewpoint, although it has been provided with material from the congress. The coordinating council therefore decided to assume responsibility for tackling the region's substantial problems.

Today, those attending the session largely approved the prepared draft statute—a kind of fundamental law for the autonomous region. After sharp discussion, the members of the council agreed that a draft document will be submitted to the congress which, if adopted, will legitimize the Sejm of a Polish autonomous entity.

It [the Sejm] will also possess legislative powers: the region will have its own law-enforcement and court system. The question of the status of languages is a painful one in the region: approval has been given to a formulation that makes "Polish and Russian equal with the state language, Lithuanian, on the territory of Wilno region".

The session endorsed the agenda for the next stage of the congress: it is planned to hear and discuss a report on the political situation, and to endorse the statute of the autonomous region, as well as its flag and emblem.

### **Vilnius Mayor Discusses City's Problems, Damage From January Events**

91UNI420A Vilnius VECHERNIYE NOVOSTI  
in Russian 13 Feb 91 p 1

[Interview with V. Bernatonis, mayor of Vilnius, by L. Valaitis, correspondent: "Vilnius Is Working; Vilnius Is Holding Out!"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Did you anticipate that your very first winter in this new post would turn out to be so difficult for you?

[V. Bernatonis] Well, I wasn't looking for a soft life or an easy time. I knew what I was getting into, and I was ready for anything. All the more so in that the beginning of my work in the office of mayor coincided with the economic blockade. But what the paratroops did recently is hard to reconcile with common sense. I wouldn't be surprised if the inhabitants of Vilnius now proceed to put a second lock on their doors and, when the doorbell rings, the first thing they do is look through the "peephole." The main thing now is a steadfast determination and a readiness to engage in day-to-day but serious work.

[Correspondent] What are the principal problems which you are now encountering? Will the city's economy be able to function normally under these extreme conditions?

[V. Bernatonis] The chief difficulty is that the budget is cracking at the seams. We have absolutely no currency suitable for use in foreign exchange. And that means that the municipal transport system will not obtain any spare parts from Czechoslovakia or Hungary. At any time some buses and streetcars could become inoperable. Furthermore, certain municipal services could also come to a halt.

But, in general, our service employees have continued to work hard. And if someone telephones me from some place or other and informs me that the faucet pressure on the fifth or ninth floor is not what it should be, that's not such a terrible disaster.

[Correspondent] As you know, the rayispolkoms have been disbanded, and in their place new structures entitled "Seniunai" [Councils of Elders] have been set up. Was this action justified?

[V. Bernatonis] Nineteen of the twenty Seniunai are already functioning. Despite the lack of experience in organizing such administrative units, no particularly serious mistakes have been allowed to occur. I can boldly assert that this decision was a correct one.

[Correspondent] What is being done to eliminate the social consequences of the Soviet military incursion?

[V. Bernatonis] For starters let me say that the damage done was colossal. In the capital's municipal economy alone it amounts to three million rubles. The full scope of these consequences will be revealed in the springtime, when the snow has disappeared. In the meantime, we have established a committee of deputies to eliminate these consequences. It includes competent specialists in various fields. They have already set to work on this matter.

[Correspondent] On 1 February an order by USSR Minister of Defense Yazov and USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Pugo was supposed to take effect concerning patrol activities in the republic-level capitals and other major cities. How do you assess this document?

[V. Bernatonis] Very negatively. The Vilnius Police will not go on joint patrols with the army. We don't need the army's services. The inhabitants of Vilnius have already succeeded in getting convincing evidence of its "humane" purposes or goals. Recently I was returning home late one evening (this was at approximately 2300 hours), when a military patrol came out onto the road. I told the driver: "No matter what happens, step on the gas!" This time we were in luck. They didn't start shooting at us. But, you know, our lives were hanging by a single hair. Things could have come to an abrupt end the way they did in the case of Jonas Tautkus.

[Correspondent] What, in particular, would you like to draw the attention of the city's inhabitants to nowadays?

[V. Bernatonis] Be careful, be on your guard against strangers, and avoid conflicts. If you are stopped to be searched, demand that these people show you documents

giving them the right to search you. Inform the police concerning every such incident. But the main thing is to work better than usual, and don't lose faith that we will achieve our goal.

[L. Vatainis] Thanks for your good words of advice.

### RSFSR

#### **'Nothing Unusual' in Russian CP Leaders' Army Contacts**

PM0705112191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 7 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with I.K. Polozkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party Central Committee, by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent (name illegible); date, place not given: "The Week Turned Out Troubled"]

[Text] [SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] Ivan Kuzmich, another week has passed, and we put the traditional question to you: Which recent events strike you as most remarkable? Bearing in mind that this period has also included holidays.

[Polozkov] So let us begin with the holiday. It did not turn out festive, which is understandable, because the people's mood today is not very uplifted and they have too many cares. And yet it is the day of worker solidarity, and its traditions run deep. Party committees sought to impart a businesslike, responsible, constructive nature to the holiday. But in some places—in Moscow, for example—exclusively critical slogans against the authorities predominated. These are grounds for very serious reflection. It is hardly possible to achieve the desired improvements by gambling on confrontation between workers' collectives and state organs.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] Many people in Russia are alarmed at the further exacerbation of the situation in the Transcaucasus.

[Polozkov] Yes, a real war has flared up between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is the result of actions by extremist, nationalist circles, which make use of the fact that law and order and respect for the laws have been weakened. We are particularly concerned at the fact that malicious attacks are leveled at communists who advocate the preservation of the traditional friendship and cooperation between the two fraternal peoples. It has just been reported that the local authorities in Armenia have sealed all the premises occupied by the republic Communist Party and are not letting communists in. Such illegal actions arouse indignation.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] The first candidates for the post of president of Russia were nominated recently.

[Polozkov] Yes, a very important political process has begun. The names of people who might aspire to the top

state posts in the republic are already being discussed in labor collectives. They include Bakatin, Voronin, Goryacheva, Gromov, Gubenko, Yeltsin, Zhirinovskiy, Ryzhkov, and others. Russia really is rich in capable, talented people. There will be people from whom to choose a worthy president and vice president. I am very keen that Russians do not make the wrong choice. Because it largely determines the republic's future and the way every family will live.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] Whom will the Russian Communist Party support in the presidential election?

[Polozkov] The candidate who advances the most realistic program for improving life in Russia, who is really capable of achieving peace, concord, well-being, and good for the Russians and who regards concern for the individual as of paramount importance.

[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA] And the final question: There are rumors about some mysterious meeting 30 April between you and leading Defense Ministry personnel. What is behind this?

[Polozkov] There was nothing unusual in that meeting. Representatives of our party's leadership constantly visit military collectives and have contact with soldiers, officers, and generals. I must say that these are always good, warm meetings. The Armed Forces are the flower and pride of our society, and those who serve in them are people of high duty and are cultured, ardent patriots. There are hundreds of thousands of communists in the Army. And, understandably, we are very interested in the life of military units, the problems they encounter, and their everyday cares. Servicemen for their part have many questions to put to us. And at the last meeting we talked about the results of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission plenum and about the chief tasks in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party's activity. I was able to see for myself once again that Army workers well understand the present situation.

#### **Decline of Local Party in Kuzbass Viewed**

91UN1378A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Apr 91  
First Edition p 2

[Report on interview with A.A. Filatov, first secretary of the Leninsk-Kuznetsk Gorkom, by PRAVDA correspondent S. Vtorushin: "To Believe in the Future"; date note given]

[Text] Kemerovo Oblast—Aleksandr Alekseyevich Filatov became the first secretary of the Leninsk-Kuznetsk Gorkom [City Party Committee] a year ago. Before that he was in charge of the mine engineering inspection center. He came there from the Polysayevskaya mine where he spent 17 years of his life; there he went all the way from metalworker to manager. Filatov is well known in the city, he enjoys the respect even of those people who do not hide their animosity toward the CPSU.

He and I met during a time which is distressing for everyone in the Kuzbass. The strike has spread to more than half of the coal mining facilities. In Leninsk-Kuznetsk no work was going on at ten shaft mines and a strip mine, which produce about 18 million tons of coal a year. This circumstance has affected the entire socio-political situation in the city.

"Is it hard to be the first secretary of the party gorkom at such a time?" I asked him.

[Filatov] It is very hard. There have been many changes in our country lately. Since the party used to be the guiding and directing force in our society, it is being held entirely responsible for all our troubles and problems. Not everybody can take this. Since late 1989 and to date, our city party organization has shrunk from 11,800 people down to 6,000.

The workers movement in the Kuzbass fell under the control of the opposition which managed to drag the miners into a strike, the likes of which have not been seen before in the history of our country. This strike puts the strikers themselves on the verge of economic ruin and it is not far away either. When our people reach the end of their tether they are going to ask who is to blame for all this. Somebody will prompt them to blame it all on the president or on the central government. They will also start looking for the guilty parties among party officials, even though the majority of them have been replaced in most places.

[Vtorushin] How do communists act in such a situation?

[Filatov] With considerable lack of self-confidence. At the mines their voice is practically not heard. At the last city conference they refused to participate in the city newspaper which until then was the organ of the party gorkom and of the city soviet. But it is very difficult for a party organization to work without its own press.

All mines are conducting rallies in which they demand the removal of party committees from enterprises. Communists sit at these meetings and say nothing. As a result of this the party committees have had to leave practically all the mines at the insistence of the workers committees. Communists are constantly feeling pressure from the workers committees as well as from workers who are extremists. In some teams they are told openly: If you are a communist you have to leave our team. Unfortunately, there are few people among the communists who can say: My views are my own business and I am going to stick to them to the end. At the Polysayevskaya mine the workers conference decided to compute the losses allegedly caused by the party organization during its entire existence and they wanted to get compensation for them. They were talking about the construction of the party office, the lease of party committee premises, etc.

This year the city party organization did not receive a single new member. What is more, the managers of the 7 November mine and of the mine imeni Kirov and the manager of the Krasnyy Oktyabr plant left the party.

We find it difficult to hold a meeting now. First, we do not have a place for it. Workers conferences have stopped us from using any premises that belong to the mines, including houses of culture. We tried to hold a party meeting for the communists of the Polysayevskaya mine in the gorkom building. Of the 118 people who are on record as members of the party organization only 45 showed up. It is not so much that the people feel demoralized, as they are disappointed in life, in the situation in the country, and in the outlook for the future. They are yielding to apathy more and more.

[Vtorushin] What can we do? We cannot put up with this situation.

[Filatov] If I knew what to do, the situation would be different. I am not a theoretician. I would like to be smart but I have to deal with reality.

Another wave of quitting the party has started now. People were provoked to this by the price increase. Should we be finding justifications for this increase? All the problems related to this are being addressed primarily to us, to the raykoms, [rayon party committees], gorkoms, and local soviets, and not just to the Central Committee or to the government. We have no rationale allowing us to justify what has happened. The compensation that was promised to us cannot cover even a small portion of the increased expenses of any family.

In order to consolidate our society we need to have a concept capable of uniting the people and of endowing them with a belief in their future. As I read the speeches of our current leaders, one thing recurs constantly: We must, we must, we must. We must do this, or that, or another. But nobody tells us how to do it. Nobody believes in such programs any more.

I think that at the CPSU Central Committee plenum it should be stated clearly and precisely what we want, where we are heading, and how we mean to overcome the crisis. If our people support us it will mean that a process of renewal will start in the party. I personally want very much to believe in such an outcome because any other result will only cause more disappointment, more uncertainty, and may lead the party to even bigger losses.

## Western Republics

### Moldovan Decree on Normalizing Situation in Republic

91UN1472A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 30 Apr 91 pp 1-2

[Decree of USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities: "On Ways To Achieve Consensus With Regard To Normalizing the Situation in the Moldovan SSR"]

[Text] Having listened to and discussed the report by Comrade G.N. Kisilev, leader of the group of USSR people's deputies which went to the Moldovan SSR in

order to study the situation there, the Council of Nationalities notes that, in accordance with the Ukase issued by the President of the USSR: "On Measures for Normalizing the Situation in the Moldovan SSR," certain measures were undertaken within this republic for the purpose of stabilizing the situation and reducing tension in interethnic relations. In the very near future it is intended to revise the decree of this republic's Supreme Soviet regarding the functioning of languages on its territory.

At the same time, nevertheless, the execution of the Ukase's principal provisions is being delayed under various pretexts. Up to now we have not abrogated a number of legislative acts which infringe upon the rights of the non-Moldavian population; we have retained the procedure of putting into force legislative acts of the USSR only after they have been ratified by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet. Unconstitutional organs of the Dnestr and Gagauz Republics have continued to function, and the powers of several deputies to Moldova's parliament from these regions have not yet been restored.

The demarcation, i.e., fractionation, of this republic's population has intensified, and various views of the Moldovan SSR's further development are possible. In contrast to the "line" taken by the official authorities regarding the attainment of full sovereignty and state independence, most of the inhabitants of the Dnestr and Gagauz regions do not picture or conceive their own future outside the borders of the USSR. As the chief conditions for a national consensus or accord, they have set forth demands that this republic's parliament and leadership reject the approval of Moldova's unlawful inclusion within the body of the USSR, as well as the official affirmation of this republic's participation in the new Union Treaty, the abrogation of legislative acts which infringe upon the rights of the population of other nationalities or ethnic groups, and likewise taking its interests into account when preparing new laws.

Taking into consideration the destructive nature of the ongoing opposition between various social forces of the Moldovan SSR and the threat to the preservation of its integrity, the Council of Nationalities hereby **DECREES** that the following actions be undertaken:

1. Address a call or appeal to the President, Supreme Soviet, and peoples of the Moldavian for a national consensus and a constructive dialogue, based on the existence of laws for the purpose of preserving this republic's integrity within a renewed or renovated USSR.

Propose to the leadership of the Moldovan SSR and the leaders of the opposition forces that they proceed immediately to negotiations on working out compromise solutions.

2. Call upon the population and political leaders of the Dnestr and Gagauz regions to declare a moratorium on any actions leading to a split-up of the Moldovan SSR,

and calling upon Moldova's President and Parliament to deactivate those previously passed legislative acts which infringe upon the rights of the population of non-Moldavian nationality.

3. In order to perform intermediary, peacemaking functions and to maintain regular ties with people's deputies, the Moldovan SSR should approve and confirm the standing—i.e., permanently acting—group of USSR people's deputies headed by Comrade S.V. Pilnikov.

4. Propose that the USSR Council of Ministers form and send to this republic a working group consisting of representatives of law-enforcement, financial, and economic organs of the USSR. They would be assigned the task of examining and considering specific problems in the localities involved, as well as the claims being made against the central organs of administration.

5. The task of monitoring the execution of the present Decree shall be assigned to the Council of Nationalities' Commission for Nationality Policy and Interethnic Relations.

R. Nishanov, chairman,  
Council of Nationalities.  
Moscow, The Kremlin.  
26 April 1991.

### Moldovan Communist Party Ousts Dissenters

91UN1482A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian  
11 Apr 91 p 2

[Report by unidentified SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent: "Dissenters Expelled From the Party"]

[Text] Kishinev, 10 April—A founding conference of representatives of the Democratic Platform of the Communist Party of Moldova took place. About 150 delegates discussed the Democratic Platform program and some organizational issues.

Now it is clear that it was not the Democratic Platform organizers' task to search for the truth. The separation of the new movement from the communist ranks is related to something else. During the last few months the Communist Party of Moldova has started to play a more active role in the sociopolitical life of the republic. The authority of the communist group in the Moldovan parliament has increased. This definitely does not suit certain circles in Kishinev. Thus, the idea was that the creation of the Democratic Platform would discredit the Communist Party of Moldova, split its ranks, and smear its activities. It is no accident that such a figure as A. Grezhderu, editor of the weekly FAKEL who long ago lost both the moral and formal right to call himself a Communist, turned out to be at the helm of the Democratic Platform. He and a number of like leaders are conducting an unrestrained anticommunist, anti-Soviet, and anti-Russian campaign. The reason they suddenly remembered their membership in the Communist Party of Moldova is that this way they could cover their true

essence and deceive the gullible. However, the Communist Party of Moldova Control and Inspection Commission, albeit belatedly, formulated a principled appraisal of these Democratic Platform leaders and expelled them from the ranks of the Communist Party.

The ripples from the separatist actions are not so harmless, however. The Democratic Platform did lead away a group, a small one, of Communists under the cover of slogans about patriotism and real sovereignty for the republic.

There is also a great danger that the Democratic Platform will concentrate its activities on squabbles, thus distracting communist forces from parliamentary work. It is no accident that one of the members of the founding committee of the new movement is V. Pushkash, deputy chairman of the Moldovan Supreme Soviet, who long ago lost his ties to the Communist Party of Moldova.

#### **Hungarian Consul General on Relations With Ukraine**

91UF0662A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA  
in Russian 19 Mar 91 p 3

[Interview with Hungarian Consul General Andrash Paldi by V. Kulakova under the rubric: "Timely Interview: Ukraine-Hungary-Ukraine"]

[Text]

#### **Hungarian Republic Consul General to Kiev Andrash Paldi answers KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA's questions**

Andrash Paldi was born in 1927 in a village to a peasant family. After graduation from middle school, he studied economic sciences at a university in Budapest. After receiving his diploma, he taught in one of the university's departments and then worked on the Council of Ministers Secretariat staff. He was a Gosplan associate for more than 10 years and after that he became an advisor to the Hungarian Government Mission under CMEA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance].

From 1978 to 1982, he was an advisor to the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow and was involved with economic cooperation issues of the two countries. After returning to the homeland, he headed the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] economic policy main department until his designation as Consul General to Kiev in 1986.

In the 1970's, Andrash Paldi wrote a book about the USSR economic management system and he is a candidate of economic sciences. His wife also works in the MID and she is an historian and archivist. His son is a research biologist. His daughter is an economist.

Andrash Paldi is a grandfather with four grandchildren.

[Kulakova] How do you regard perestroika in the USSR?

[Paldi] The proclamation of perestroika four-five years ago was loudly heard both in the Soviet Union and abroad. With the rapid collapse of the "uskoreniye" slogan in 1985, perestroika offered hope to those who thought radical change not only of the Soviet economy but also of the ossified socio-political system was necessary.

In my opinion, the trouble was that no one knew exactly what it was a question of. During and after the Brezhnev era of stagnation, many people realized that the old way of building socialism was already no longer suitable, economic methods were ineffective, and the state was increasingly lagging behind Western countries while at the same time the political system was still insufficiently democratic to provide the possibility for development of man's own capabilities. The proclamation of perestroika and the principles of glasnost and democracy aroused hope. Alas, there was no concept or program behind the slogans and they rapidly became hollow and each person understood them the way he wanted to. The ideas of perestroika soon began to lose their mobilizing force.

Is it not surprising that today people argue about whether the goals of perestroika have been implemented or if the period of perestroika has already ended?

In my opinion, the state's political and economic development has already long ago passed perestroika's initial goals which strived to make the economy more efficient within the framework of the old political system and through glasnost to just improve the political atmosphere. However, today building a pluralistic system (a multiparty system) and creation of conditions for a market economy are on the agenda. And this is already not perestroika but a much broader concept.

[Kulakova] What can you say about Ukraine? Has your perception of it coincided with what you have actually seen?

[Paldi] When I received my assignment to work in Kiev, I knew where I was going. While working at the embassy in Moscow, I visited Ukraine. Therefore, I did not encounter any surprises when I arrived in Kiev. However, there were a few surprises a bit later, both positive as well as negative.

I arrived at the end of 1986 after the Chernobyl disaster. And I was surprised to see that both we and the city's residents practically knew very little about what had occurred, about radiation protection techniques, etc. At that time I had to summon scientists from Budapest to calm the members of the Hungarian colony, first of all families with children.

Later when the Ukrainian Union of Writers began to sound the alarm with regard to the need to increase the role of the Ukrainian language, the development of Ukrainian culture, and the rebirth of Ukrainians' national consciousness, I perceived this as an entirely normal matter. What was surprising was the fact that letters and articles began to appear on the pages of

newspapers one after the other which hung the label of nationalism on this movement and speeches were heard against the Ukrainian language. I met people among the Ukrainians I knew who thought that the campaign of national revival was superfluous and even harmful, and in so doing said: "Does it matter what nationality I am or what language I speak?" If I did not live in Ukraine and I myself had not heard these conversations, I would not have believed that they had occurred. Nations one hundred times smaller than Ukraine are fighting for their national identity. Does it turn out that the Ukrainian people are an exception?

A pleasant surprise has been the fact that in Ukraine I have always felt and feel a lively interest and good will toward Hungary. Events in Hungary, the peaceful course of changes in the social system, the choices of a multi-party foundation and the struggle for a new, democratic government in the sphere of forming the new system have been carefully followed here. My interlocutors have often stressed: Soviet perestroika has very positively impacted Eastern European changes but at the same time we must not forget that the peaceful transition in Hungary, for its part, had a strong impact on changes in the Soviet Union.

It is very pleasant to also recall those days when Hungarian Republic President Arpad Goncz visited Kiev at the invitation of UkSSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Leonid Kravchuk. This visit, along with the customary joint statement, is evidence of the fact that Hungary is interested in the restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty and in comprehensive cooperation between the two neighboring countries.

[Kulakova] What can you say about Ukraine's and Hungary's prospects for cooperation, do these contacts have a future?

[Paldi] Direct cooperation between Ukraine and Hungary is only now beginning to develop. Until the present time, as we all know, practically all contacts could exist only through Moscow. Although in 1982 at Hungary's request, your central government authorized Ukrainian and Hungarian enterprises to establish direct ties but they did not receive either sufficient independence, rights, or money to do this. Today these restrictions have disappeared to a great degree but now the economic crisis, the shortage of goods, and initial difficulties of the transition to payments in dollars are impeding the growth of economic ties.

Our political contacts are developing very well. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet adopted a Declaration on Sovereignty in July and already in August we met Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Zlenko in Budapest who arrived at the invitation of the Hungarian government. Hungary was the first country that a member of your government visited. The head of our state also was the first to arrive in Kiev on an official visit after adoption of the Declaration. Since that time,

the two ministries of foreign affairs have closely cooperated with each other, the development of several documents is ongoing, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Geza Jeszenszky will arrive in Kiev in the near future at the invitation of the Ukrainian side. I think that after this I will be able to state that Ukrainian-Hungarian ties have a very promising future.

[Kulakova] Ukraine as a subject of international law. In your opinion, is it legitimate to pose the question in this way?

[Paldi] Let us look at the facts. Until now, the Government of the USSR has not recognized the Declaration on Sovereignty of Ukraine. Therefore, are we not surprised by the fact that for now the Western powers also do not consider the Ukrainian government to be the government of a sovereign state but Ukraine is a subject of international law. The situation is also contradictory since at the same time Ukraine is a member of the UN. However, we need to see that the unsettled state and instability of relations within the Soviet Union itself are reflected in this international political distorting mirror.

I also think that Ukraine's aspiration to become a participant in international political life is natural. Everything depends on what the content of the Union Treaty being concluded will be.

[Kulakova] How settled is the Consul General's lifestyle and do you feel at home in Kiev?

[Paldi] The life of the Consul General and the Hungarian Trade Mission in Kiev is organized and our living conditions are good for the most part. But just for the most part because unfortunately concerns and difficulties multiply with every passing day. Here are just some of them: for two years now, the trade mission has not been able to obtain a building with suitable conditions for work; cars of representatives of firms are regularly broken into and we are attempting to broaden the Consulate General's contacts. After the previously mentioned visit of our president, the number of Consulate General diplomats was increased from three to four people but we have simply not been able to obtain an apartment for our new associate.

Unfortunately working conditions are also not improving but worsening. Bureaucratic obstacles are always increasing. The cashier at the consulate had a mass of problems with coupons and with the exchange of 50 and 100 ruble notes which would not have occurred if the local authorities did not forget about the diplomatic status of foreign states' missions. Today we already cannot use automobiles when necessary (we often have to drive to other oblasts at great distances) since we cannot obtain gasoline ration coupons.

I do not want to organize a complaints day on the pages of the newspaper but you yourself asked me about this. And if I nevertheless feel good in Kiev then that is because those partners with whom we meet in the parliament and in ministries and other institutions

during the course of our activities are always cheerful and sincerely ready to help. Therefore I think our cooperation is effective and useful for both peoples. Besides, I know that the enumerated difficulties have not arisen due to specific bureaucrats and therefore I hope that these problems will also be resolved with time.

### Caucasus

#### Armenian Law on Republic Referendums

91US0493A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian  
9 Apr 91 p 3

[Armenian Republic Law: "On an Armenian Republic Referendum"]

[Text]

#### Section 1. General Provisions

##### Article 1. The Concept of a Referendum

In the Armenian Republic the people shall exercise their power either directly or through their representative organs.

A referendum (i.e., a nationwide vote) is a means by which the people can exercise their power directly—to decide the most important questions of state life, to adopt laws or decrees for the Armenian Republic, or to reveal public opinion.

##### Article 2. Principles of Conducting a Referendum

A referendum shall be conducted on the basis of a free exercise of universal, free, and direct suffrage, with secret balloting. Citizens of the Armenian Republic shall take part in a referendum directly. Each citizen shall have one vote.

During the course of the entire process of conducting a referendum glasnost and public participation shall be guaranteed and provided for.

A referendum shall be conducted on the entire territory of the Armenian Republic.

In case of necessity, a referendum can be conducted on separate territories of the Armenian Republic.

##### Article 3. The Right To Participate in a Referendum

The right to participate in a referendum shall be possessed by those citizens of the Armenian Republic who have reached the age of 18 prior to or on the day when the referendum is to be conducted, who are permanent residents on the territory of the Armenian Republic at the time when the decision to conduct the referendum is adopted.

No direct or indirect restriction whatsoever shall be allowed on the right to participate in a referendum; such restrictions shall be punished in accordance with the law.

But a referendum shall not be participated in by mentally ill or mentally deficient citizens, persons deemed incompetent by a court, or those being held by sentences in places of incarceration.

##### Article 4. Questions To Be Decided by a Referendum

The following items may be decided by a referendum:

questions relating to changing the status of the Armenian Republic;

the adoption of laws for the Armenian Republic or other decisions;

questions concerning abrogating the Law of the Armenian Republic, or its individual provisions [i.e., statutes], or making amendments to it;

the adoption of decisions predetermining the fundamental content of the laws of the Armenian Republic or other acts;

revealing public opinion with regard to important issues of state life.

What cannot be put on a referendum are questions concerning the borders of the Armenian Republic, the republic's defense and security, the safeguarding and preservation of public order, measures to protect the health and safety of our citizens, and the performance or execution of obligations stemming from international treaties concluded by the Armenian Republic.

##### Article 5. The Right To Schedule a Referendum

The right to schedule a referendum shall belong to the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic.

##### Article 6. Financing and Materially Providing for a Referendum

The expenses connected with preparing and conducting a referendum shall be borne and handled by the state.

Enterprises, institutions, and organizations, as well as state and public organs, shall grant referendum commissions the areas, rooms, and equipment necessary for preparing and conducting a referendum.

##### Article 7. Legislation Concerning a Referendum

The legislation concerning a referendum shall consist of the present Law, as well as the Constitution of the Armenian Republic, the laws of the Armenian Republic entitled: "On Elections of People's Deputies of the Armenian Republic," "On Elections of People's Deputies of the Local Soviets of the Armenian Republic," and other laws of the Armenian Republic insofar as they do not contradict or are in conflict with the present Law.

##### Article 8. Responsibility for Violating a Referendum

Persons who hinder by means of force, violence, deceit, threats, or otherwise the free exercise of an Armenian Republic citizen's right to participate in a referendum or

to campaign, as well as members of referendum commissions, officials of state or public organs, members of an initiative group, persons engaged in collecting signatures, forging referendum documents, knowingly making a false tally of the votes, violating the principle of secret balloting, or permitting other violations of the present Law, shall bear the responsibility stipulated by the law.

## **Section 2. Preparing and Conducting a Referendum**

### **Article 9. The Initiative for Conducting a Referendum**

The initiative for conducting a referendum shall be possessed by the following:

citizens of the Armenian Republic;

the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic.

The initiative belonging to citizens of the Armenian Republic shall be implemented if they collect at least 200,000 signatures of citizens demanding or requesting that a referendum be conducted. These must be citizens who themselves have the right to participate in a referendum.

### **Section 10. An Initiative Group for Conducting a Referendum**

In case citizens come up with an initiative for conducting a referendum, they shall form an initiative group for conducting a referendum. The list of the initiative group shall register the last name, first name, patronymic, and place of residence of each member of the group. The question to be submitted to a referendum shall be formulated by the initiative group in such a way as to enable an unambiguous answer to be given to it.

In order to register the question to be submitted to a referendum, the initiative group shall turn to the Central Referendum Commission of the Armenian Republic. The formulation of the question to be submitted to a referendum can be clarified by editing with the consent of the initiative group.

The Central Referendum Commission shall register all the members of the initiative group and the question to be submitted to a referendum, taking into account the conclusions arrived at by the appropriate commission of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic. Information about this—along with the address to which the lists of signatures must be sent—shall be published in the daily newspaper AYASTANI ANRAPETUTKI.

The question being proposed for a referendum shall be included on the lists of signatures.

No later than a month's time after having turned to the Central Referendum Commission, an initiative group shall be granted or issued a certificate of registration.

A registration can be rejected or refused only in case Articles 4 and 9 of the present Law are violated.

A refusal to register can be appealed by an initiative referendum group to the Supreme Court of the Armenian Republic.

### **Article 11. Procedure and Time Periods for Collecting Signatures**

An initiative referendum group shall organize the collection of signatures beginning on the day when it obtains a registration certificate.

The collection of signatures shall be performed by citizens of the Armenian Republic who possess the franchise, i.e., those who enjoy suffrage.

Each list of signatures, with an indication thereon of the last name, first name, patronymic, and place of residence of the person collecting the signatures, as well as the member of the initiative group, no later than seven days after the registration certificate has been submitted, must be witnessed and certified by the executive committee of the city, rayon-in-city, settlement, or rural Soviet in accordance with the place where the signatures were collected. Unwitnessed, uncertified lists of signatures shall be invalid.

The collection of signatures does not require that the person who has collected the signatures submit any other document but the list of signatures itself.

Each person, upon presentation of his passport or other ID, can append his name to the list of signatures, but only once. The signature of a citizen shall be accompanied by an indication of his last name, first name, patronymic, place of residence, proper document establishing his identity, and date of signing the list.

When it is necessary to prove the authenticity of signatures by the executive committee of local council of people's deputies.

### **Article 12. Summary Record**

Based on the filled-out lists of signatures, the initiative referendum group shall summarize the results of the collection of signatures and draw up a summary record. No later than four months after obtaining the registration certificate, the initiative referendum group shall send the summary record and the lists of signatures which have come in to the Central Referendum Commission.

The Central Referendum Commission shall verify or check out the execution of Articles 8 and 10 of the present Law and enter the results of the collection of signatures in the summary record. A demand or request concerning the conducting of the referendum, along with the summary record, shall be sent to the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic by the Central Referendum Commission within one month after receiving the documents from the initiative group.

**Article 13. Introducing the Question of Conducting a Referendum for Examination and Consideration**

The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic shall include a question of conducting a referendum on the agenda of the current or the next session of the Supreme Soviet.

**Article 14. Adopting a Decision on Conducting a Referendum**

The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic shall adopt one of the following decisions regarding the question of conducting a referendum:

- 1) on scheduling or fixing a date for the referendum and measures to provide for its being conducted;
- 2) to adopt a law or a decision regarding the question to be submitted for a referendum without conducting a referendum;
- 3) on refusing a demand or request to conduct a referendum in case there has been a violation of the requirements of the present Law.

A decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic shall indicate the date for conducting a referendum, the formulation of the question submitted to the referendum; it shall also specify the financing procedure and resolve other matters linked to conducting the referendum.

The decree on conducting the referendum, along with the draft law or decision submitted to the referendum, shall be promulgated in the mass media during the course of ten days after the adoption of this decree.

**Article 15. The Time Period for Conducting a Referendum**

A referendum shall be conducted during a time period of not earlier than one, or not later than nine, months after the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic has adopted a decree concerning the conduct of the referendum involved.

In exceptional cases the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic or its Presidium can designate or schedule other time periods for conducting a referendum.

**Section 3. The Procedure for Conducting a Referendum**

**Article 16. Glasnost in Preparing and Conducting a Referendum**

Preparing and conducting a referendum shall be carried out by referendum commissions, sociopolitical and public organizations, and labor collectives openly and with glasnost.

The referendum commissions shall notify citizens concerning their work, the formation of precincts, the composition, place, and time of the referendum commissions' work, as well as voter lists. The referendum

commissions shall inform citizens concerning the question submitted to a referendum and the results of the referendum.

The right to attend or be present at the sessions of the referendum commissions during the sealing and opening of the ballot boxes and tallying up the votes, ascertaining the results of the voting in a precinct, as well as during the entire course of the voting, shall be enjoyed by representatives of sociopolitical and public organizations, the press, television, and radio—with the proper credentials. This right shall also be enjoyed by representatives of labor collectives, collectives from special secondary and higher educational institutions situated on the territory of the rayon or city involved, by meetings of voters according to their place of residence, as well as by people's deputies of the Armenian Republic and people's deputies of the local soviets elected from the territory of the given Soviet of People's Deputies. The number of the representatives from sociopolitical and public organizations, labor collectives, collectives of special secondary and higher educational institutions, as well as meetings of voters according to their place of residence, shall be determined by the appropriate precinct referendum commission; the latter shall create equal conditions in order to ensure the attendance of representatives. The powers of the representatives must be certified by the appropriate documents and by the decision of the collectives or their councils and meetings of voters according to their place of residence. They shall be informed about this by the appropriate referendum commissions no later than three days prior to the referendum.

In order to ensure that glasnost prevails in a referendum, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic shall be empowered to invite foreign observers to attend.

The mass media shall report on and publicize the course of preparing and conducting a referendum. Their representatives shall be guaranteed unhindered attendance at all meetings and sessions connected to a referendum. The referendum commissions, local and public organs, as well as labor collectives, shall accord them information concerning the preparation and conduct of a referendum.

**Article 17. Guarantees of the Right To Participate in Discussing Questions Submitted to a Referendum**

Citizens of the Armenian Republic, sociopolitical, public organizations, labor collectives, collectives from special secondary and higher educational institutions, as well as meetings of voters according to their place of residence, shall be guaranteed the enjoyment and exercise of the right to campaign in an unhindered manner for or against the conduct of a referendum or a question submitted to a referendum. On voting day no kind of campaigning with regard to the question submitted to a referendum shall be allowed.

Public discussion of questions submitted to a referendum shall be conducted in accordance with the legislation of the Armenian Republic regarding assemblies, political meetings, street processions, and demonstrations.

The executive organs of the local soviets of people's deputies of the Armenian Republic and the referendum commissions shall grant rooms or areas for organizing public discussions to citizens of the Armenian Republic, sociopolitical, and public organizations.

#### **Article 18. Referendum Commissions**

In order to prepare and conduct a referendum, the following referendum commissions shall be formed:

the Central Referendum Commission of the Armenian Republic;

rayon- and city-level referendum commissions;

precinct-level referendum commissions.

#### **Article 19. Formation of the Central Referendum Commission**

The Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic, taking into consideration proposals by the republic-level organs of sociopolitical and public organizations, labor collectives, collectives from special secondary and higher educational institutions, meetings of voters according to their place of residence, and the initiative group for conducting a referendum, no later than one month prior to the day for conducting the referendum shall form a Central Referendum Commission with the following composition: a chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and 14 commission members.

The term of office for the Central Referendum Commission shall be five years.

#### **Article 20. Powers of the Central Referendum Commission**

The Central Referendum Commission shall be empowered to do the following:

- 1) exercise monitoring controls over the performance of the present Law and ensure its uniform application; in case of necessity, enter the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic to present an interpretation of the present Law;
- 2) direct and channel the activity of referendum commissions, petition the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic or its Presidium concerning the introduction of changes into the composition of referendum commissions;
- 3) distribute monetary funds among rayon- and city-level referendum commissions, monitor the provision of

referendum commissions with rooms or areas, transportation, and communications. It also examines and considers other matters providing a referendum with material and technical aid;

4) establish the forms of ballots, voter lists, and records or minutes of the sessions held by referendum commissions, and other referendum documents, model ballot boxes and seals of the referendum commissions, as well as the procedure and time periods for storing documents;

5) listen to reports from the referendum commissions, ministries, state committees and departments, along with those from other state and public organs of the Armenian Republic on matters connected with preparing and conducting a referendum.

6) summarize the results of a referendum which has been conducted; publish the referendum results in the press;

7) examine and consider statements and complaints regarding the decisions and actions taken by referendum commissions, and reach final decisions regarding them;

8) exercise other powers in accordance with the present Law and other laws of the Armenian Republic.

#### **Article 21. Formation of Rayon- and City-Level Referendum Commissions**

Rayon- and city-level referendum commissions shall be formed in accordance with the Law of the Armenian Republic entitled: "On Elections of People's Deputies of the Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Armenian Republic" no later than one month prior to the day when the referendum is to be conducted. Such commissions shall comprise the following: the Yerevan City Commission, rayon-level commissions, and city-level commissions for those cities under republic-level jurisdiction.

The term of office for rayon- and city-level referendum commissions shall be five years.

#### **Article 22. The Powers of Rayon- and City-Level Referendum Commissions**

Rayon- and city-level referendum commissions shall be empowered to do the following:

- 1) Exercise monitoring controls over the performance of the present Law on the territory of the appropriate local Soviet;
- 2) direct and channel the activity of precinct-level referendum commissions;
- 3) distribute monetary funds among the precinct-level referendum commissions; monitor the providing of precinct-level referendum commissions with rooms and areas, transportation, and communications, and examine other matters regarding material and technical aid for a referendum;

4) provide for and ensure the distribution of referendum ballots among the precinct-level referendum commissions;

5) listen to reports from the precinct-level referendum commissions, the executive committees of local soviets, as well as from the leading officials of enterprises, institutions, and organizations regarding matters connected with preparing and conducting a referendum;

6) observe the drawing up of referendum voter lists by the precinct-level referendum commissions and their being submitted for general familiarization;

7) establish the referendum results in the appropriate rayon or city;

8) provide for and ensure the procedure and time periods for storing referendum documents as established by the Central Referendum Commission;

9) examine and consider statements and complaints regarding the decisions and actions of the precinct-level referendum commissions and take decisions on them;

10) exercise other powers in accordance with the present Law and other laws of the Armenian Republic.

#### **Article 23. Formation of Precincts for Voting**

In order to conduct voting and to tally the votes during a referendum, the territory of rayons and cities shall be divided into precincts, basically corresponding to the electoral precincts formed for electing people's deputies of the Armenian Republic.

Precincts for voting shall be formed no later than 20 days prior to the day for conducting a referendum.

The appropriate local Soviet of People's Deputies or its presidium shall notify citizens concerning the boundaries of each referendum precinct with an indication of the site of the precinct-level referendum commission and the rooms or areas available for voting.

#### **Article 24. Formation of a Precinct-Level Referendum Commission and Its Powers**

A precinct-level referendum commission shall be formed in accordance with Article 23 of the Law of the Armenian Republic entitled: "On Elections of People's Deputies of the Armenian Republic" no later than 20 days prior to the day for conducting the referendum; and its powers shall be determined in accordance with Article 24 of that same Law.

#### **Article 25. Organizing the Work of Referendum Commissions**

The chairman, deputy chairman, and secretary of a referendum commission shall be elected at the first session of the appropriate commission.

The commission's sessions shall be competent, i.e., legally empowered, when they are taken part in by at

least two-thirds of the commission's membership. The decisions of the commission shall be taken by open voting. Such decisions shall pass when they gain a majority of the votes of the total commission membership. Commission members who do not agree with its decision shall have the right to state their own personal opinion; the latter shall be attached—in written form—to the record and shall be sent on for examination and consideration by the higher-ranking commission.

The commission decisions, adopted within the limits of their powers and authority, shall be mandatorily binding and shall be carried out by all state and public organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations.

The decisions and actions of a commission can be appealed to a higher-ranking referendum commission, and—in cases provided for by the legislation on referendums—they can also be appealed to a court.

Commission members, including the chairman, deputy chairman, and secretary, upon the commission's decision, can be released or relieved during the period of preparing and conducting a referendum from their production or service duties, while retaining their average wages or salary by means of funds to be allocated for conducting the referendum involved.

From the time when they are formed referendum commissions shall keep a journal of their official business.

#### **Article 26. Assisting Referendum Commissions To Exercise Their Powers**

State and public organs, enterprises, institutions, organizations, and officials shall be obliged to assist referendum commissions to exercise their powers and to offer them the information and materials needed for their work.

A referendum commission shall have the right to turn for help with regard to preparing and conducting a referendum to state or public organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, or to officials, which are obliged to examine and consider the question submitted to them and provide the commission with an answer no later than within a three-day period.

#### **Article 27. List of Citizens Having the Right To Participate in a Referendum**

The executive committees of rayon- and city-level, as well as executive- and village-level soviets of people's deputies shall provide a registry of citizens having the right to participate in a referendum. And they shall transmit or hand over corrected lists to the precinct-level referendum commissions.

Lists of citizens having the right to participate in a referendum shall be submitted for general familiarization 15 days prior to the day for conducting the referendum, whereas in referendum precincts formed in sanatoriums and rest homes, in hospitals and other

stationary treatment institutions—this must be done two days prior to conducting the referendum.

Citizens shall be provided with the opportunity to become acquainted with the list of citizens having the right to participate in a referendum and to verify its correctness in the area set aside by the commission for this purpose.

Each citizen shall have the right to complain about and appeal a non-inclusion, incorrect inclusion in the list, or an exclusion from the list, as well as inaccuracies regarding data about him in the list. A statement concerning such inaccuracies in the list shall be examined and considered by the precinct-level commission. The latter is obliged, within a two-day period, and on the eve of or during the day for conducting the referendum—immediately, to examine and consider the statement, to make the necessary corrections in the list, or to issue to the person making the statement a copy of the decision containing the grounds for rejecting his statement. This decision can be appealed no later than five days prior to the referendum involved to a rayon-level (or city-level) people's court, which is obliged to examine such a complaint, i.e., an appeal within a three-day period. The decision of the rayon-level (or city-level) people's court shall be final. A correction in the list of citizens having the right to, i.e., entitled to, participate in a referendum upon the decision of a court shall be performed immediately by the precinct-level referendum commission involved.

When a citizen having the right to participate in a referendum changes his place of residence during the period between the time when the lists of citizens having the right to participate in a referendum are submitted for general familiarization and the day for conducting the referendum, the precinct-level commission, at his request and upon his presentation of his passport or other ID, shall issue him a certificate of the right to vote; and it shall then expunge his last name from the list of citizens who have the right to participate in a referendum.

Based on a certificate of the right to vote, a citizen having the right to participate in a referendum on the day for conducting the referendum involved shall be included on a supplementary list of citizens having the right to participate in the referendum at the precinct of the referendum according to his place of residence.

The supplementary list of citizens having the right to participate in a referendum shall be drawn up in precincts of the referendum on the day for conducting the referendum. And, after the voting has been completed, it shall be signed by the chairman and secretary of the precinct commission.

If no later than 15 days prior to the day for conducting the referendum it appears that a citizen included on the list will not be able to show up to vote on the day of the referendum, he shall have the right to obtain a ballot at the precinct referendum commission. When he obtains a

ballot, the voter shall be registered on the list of citizens having the right to participate in a referendum. After filling in the ballot, the citizen shall put it into an envelope, which he shall glue, certify with the seal of the precinct-level referendum commission, and hand over to the precinct-level referendum commission. Such an envelope will be kept until the day for conducting the referendum, and at the time of the voting it will be dropped into the ballot box by the chairman of the precinct-level referendum commission in the presence of other commission members and observers.

#### **Article 28. The Place and Time of Voting**

Voting shall be conducted on the day of the referendum from 0700 hours to 2300 hours local time.

The precinct-level referendum commission shall notify citizens about the date, time, and place of voting no later than 15 days prior to the voting.

The text of the draft law or the decree being submitted to the referendum must be exhibited or posted in the areas or rooms where the voting is to be conducted.

#### **Article 29. The Ballot**

The model ballot to be used for voting in a referendum shall be approved by the Central Referendum Commission no later than 30 days prior to the voting.

The ballot shall cite the text of the question being submitted to a referendum and the two variant answers—"Yes" and "No."

#### **Article 30. Voting**

Voting shall be conducted according to referendum precincts.

Ballots shall be handed out to citizens by the appropriate precinct-level referendum commission, based on the list of citizens having the right to participate in a referendum or certificates for the right to vote—upon presentation of a passport or other ID. Upon receiving the ballot the citizen's name is checked off on the list. In case certain citizens, because of a health condition or for other reasons, cannot come in person to the voting area, upon their request, the precinct-level referendum commission shall entrust certain commission members with the task of organizing voting at the site where these citizens are located—in accordance with a separate list.

During the time when the ballots are being filled in, the presence of any person whatsoever, except for the voter, shall be prohibited.

A person taking part in a referendum who is incapable of filling in the ballot on his own shall have the right to invite another person into the booth or room, except for members of the precinct-level referendum commission.

When voting, citizens shall cross out one of the answers indicated on the ballot—"Yes" or "No."

Ballots on which both words "Yes" and "No" have been crossed out, or on which neither one has been crossed out shall be deemed invalid.

The voter shall drop his filled-in ballot into the ballot box.

#### **Article 31. Establishing the Referendum Results**

A precinct-level referendum commission shall establish the results of the voting for its own precinct.

Before opening up the ballot boxes, a precinct-level referendum commission shall count and void all unused ballots and draw up an record of this. The ballot boxes shall be opened by the precinct-level commission after the commission chairman has declared that the voted has been completed. Opening the ballot boxes prior to the voting being completed shall be prohibited.

In accordance with the basic and the supplementary lists, the precinct-level commission shall establish or ascertain for this precinct the total number of citizens having the right to participate in a referendum. Based on the ballots found in the ballot boxes, the commission shall establish the total number of citizens who took part in the voting, the number of citizens who voted "Yes," the number who voted "No," and the number of ballots deemed invalid or "void."

The results of the vote tally shall be examined at a session of the precinct-level referendum commission, and a record shall be drawn up. This record shall be signed by the chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and members of the commission; it shall then be sent on to the appropriate rayon- or city-level commission following the procedure to be established by the Central Referendum Commission.

In case two or more referendums are conducted simultaneously or there are two or more referendum questions, the results of each one shall be carried out or treated separately.

Based on the records of the precinct-level referendum commissions, the rayon- or city-level referendum commission shall determine the following: the total number of voters for the rayon or city, the number of citizens who took part in the voting, the number of citizens who voted "Yes," the number of citizens who voted "No," and the number of ballots which were deemed invalid or "void."

The referendum results for the rayon or city shall be determined at a session of the rayon or city referendum commission and shall be entered into the record. This record shall be drawn up and signed using the same procedure as in the precinct-level referendum commission.

Based on the records from the rayon- and city-level referendum commissions, the Central Referendum Commission shall determine the following: the total number of citizens having the right to participate in a

referendum, the number of citizens who participated in the voting, the number of citizens who voted "Yes," the number of citizens who voted "No," and the number of ballots which were deemed invalid or "void."

The decision on the question submitted to a referendum shall be considered passed if more than half the citizens having the right to participate in a referendum voted "Yes," and, in exceptional circumstances—more than two-thirds of them do so.

The referendum results shall be summarized at a session of the Central Referendum Commission and entered into the record. The record shall be signed by the chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and members of the Central Referendum Commission and shall be published as an official report on the referendum results.

If, during the conduct of a referendum, violations of the Law were allowed to occur, and these violations exerted a substantial influence on the results of the referendum, the Central Referendum Commission can designate and schedule a repeat election and set the time for voting on the appropriate territory.

#### **Article 32. Publication and Entering Into Force of a Law of the Armenian Republic Adopted by Means of a Referendum**

A law of the Armenian Republic or a decision passed by means of a referendum shall be published in accordance with the procedure for publishing laws of the Armenian Republic.

A law of the Armenian Republic or a decision passed by means of a referendum shall be deemed as adopted from the day the referendum was conducted and shall enter into force, i.e., become operative, on the day following its publication, unless the text of the question submitted to the referendum indicates another time period.

#### **Article 33. Procedure for Abrogating or Introducing Changes in a Law or a Decision Passed by Means of a Referendum**

A law of the Armenian Republic or a decision passed by means of a referendum can be abrogated or amended only by means of a referendum.

[Signed] L. TER-PETROSYAN, Chairman, Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic.

A. SAAKYAN, Secretary, Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic.

2 April 1991, city of Yerevan.

#### **Armenian Consumer Goods Hoarded in Warehouses**

91US0450A Yerevan AVANGARD in Armenian  
24 Jan 91 p 3

[Article, published under the rubric: "Who Profits?" by Colonel of Militia Ashot Grigoryan, deputy chief of the

Directorate for Protection of State Property of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, and Varuzhan Balyan, entitled: "Abundance in Warehouses, Empty Shop Display Cases: How Long Will This Situation of Total License Continue?"]

[Text] The tense socioeconomic situation prevailing in this republic is continuing unabated. Ignoring justified complaints and the interests of the people, the dissatisfaction of whom is increasing day by day, the bureaucrats and their stooges are taking advantage of the current difficult situation, continuing their old ways of stealing and appropriating the state's resources and exploiting the people. As a result, day by day new items are added to the already extensive list of goods in short supply.

Yes, we are forced once again to return to the matter of trade, one of the eternal problems of our daily lives. In this article we shall address this question to specific persons and organizations.

\* \* \*

Pursuant to Directive No 740 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Armenia, dated 15 November 1990, in order to prevent the profiteering which has been occurring in this republic's trade system and in order to study the reasons behind this profiteering, the Directorate for Protection of State Property of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, together with law enforcement agencies, has in recent months conducted inspections at trade facilities in the city of Yerevan, as well as in certain other rayons in this republic, recording numerous instances of large-scale profiteering.

The reader might justifiably ask: "Are we back to that old tune? We have been hearing it for years. Is it really going to cause any change?" Let us say right at the outset that the times for "old tunes" are past, that the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its components are experiencing today a period of widespread reforms. Those who have the opportunity to take a close look at their activities will become convinced that there are already positive changes in this area, that there are more and more cases of detection and exposing of the operations of large "sharks." Prior to discussing the results of the spot-check visits to trade facilities, we shall cite specific examples illustrating the above statement. In recent weeks and months the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs components charged with protecting state property have brought to light large-scale instances of stealing of state resources. For example, engineers Aleksanyan and Aghajanyan, who are employed by poultry operations in Echmiadzin and Yerevan, and Chairman Gevorgian of the Temp Cooperative entered into a criminal conspiracy and appropriated a sum of 200,000 rubles through the fabrication of phony documents. Director Jraghatspanyan of the Haykoop board of the Hoktembryan Machinery Plant and warehouse manager Karchikyan have been charged with appropriation of 18,300 rubles worth of goods. Director Baghramyanyan of

the Aghbulagh State Farm in Krasnoselskiy Rayon, chief accountant Melkumyan and warehouse manager Poghosyan were exposed for misappropriation of large amounts of money in the procurement of agricultural products. In the course of their criminal conspiracy, they padded potato procurement figures to the amount of 172 tons, and extorted a total of 13,501 rubles. Retail sales managers Potikyan and Ayvazyan of the Yerevan Taron Furniture Combine and one Vasilyan, head of that combine's Shop No 1, were charged with large-scale theft of property belonging to the state. Using phony receipts, they stole 18,200 rubles worth of goods. H. Virabyan, brigade leader at the Spitakagropromstroy Industrial Association construction administration, wastefully expended and misappropriated during 1990 a total of 300 tons of cement. Here is one final example, which is so typical of the capital's trade facilities: L. Karapetyan, manager of Grocery Store No 544, upon receiving 2,500 bags of high-quality coffee from Shahumyan Rayon Grocery Warehouse No 5, instead of transferring the coffee to the store, hid it in the apartments of four of his employees, with the aim of reselling it at some future time, in the expectation of making 11,000 rubles profit.

One can state without hesitation that the above examples are a result of an attitude of total license and patent chicanery on the part of the management personnel of the above organizations. In view of these financially and economically most difficult times for our republic, can one forgive such squandering, theft and extortion? Is this immoral behavior not one of the causes of the extreme tensions generated among consumers, the artificial goods shortages, the steady rise in prices on the black market, and other instances of riding roughshod over the public? According to statistical studies conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the trade system is in the lead among crimes committed in the various branches of the economy in this republic (the agroindustrial complex is in second place, and the construction industry is in third). According to those same statistics, the majority of crimes committed in the trade system, approximately 83 percent of the total, involve deceiving the customer, shortweighting, short measure, and concealing or setting aside goods. Hence very frequently those who organize and connive in such crimes are the trade organization managers, those who are called upon to ensure that the law is observed, those whose job is to better meet the public's needs and to improve retail trade services. As things stand, however, violations of regulations and crimes occur in greater number at those trade establishments where there are numerous executive and managerial personnel. Take the self-service department stores, public stores and trade centers, for example. Each one of these establishments has a director, deputy directors, chief accountants, department heads, and inspectors.... In spite of this fact, even more profiteering takes place precisely at such establishments. The reader will see that this is true from the examples cited below. Consequently it is high time to remove bad managers from the system and to root out the lies and deception. Otherwise we shall be forced to encounter in the future many more such

disgraceful situations as have recently been uncovered at trade establishments by teams of investigators from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the public prosecutor's office.

The inspections have been conducted primarily for the purpose of finding within the trade system those goods which have been kept off the retail shelves. And what have the inspections revealed? It is not true that the stores have not been receiving goods, that they are empty, that the requisite variety is lacking, that there is no possibility of an extensive choice among goods. Yes, for years now we mere mortals have believed and continue to believe these things, running from one store to another, we the tired, frustrated, naive ones, in a state of dejection from running around helplessly. The fact is that during the worst days of the blockade the stock-rooms and warehouses in this republic were filled with various types of grocery items (including short-supply items and goods produced abroad!). And subsequently, when our cruel neighbors "felt sorry" for us and "magnanimously" opened the rail line, upon which the warehouses were filled to bursting, at this point the internal exploiters, those Armenians who were slaves to their stomachs and wallets, became even more cruel. And were not the deliberate goods-withholding actions of the latter more immoral than the actions of the former? And what would be the predicament of the people if months ago detachments organized by Armenian young people had not somewhat shaken up the supply warehouses? But did those temporary measures correct the existing problems? Not in the slightest. Right after that "the HHS [Armenian Pan-National Movement] did not allow us to earn a single penny," claiming that cheats and swindlers in the trade system were once again continuing their nefarious business, in a fiercer manner and improving upon previous methods, particularly the technique of concealing goods from the people, stockpiling them in warehouses and individuals' apartments. Between 16 November and 25 December a total of 878 trade establishments were inspected, of which 529 are under the Ministry of Trade, 50 belong to Haykoop, and 17 are under various other agencies. During this period alone a total of 366,700 rubles worth of concealed goods were discovered.

We feel that the readers might be interested in hearing what kind of goods these were (to avoid repeating the same goods from store to store, we shall enumerate only the largest discoveries of unlawful hoarding). 296 rubles worth of various kinds of candy were discovered in Store No 458 in 26 Commissars Rayon, while 375 kilograms of halvah and 160 kilograms of sugar were discovered in Store No 542 in Shahumyan Rayon. 250 kilograms of coffee beans were hoarded and withheld from sale in the warehouse of Cooperative No 1 in that same rayon. During the search for concealed, hoarded goods, a kind of record was set by Grocery Store No 490 in 26 Commissars Rayon, in the warehouse of which inspectors discovered 150 bottles of Fanta, 100 bottles of Pepsi Cola, 90 cartons of milk, seven crates of sour cream, four

cases of yogurt, 50 kilograms of granulated sugar, 20 kilograms of salt, 24 boxes of canned eggplant caviar, 400 kilograms of butter, and 40 bottles of Jermuk mineral water. On 5 December inspectors at Grocery Store No 638 in Myasnikyan Rayon discovered 14,000 boxes of matches being hoarded and withheld from sale. To those residents of Ordzhonikidze Rayon who had no luck in purchasing sugar with their ration coupons, we can report the following: during an inspection of Grocery Store No 340 in your rayon, it was discovered that 84 kilograms of sugar had been sold under the counter, without benefit of ration coupon. In Grocery Store No 350 in that same rayon inspectors discovered 225 bottles of vodka and 364 packs of Masis and Arin-Berd cigarettes. It will naturally come as some surprise to beer lovers to learn that even today Armenia's trade organizations are receiving large quantities of beer from foreign countries; however.... At Spandaryan Rayon Coop No 1 retail outlet a total of 1,392 cans of German-made beer, representing a value of 22,968 rubles, were concealed and withheld from sale. Residents of that same rayon, who were blaming the "lazy" chickens for the fact that no eggs were available, could not have known that during that time there were 18,510 eggs hoarded away in the storage areas of Store No 158, as well as 2,460 packs of cigarettes, 35 cans of tomato paste, 179 jars of strawberry jam, 3,354 cans of condensed milk, and 134 kilograms of coffee....

At the Nork Self-Service Department Store in Sovetskiy Rayon, a total of 1,033 bottles of vodka and 15 different kinds of candy, representing a total value of 2,507 rubles 70 kopecks, had been withheld from the shelves and hoarded away. And at this same store an inspection conducted approximately one month prior to this time had resulted in the discovery of 20,172 rubles worth of consumer goods withheld from the shelves and hoarded away, plus 1,661 rubles worth of grocery items and 12,348 rubles worth of beverages. We Soviets who are smokers and fanciers of cognac will be interested to know that an inspection visit paid on 10 December to the Garni Store No 721 revealed 990 packs of Masis brand cigarettes, while an inspection at Store No 748 revealed 20 bottles of Ani cognac and a like quantity of five-star cognacs.

Inspectors also discovered hoarded goods in the stock-rooms of stores selling wearing apparel and consumer durables. 256 rubles worth of battery chargers were discovered in the electrical appliance department at the State Department Store, 526 rubles worth of children's undergarments were discovered at Yerevan's Yerardar Store No 17, 25 different brands of manufactured goods representing a total of 26,024 rubles were found at the Jrashen Village Store of the Shahumyan Rayon Co-op, and a total of 61,865 rubles worth of Italian, Austrian, and Greek-made pantyhose were discovered in the knitwear department at Yerardar Department Store No 6. Knitwear valued at 5,388 rubles 50 kopecks and 3,828 rubles worth of material were withheld from sale at Fabric/Shoe/Wearing Apparel Store No 318 in Leninskiy

Rayon. 116 ladies' suits and 15 dresses were discovered at Children's World Association Store No 414 in that same rayon. On 14 December 539 irons worth a total of 6,468 rubles were discovered at Household Goods Store No 236 in Shahumyan Rayon. A most interesting variety of hoarded goods was found in storeroom areas at the Hoktemberyan Rayon Trade Center: 11,376 cases of Chinese-made soap; 8,500 shavers of foreign manufacture; 9,500 rubles worth of ready-made wearing apparel. G. Hunanyan, head of the electronic goods department at the Ashtarak Trade Center, was engaged in a rather clever scheme. He had taken home 39 Foton color TV sets which had been delivered to the store, and was engaged in a brisk marketing operation out of his apartment....

As we stated, teams have made inspections not only in the city of Yerevan. In order to avoid enumerating a long list of goods and kilogram-ruble amounts, we shall merely state that our fellow Armenians residing in Echmiadzin, Ashtarak, Masis, Artashat, Hoktemberyan, Abovyan, and Hrazdan rayons are also not in an enviable position. In these seven rayons (stores in rayon administrative seats as well as in the villages were inspected) inspection teams discovered numerous goods valued at tens of thousands of rubles, for the most part of foreign provenance, discovered in storage areas at the inspected trade facilities.

This gives the reader a fairly good picture of the disgraceful situation currently prevailing in the republic's trade system. Unconscionable concealment and hoarding of goods is running rampant. This involves all kinds of goods, anything from from which profit can be made. And all of this is happening under the very nose of management, under management's instructions or with its connivance. They will withhold from the shelves and hide away even a match worth a single penny, milk destined for a hungry child, and winter shoes which would be destined for a child shivering in the cold of winter in his summer shoes and coat. This shameful, criminal behavior brings no honor to our nation. How long is this situation of total licence going to continue?

\* \* \*

From the Editors: This article was ready for publication when we were informed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Armenia that criminal charges were brought against 42 persons as a result of the inspections at trade facilities. 10 criminal cases are currently still at the pretrial investigation stage. Administrative action has been taken against 153 persons, 50 of whom have been fired.

Trade employees who have received various punishment include store managers, department heads, and other persons in positions of responsibility.

### Armenian Supreme Soviet Renames Villages

NC0605093891 Yerevan HAYASTAN in Armenian 11 Apr 91 p 3

[Decision issued by the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet in Yerevan on 3 April]

[Text] The Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet has decided to accede to the appeal of rayon and city soviets of people's deputies and to rename the following settlements in the Armenian Republic:

Old Name	New Name
<b>AMASIYSKIY RAYON</b>	
Okhchogli	Ogdzhi
Azizbekov	Aregnadem
Baytar	Hovtun
Duzkend	Alvar
Gondzhali	Zarishat
Gyolli	Ardenis
Balykhli	Zorakert
Garabulag	Shagik
Chakhmakh	Kamkhut
Chaybasar	Aravet
Yeniyol	Agvorik
Ibish	Yerizak
Oksuz	Darik
Chivinli	Yegnadzhur
<b>ASHTARAKSKIY RAYON</b>	
Dzorap	Agtsk
Nazyrvan	Gazaravan
<b>ARARATSKIY RAYON</b>	
Shirazlu	Osketap
Yengidzha	Sisavan
Khalisa	Noyakert
Shidlu	Yegegnavan
Sovetashen	Zangakatun
Settlement near Kirov farm	Taperakan
<b>GORISSKIY RAYON</b>	
Khndzoresk-2	Nerkin Khndzoresk
<b>GUGARKSKIY RAYON</b>	
Gyuzaldara	Aznvadzor
<b>DILIZHANSKIY RAYON</b>	
Kuybyshev	Hagartsin
<b>YEKHEGNADZORSKIY RAYON</b>	
Alayaz	Yegegis
Yekhegis	Artabuynk
Gavushug	Hermon
Gzlgyl	Arates

Old Name	New Name
Gyulliduz	Vardahovit
ECHMIADZINSKIY RAYON	
Gegakert	Samagar
TUMANYANSKIY RAYON	
Danushavan	Aygehat
IDZHEVANSKIY RAYON	
Samet Vurgun	Hovk
Salah	Agavnavank
Polad	Khachardzan
Akhkilisa	Chermakavan
Chichakbulag	Gegatap
KAPANSKIY RAYON	
Adzhibadzh	Adzhibadzh
Bekdash	Khordzor
Gyard	Kard
Garachiman	Ditsmayri
Kovshut	Kavchut
Nerkin Pirlu	Gegavank
Shabadin	Yegeg
KALININSKIY RAYON	
Kalininskiy Rayon	Tashirskiy
Kalinino City	Tashir
Evlü	Dzoramut
Demurchilar	Gogavan
Gzldash	qArtsni
Sariar	Apaven
Sovugbulag	Pagagbyur
Karakala	Noramut
Kara Isa	Megvahovit
KAMOYSKIY RAYON	
AkhkalaTcBerkunk	
KOTAYKSKIY RAYON	
Settlement near the vinery	Verin Ptgni
KRASNOSELSKIY RAYON	
Krasnoselsk	Chambarak
Akhbulakh	Agberk
Tokhludzha	Drakhtik
Gyolkend	Aygut
Chaykend	Dprabak
Amrkher	Kalavan
Bariabad	Barepat
Karakaya	Dzoravank
Meshakend	Antaramedzh
Ordzhonikidza	Vahan
OKTEMBERYANSKIY RAYON	

Old Name	New Name
Town named after Voroshilov	Hatsik
RAZDANSKIY RAYON	
Kumysh	Karenis
Takyarlu	Artavaz
MASISSKIY RAYON	
Zangilar	Zorak
Sarvanlar	Sis
Kalinin town	Noramarg
Dostluk	Hayanist
Demurchi	Darbnik
Zahmet	Khachpas
NAIRISKIY RAYON	
Lusakert	Argel
NOYEMBERYANSKIY RAYON	
Shavarshavan	Koti
SISIANSKIY RAYON	
Agudi	Agitu
Dzhomardlu	Tanahat
Uz	Uyts
Lernashen	Shenatag
Bartsravan	Mutsk
Shagat	Shagat [as published]
VAYKSKIY RAYON	
Gomur	Gomk
Zeyta	Zedea
Gyulstan	Nor Aznaberđ
Kochbek	Ugedzor
Chaykend	Getik
VARDENISSKIY RAYON	
Gyunashly	Kutakan
Kizil-Kend	Tsapatag
Dara	Daranak
Shishkaya	Gukarich
Gyoysu	Avazan
Mets-Mazra	Mets Masrik
Pokr-Mazra	Pokr Masrik
Bahar	Arpunk
Sovetkend	Kakhakn
Yenikend	Tretuk
Narimanlu	Shatvan
Azizlu	Norabak
Sariyagub	Dzhagatsadzor
Sovetakert	Khachagbyur
Gaybash	Gegamabak
Goshabulag	Shatdzhrek

Old Name	New Name
Dashkend	Ayrk
Subatan	Gegakar
Gyuney	Areguni
Shafak	Vanevan
Zod	Sotk
Zarkend	Kut

[Signed] L. Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet;

A. Saakyan, secretary of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet [Dated] 3 April, Yerevan.

### **Omanidze Made First Deputy Chairman of Georgia**

*AU0305175491 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZYIA in Russian 19 Apr 91 p 1*

[Decree of the President of the Republic of Georgia on the nomination of M.M. Omanidze first deputy chairman of the Government of the Republic of Georgia, issued in Tbilisi on 18 April 1991; and Sakinform biography of Murman Melitonovich Omanidze—word between slantlines published in boldface]

To nominate Murman Melitonovich /Omanidze/ first deputy chairman of the Government of the Republic of Georgia.

[signed] Z. Gamsakhurdia, President of the Republic of Georgia.

18 April 1991.

### **Murman Omanidze**

Murman Melitonovich Omanidze was born in 1938 in Tbilisi into a worker's family. After finishing high school, he continued his education at the Kiev United [as published] School for Self-Propelled Artillery imeni Frunze.

In 1952-62, he worked as a mechanic in the system of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy of the USSR. In 1963-68, Omanidze studied at the All-Union Polytechnic Institute, and in 1973, he graduated, with distinction, from the Leningrad State University Faculty of Law where he studied by correspondence.

In 1971-84, Murman Omanidze occupied various important posts in the system of construction and transport organizations; in 1984-88, he was deputy general director of the "Agropromstroykombinat" industrial combine; since 1969—he was deputy chairman of the Union of Georgian Lawyers.

From January 1991 and to this day, Murman Omanidze worked, first, as deputy minister of transport of Georgia and, then, as first deputy minister.

At the same time, Murman Omanidze is engaged in teaching and is a candidate of juridical sciences, member of the Soviet Association for International Law and of the Soviet Association of Lawyers- Democrats.

He is married and has two children.

### **Central Asia**

#### **Goals of 11 Kazakh Pressure Groups Outlined**

*91US0477A Alma-Ata QAZAQ ADEBIYETI in Kazakh No 52, 28 Dec 90 p 13*

[Article by Zhusipbek Qorghasbekov: "The Supporter, Glasnost, the Helper, Democracy"]

[Text] "We expose the deceit of the CPI!" "Why cannot Rozenbaum find a ballot for us?..." The ear has now become used to such words. They are not only heard from the squares where heated meetings are held as before, but from markets and railway stations, wherever a lot of people congregate. But these words are not just spoken to sell papers for 50 kopeks, 1 or 3 rubles.

However, it seems as if recently rabble-rousing rude slogans and vain threats such as "Rosenbaum's ballot" have become rarer. Various sociopolitical currents, and most of the civil movements brought into being by perestroika and glasnost have given up sloganeering, have gone over to concrete action, and have been able to flex their muscles. This is because they understand that they cannot make the simple truth that "riding a horse is faster than riding a donkey" into policy. However, in this regard the aims of individual organizations and movements concerned with things beneficial to the general public, and to the people, are diverse. Repeating in this connection our statement (6 July 1990) that the time has come for the unofficial organizations and movements of Kazakhstan to unite into an influential and weighty organization, with one goal, one intention, and to consider the cares of the people, we have felt it suitable to respond to the requests of readers wishing information about democratic forces and groups of the republic.

#### **'Kazakh Language' Society ['Qazaq tili' qoghamy]**

Founded on 21 October 1989. Aims: To make the mother tongue the official language of the republic in actual practice, and to revitalize it. There are local branches in all oblasts of the republic, and within them in many cities and rayons. Such small organizations have also appeared in areas outside the borders of the republic; for example, in Barnaul, Omby etc. The Society is in close connection with "Kazakh Language and Culture" in Mongolia, with "The Society of Kazakhs in Turkey" in Turkey, with the "Kazakhs' Society" in Germany, and likewise with similar organizations in Sweden, France, Iran and other countries. For this reason, the proposal to rename the society the "International Kazakh Language Society" was widely supported at the Society plenum of 12 December 1990. The newspaper ANA TILI has appeared, with a circulation of more than 100,000.

The president is Abdwali Qaydarov, director of the Kazakh SSR Gha. A. Baytursynov imeni Linguistics Institute, academician. The vice-presidents are Omirzaq Aitbayev, candidate in philological sciences, and writer Ernest Torkehanov.

Society division chief Mukhtar Abdildabekov provided the statement of aims above.

**Kazakhstan Society of Local Historians [Qazaqstan olketanushylar qoghamy]**

The Society was formed on 28 November 1989. Aims: To organize and develop, on a broadly democratic and scientific basis, the local historians' movement in Kazakhstan. Members of the society are noted scientists and social activists, local historians and ethnographers, officials of museums and archives, writers and representatives of other specialties. Councils have been opened in all oblasts of the republic. Small industries called "My People" [Elim-ay] and "History" [Shezhire] are operating to propagandize, disseminate and renew cultural monuments of a national character and examples of folk art. The local history service of great Kazakhs such as Shoqan Walikhanov, Salyq Babazhanov, Abubekir Dibayev and Alikhan Bokeykhanov, and the experiences of the "Society for Kazakhstan Research," which collected a great deal of information in this area during the 1920s and 1930s, are taken as guidance.

Chairman of the Republic Council of the Kazakhstan Society of Local Historians is Manash Qozybayev, director of the Kazakh SSR Gha. Sh. Walikhanov imeni, History, Archaeology and Ethnography Institute, Kazakh SSR people's deputy. The first deputy chairman is Abu Takenov, doctor of historical science, professor.

Otegen Kelebayev, scientist-secretary of the Council provided the statement of aims.

**The Kazakhstan Social Committee for Ecology and the Aral and Balkhash Problems [Qazaqstan ekologiyasy zhane Aral, Balqash problemalary zhonindegi Qoghamdyq komitet]**

It was founded in November 1987. Aims: To improve ecological conditions within republic territories, save the Aral and Lake Balkhash from disaster, and show humanitarian concern for the local people of those regions. To this end, an international congress on the theme "20th Century, Poetry, the World and Ecology" is being convened.

The chairman is Mukhtar Shakhanov, noted poet, chief editor of the ZHALYN Journal, USSR people's deputy. The science policy-maker is economist Oralzhan Masatbayev.

The science policy-maker provided the statement of aims.

**The 'Nevada-Semey' [possibly 'Nevada-Semipalatinsk'] Antinuclear Testing Mass Movement ['Nevada-Semey' Yadrolyq Synaqqa Qarsy Khalyqtyq Qozghalysy]**

Founded in 1989. Aims: Putting a stop to the nuclear testing which has caused a great deal of damage to the environment of the Semipalatinsk Testing Area and to the health of local people. There are branches in several oblasts, and the movement has the publications AMANAT and IZBIRATEL. At present the movement is known internationally. Direct connections have been established with the state of Nevada. An international campaign against nuclear testing has been organized.

The spiritual leader of the movement is Olzhas Suleymenov, noted poet, first secretary of the Kazakhstan Writers' Union, and USSR people's deputy.

**The 'Liberation' Civil Movement ['Azat' Azamattyq Qozghalysy]**

Formed on 1 July 1990. Aims: Formation of an independent, national-democratic state in Kazakhstan and guaranteeing its historical development. There are divisions in nine oblasts, in several rayons, in the RSFSR and in Mongolia. Some 120,000 members and supporters are registered. The first issues of the independent political newspaper called AZAT have begun to appear in the Kazakh and Russian languages. There is no need to resign from the CPSU or the All-Union Komsomol to become a member of the movement.

According to representatives of the movement, the term "nationalist" has been applied to it. Expressing dissatisfaction with this label, the leaders of the movement think that "it is impossible not to think nationalistically under conditions of interethnic tensions, as is the case at present."

Co-chairmen: Mikhail Yesenaliyev, former Kazakh SSR minister of external affairs, candidate in philosophical science, Sabetqazy Aqatayev, candidate in historical sciences, Marat Shormanov, former second secretary of the Alma-Ata City Party Committee, Nurbaqyt Qoyshebekov, Kazakh SSR people's deputy, architect, Yevgeniy Golovastikov, driver from the No 2 Motor Base, Gulzhahan Bibolsynova, chairman of the Association of Young Constructors, and Sayyn Sapaghatov, journalist, chairman of the "Mind" [Parasat] Organization organized in Mangistau.

The statement of goals was provided by Sabetqazy Aqatayev.

**'December' National-Democracy Party ['Zheltoqsan' ultyq-demokratyalyq partiyasy]**

Formed on 20 May 1989. Aims: Separatist independence within the territories of the republic, democracy, formation of a multiparty regime of law. The party has, in cooperation with a special parliamentary commission, actively participated in efforts to assign a correct political evaluation to the 1986 December Incident, and to exonerate those unjustly punished. The party has a total

of 300 members in its ranks. Branches have been formed in Chimkent, Tselinograd, Pavlodar and in some other oblasts.

Co-chairmen: Khasen Qozhakhmetov, Kazakh radio studio editor, composer, Qiyal Shabdalın, journalist, and Amanzhol Nalibayev.

Khasen Qozhakhmetov provided the statement of party aims.

**The 'Fertile Land' Historical-Ethnographic Union  
['Zheruyyq' Tarikhi-ethnografiyalıq birlestigi]**

Founded in September 1989. Aims: To investigate and assimilate the ancient history of the Kazakh steppe, and the customs and practices of our people which have come down from time immemorial. It has gained notoriety through its organization of "Golden Eagle Trainer" [Burkitshi] game bird races, in cooperation with the young people's creative-industrial group called "Determined" [Qaysar], and likewise of "Women's Testing" [Qyz Syny] competitions. At present the group is performing circumcisions, and there are functioning a people's medicine group, a folklorists' ensemble, cooks preparing pastries and national foods, and leadership groups to organize national games in kindergarten and other organizations. There are branches in Dzhambul, Chimkent and Kzyl Orda Oblasts. Experienced young scientists Omirkhan Abdımanov, Toqtasyn Omırzaqov and Gharifolla Anesov actively participate.

Asan Sarqulov, responsible secretary for the Union, prepared the statement of aims.

**The 'Truth' History-Education Society ['Aqiqat' tarikhi-aghartu qoghamy]**

It was formed in 1988. Aims: While actively involved in history-education work, to publish needed archival materials, and to investigate the "blank pages" of history. Organizationally and politically, the Society takes advantage of meetings of the "Liberation" [Azat] civil movement, and assists that organization in all activities not antigovernment. It has open five sports-sanitariums in our capital, and a medrese under its Qaskeleng branch. Some 37 disciples are being educated in the medrese. Last year "Truth Caravan" [Aqiqat Kerwyeni] expeditions were organized in Chimkent and Dzhambul Oblasts to collect information relating to the "blank pages" among the people. This effort was carried out in cooperation with the Kazakhstan Komsomol Central Committee. The Union has about 1500 members.

The chairman is Marat Khasanayev, director of the Kazakh SSR Central State Archive. The responsible secretary is archive official Alwanbet Ysqaqov.

The responsible secretary provided the statement of goals.

**'New Home' Social and Residential Housing Group  
['Shangyraq' alewmettik-turghyn uy kesheni]**

It was founded on 20 June 1990. Aims: To bring together Kazakh young people who are in difficulty, without housing and jobs in the capital, to help them in meeting their social and living needs, to create circumstances promoting their active participation in sociopolitical life, and to have an influence upon this. In response to the initiative of "New Home," officials have just recently assigned land for the building of residential housing for some 1,300 young families from outside the city.

The chairman is Medet Qulzhabayev, recent graduate of the Kazakh State University.

The statement of goals was provided by the chairman.

**'Golden Cradle' National Ethnographic Center ['Altyn besik' ulttyq-ethnografiyalıq ortalyghı]**

Founded in November 1990. Aims: Aiding homeless young workers and representatives of the intelligentsia in the capital, and refugees from environmentally impacted areas, establishing in this connection a National-Ethnographic Center, solving standards of living and social problems in connection with cultural measures. With these goals in mind the Center has been able to obtain a piece of land outside of the city, and to begin construction work. In the future it is planned to build individual mosques, schools and playgrounds for national sports competitions, and to establish a children's house to be called "Golden Cradle." There are more than 200 members in the organization.

The chairman is Bawyrzhan Amanqulov.

**Union of Kazakhstan Muslim Women [Qazaqstan musulman ayyelderi odaghy]**

It was organized on 7 April 1990. Aims: Struggle against dangers posed to the lives of mothers and children by the negative ecological, economic and socio-political conditions from which our republic is suffering, and becoming an intermediary for life. Likewise, the Union intends to mobilize its efforts to achieve perestroyka now, to democratize society, and to improve social circumstances while awakening the political sensitivities of the Muslim women of the republic. It operates on the basis of the USSR and Kazakh SSR constitutions. Conferences have been held on "Health," "Charity," "Examples," "Sisters-in-law," "Master Craftsmanship," and "Women's Labor."

The chairman is Amina Nyghymanova, docent of the Qurmanghazy imeni Alma-Ata State Conservatory, candidate in pedagogical science. The deputy chairmen are Raykhan Beysenova, candidate in medical science, and Asyly Ospanova, candidate in philosophical sciences.

The chairman provided the statement of aims.

### New Kazakhstan CP Charter

91US0469A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 27 Dec 90 p 2

[Rules of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Approved by the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan]

[Text] The Communist Party of Kazakhstan is a political organization that unites citizens of the KaSSR and the USSR on a voluntary basis. It is a constituent part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and it operates on the principles of self-government in accordance with the constitutions of the USSR and the KaSSR.

The party is guided in its activities by communist ideals; by the creative evolution of the legacy of Marx, of Engels, and of Lenin; by the achievements of progressive social thought; and by the state and national, socioeconomic and cultural development of the republic. It has as its goal the creation of a socialist society in which social justice, the preeminence of humanitarian values, and the principles of internationalism will be realized in fact.

The republic Communist Party builds its internal life and activities on the basis of lawfulness and its own regulatory and policy documents, which in turn are based on fundamental principles and rules of the CPSU. It expresses and defends the interests of the ethnically diverse people of Kazakhstan, including its working class, its peasantry, its intelligentsia, and other social segments disposed to choose socialism; and it remains ready to cooperate with all political and social parties and movements that stand for democracy and social justice.

#### Principles of Organization and Activity

1. In its intra-party relations and activities, the Communist Party of Kazakhstan proceeds from a recognition of the preeminence of the power of the party masses and democracy, integral aspects of which are party discipline, initiative, and accountability.

The fundamental principles of party organizations and activity are:

- Common bonds of ideology, party comradeship, good will, and mutual respect of party members;
- Equality of rights and duties for all communists, binding together the interests of individual communists and the party as a whole.
- The right of all party organizations to participate in working out party policy, together with independence and self-direction in resolving issues related to their own internal affairs and activities.
- Holding discussions and referendums on fundamental issues of party and public life, which are called for by governing or other leading bodies or at the initiative of communists constituting not less than a third of the members of organizations concerned.
- Freedom of communists to express opinions and to compare views, together with the right to unite in

support of particular platforms in the course of discussion, while at the same time preventing the emergence of factionalism with regard to internal organization and discipline or to ideological and political principles at variance with party policy objectives.

- The right of the minority to freedom in internal discussion, to criticism and propaganda in support of their viewpoints, and the right to demand a political review of mistaken decisions. The minority, moreover, has the right to set forth its opinions in protocols and to demand a reassessment of controversial issues within its own organization or to present them before a higher-ranking authority. Subsequent to reassessment, however, the decision taken by a majority of discussion participants becomes binding upon all of them.
- The principle that party organizations and their leaders are chosen, may be replaced, and are accountable to those who selected or endorsed them.
- The collective nature of the work of all party organizations, as well as of the activities of all elective bodies, and the broad-based development of social principles;
- The obligatory nature of carrying out the decisions of higher-standing elective bodies representing party organizations and communists, while exercising the right of communists to participate in their fulfillment, determining independently the ways and means of implementing these decisions, and in the event of disagreeing with them, the right to appeal the decisions before a higher authority—without, however, halting temporarily their fulfillment.
- Openness and frankness in the operations of all party organizations and bodies.

2. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan is constructed in principle on the basis of democratic centralism in terms of both territory and production. It has the following hierarchical structure: primary, rayon, city, and oblast party organizations. The organizations uniting communists of a given territory are higher, the greater the number of their participating [subordinate] members.

3. The primary governing bodies of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan are its general meetings, conferences, and congresses. They are empowered to act if more than half of the members of the party organization or its elected delegates are present; or, in the event of deputy reports or elections, if not less than two-thirds of them are present. These primary governing bodies elect the executive bodies (bureaus, committees) and the auditing commissions.

Party executive bodies and auditing commissions are elected by secret ballot. The voting list may include the names of any number of candidates. A candidate is elected upon receiving a majority of the votes of the members participating in the the balloting of the meeting, conference, congress, party committee plenum, or auditing commission session.

Communists vote for delegates to rayon, city, and oblast conferences, to republic conferences, and to congresses of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan by direct secret ballot at elections held, as a general rule, in their respective voting districts.

Party committees and auditing commissions are formed by directly delegated representatives of lower-standing party organizations who have been elected as representatives by secret ballot. The right of final confirmation of their election, however, rests with a party conference or congress.

Party members may not serve on more than two committees or auditing commissions of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.

Party committee secretaries at all levels and auditing commission chairmen are elected at appropriate meetings, conferences, or congresses or, at the discretion of the delegates, at plenary sessions of party committees or auditing commission sessions. They may be registered at any primary party organization.

Members of party elective bodies at the rayon committee level or higher may be elected for no more than two successive terms of office.

The membership of party executive or monitoring bodies may be altered or entirely replaced by holding new elections prior to the expiration of a term of office upon the decision of a meeting or plenary session of the executive body of the organization that elected it. The authority of the new members is subject to confirmation by plenary sessions of appropriate party committees or auditing commission sessions.

Party committees and organizations may establish independently with their own resources, or jointly with other organizations, the means necessary to disseminate mass information.

Elective party bodies may establish either permanent or temporary commissions to deal with party activities or they may establish a working staff consisting of communists appointed with due regard for the recommendations of the primary party organizations. Labor legislation covers staff workers and those who are no longer members.

4. Party organizations and committees of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan work in close collaboration with party organizations the USSR Armed Forces and among the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB, and the railroad which are stationed on the territory of the KaSSR. The communist members within these organizations may choose, and may be chosen as members of, elective bodies of organizations in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. Delegates to rayon, city, and oblast conferences and to congresses of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan may be elected at party

meetings and conferences of military units and formations in accordance with rules of representation to be determined by territorial party committees.

5. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan independently resolves issues of a political and organizational nature as well as other matters, including cadre affairs, publishing, and financial management. In matters related to the development of the state and to economic, social, and cultural affairs, the Communist Party of Kazakhstan carries out its policies with due consideration for combining the interests of the CPSU with those of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and the KaSSR. As a component part of the CPSU, it undertakes to lead and expedite all resolutions adopted at conferences and congresses of the CPSU and plenary sessions of the CPSU Central Committee. In the event that its interests are infringed upon by decisions of the CPSU Politburo or Central Committee Secretariat, the republic party Central Committee, instead of undertaking to implement the decisions, may demand a review of the controversial issue in question at a CPSU Central Committee plenum or at a united plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Control Commission.

The relations of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan with the communist parties of the Union republics are built upon the basis of policy and procedural documents and are infused with a spirit of practical cooperation, reciprocity, and party comradeship.

The Communist Party of Kazakhstan, through the good offices of its Central Committee, maintains direct ties with the parties of countries abroad.

6. The activities of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan may be suspended by decision of its congress, based upon a general party referendum that is passed by not less than two-thirds of republic communists.

#### Membership in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan

7. Any citizen of the USSR and the KaSSR who has reached the age of 18 and who endorses the charters and policy goals of the USSR and the KaSSR communist parties may be a member of the Communist Party, working in one of the primary party organizations and lending it material support.

A member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is at the same time a member of the CPSU and has a single party card. Each member of the CPSU who resides, works, or studies in the republic, by registering in one of the primary party organizations, becomes a member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.

8. A member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan has the right to take part in working out and carrying out party policy; to elect and to be elected; to criticize any party body and any communist; to make a request, declaration or proposal to any party authority and to demand an answer in direct response to his appeal; and to take part personally in discussing any issues concerned

with his activities or conduct. A communist may rely on the party's defending him against any unjust accusation or persecution related to his party activities; and in case of need, he may rely on its material assistance and support, while availing himself of its institutional services and facilities.

A member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan has the right to take part in the work of social organizations and associations the activities and objectives of which do not conflict with the policy objectives of the party.

9. A member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan has the following obligations: to carry out the decisions of party bodies; to uphold and advance party ideas; to struggle to achieve its objectives and establish its avant-garde views in society; to adhere consistently to party policy in labor collectives, in state and public organizations, and among the people at large; to comply with the requirements of the law and party discipline; to strive to strengthen the friendship of peoples and to affirm the principle of internationalism. A communist is obligated to guard the honor and dignity of the party and help to strengthen its ideological and organizational unity and to increase its authority. He is obligated to pay his party dues promptly, and to protect party property.

Membership in the party is incompatible with participation in any other political parties or in any nationalist, chauvinistic, or anti-socialist acts or organizations.

10. Admission as a member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is carried out on an individual basis at the entrant's expressed wishes. The decision to admit the entrant is taken at a meeting of the primary party organization, and it becomes final if more than half of the participating members vote for his admission. Admission to membership of citizens from labor collectives or at their places of residence, where there are no primary party organizations, may be brought about directly by rayon and city party committees. A probational period may be set for the new member, and sponsorship by two other party members may be required. Persons who have previously been members of other political parties are considered for admission on the basis of the overall circumstances. The registration of members in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is done in accordance with procedures similar to those of the CPSU. A communist is registered on the party rolls either at his place of residence or work, as he wishes, and with the concurrence of the primary party organization.

If for reasons of health or age a party member is unable to participate fully in the life of the party, in response to a personal statement by him, the primary party organization may release him from his regular duties and from the payment of membership dues.

A member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan who has worked actively in the party not less than 30 years may upon the recommendation of the primary party organization be awarded the honorary title of "Veteran of the CPSU."

11. In the event of a violation of the statutory requirements, the primary party organization or a higher-standing party committee may rebuke the communist, or reprimand him, or it may expel him from party membership. The decision by a higher-standing party committee to expel the member is conveyed to him by the primary party organization concerned; and in the event that an objection is lodged, the matter is reviewed a second time by the committee, with the participation of representatives of the primary party organization, at which time a final disposition of the matter is taken.

Party membership may also be terminated by a communist's statement that he is leaving the Communist Party of Kazakhstan of his own free will. This statement is subject to review by the primary party organization.

The termination of membership of a person found guilty of a crime in court is decided upon by the primary party organization after the sentence is imposed.

Questions concerning the party status of a member of a party elective body are addressed at a party plenum with due consideration given to the opinions of the primary party organization.

The case of a party member who has not paid his membership dues for three months or more is subject to review by the primary party organization. A member of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan who has been off the books for a three-month period, except for a valid reason, is considered expelled; the decision to expel is made by the party committee for the organization where the person was previously registered.

A decision to expel a member from the party is adopted if more than half the participating members of the primary party organization or party body vote for expulsion.

A person who has been expelled from the Communist Party of Kazakhstan or who has received a penalty has a right to appeal the decision within three months to the Party Control Commission of a higher-standing party committee, right up to the CPSU Central Control commission. The appeal is reviewed within two months of the day of its receipt.

#### Primary Party Organizations

12. Primary party organizations form the basis of the party. They may be established in terms of function, productivity, and territory, consisting of not less than three members, by the decision of a meeting and registered with the appropriate rayon and city committees. For a period during which important political or social campaigns are carried out (elections, referendums, and so on), party rayon and city committees may form united territorial-productive organizations and groups.

A primary party organization may comprise other party groups or shop organizations, which by decision of a meeting or conference may be granted the rights of

primary party organizations with respect to membership in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.

With regard to the tasks and specific circumstances of their activities, primary party organizations conduct meetings as needed but no less than one every three months; they decide independently matters of admitting and terminating party membership; they determine the direction, the structure, and the methods of political actions and their own financial management; and they build reciprocal relations with the organizations of other parties as well as with soviet and public organizations.

The basic tasks of the primary party organizations are:

- to create conditions necessary for realizing the rights and duties of communists, to defend their honor and dignity, to be vigilant that their activities are in compliance with the Party Rules, and to assist local party bodies in their organizational, political, and propaganda work;
- to carry out direct political work with all those who are not party members, seeking to convince them to support party policy; to know the needs, opinions, proposals, and questions of the masses; to protect their social interests and rights; and to initiate solutions to substantive problems, whether political in nature or of some other kind, affecting the efforts of citizens to govern themselves.

In exceptional cases, by decision of a rayon or city party committee, a primary party organization may be dissolved when its activities are found to be in conflict with party policies or rules. Within two months of the dissolution of a primary party organization by a rayon or city party committee, its members must answer charges with respect to their personal conduct, and appropriate measures must be taken in terms of political, ideological, and organizational remedies. The primary party organization has the right to appeal the decision to dissolve it before higher-standing party bodies.

13. In order to carry out current operations, a meeting (conference) of a primary party organization elects for a period of two or three years a party committee and its secretary. At the discretion of the communists present, it also elects an auditing commission. In party organizations numbering fewer than 15 communists, the secretary and the deputy of the party organization (in party groups, the party group organization) may be elected for a period, and by as procedure, that is determined at the meeting, but for a period of not more than two or three years. The work of a primary party organization secretary is subject to regulations applicable to the status of secretary.

#### **Rayon, City, and Oblast Party Organizations**

14. Rayon, city, and oblast party organizations perform work in support of party policy within rayon, city, and oblast limits, implementing the decisions of higher-standing party bodies together with resolutions of their own.

A rayon, city, or oblast party conference sanctions the authority of members of rayon, city, and oblast party committees, as well as auditing commissions, elected in lower-standing party organizations for a period not to exceed five years, and it elects members of higher-standing elective party bodies. Conferences are convened by decision of a rayon, city, or oblast party committee, or at the demand of a group of party organizations comprising not less than a third of the total number of communists in the rayon, city, or oblast.

Conferences and party committee plenums review urgent matters of party life in its relations with the soviets of people's deputies and their executive bodies as well as with other social movements and parties. Taking under advisement the opinions of the party organizations present, the conferences forge and submit proposals to state executive bodies, public associations, labor collectives, and the public at large, addressing programs designed to resolve political, national or ethnic, social, economic, ecological or cultural and moral, as well as other, problems in the region. Party committee plenums are convened as required but not less than once in six months.

Rayon and city party committees direct and coordinate the activities of primary party committees and keep the records of the communists. An oblast party committee may grant a relatively large primary party organization the rights of rayon party committees to keep such records.

Rayon, city, and oblast party committees monitor compliance with policy and regulatory documents of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and with the decisions of party conferences and congresses. They are entitled to revoke the decision of a primary party committee—and an oblast party committee is entitled to revoke the decision of a rayon or city party committee—if the decision is in conflict with party policies or rules.

Rayon, city, and oblast party committees, taking into consideration the opinions of lower-standing organizations, elect at their plenum a rayon, city, or oblast party bureau.

15. Auditing commissions of rayon, city, and oblast party organizations check the accuracy of the budget-keeping process, including the records of payment of membership dues, together with the process of reviewing citizen appeals, and the financial affairs of enterprises and institutions within the purview of their party committees and primary party organizations.

16. To maintain oversight control of compliance with decisions of leading party bodies, the observance of rules, and the resolution of matters pertaining to protecting the interests of primary party organizations, the honor and dignity of communists, and for the purpose of reviewing appeals within rayon, city, and oblast party organizations, party committees at the appropriate level

form party control commissions. Party control commissions are invested with independence of action in the disposition of appeals made by communists. They operate in accordance with procedures approved at a plenum of the party committee.

#### **Higher and Central Bodies of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan**

17. The highest body of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is the congress. Regular congresses are convened by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan not less than once in five years. The decisions of the Central Committee with respect to the convocation of the congress, its agenda, and rules of representation are announced no later than three months prior to the congress. The Central Committee publishes in advance draft documents on the issues to be addressed at the congress.

A special (extraordinary) congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is convened by the Central committee either on its own initiative or at the demand of party organizations comprising not less than a third of the total number of communists and within a two-month period of receiving it.

In the event of noncompliance by the Central Committee with the demand to convene a special (extraordinary) congress, the organizations making the demand may form an organizational committee enjoying all the rights of the party Central Committee for the purpose of holding a special (extraordinary) congress.

18. A congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan:

- listens to reports and accounts of the Central Committee, the Auditing Commission, and other bodies; it provides critical comments on their work, and adopts resolutions on matters discussed;
- receives documents on policy and procedure; reviews and amends them;
- determines the political course of the party and its election platform;
- approves the composition of the Central Committee and the Auditing Commission, persons elected in oblast party organizations, and representatives to attend conferences of military units and formations;
- assigns representatives of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan to the staffs of central CPSU bodies.

19. During the period between congresses, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan convenes as many republic party conferences as required to discuss critical issues of policy and practical activities of the party.

The conferences are entitled to hear reports of the Central Committee and Auditing Commission concerning their operations, and to make decisions within the framework of party policy documents on other matters that the party is under obligation to deal with. It may also make alterations in the Party Rules.

20. During the period between congresses, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan:

- elects the Politburo of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, which accounts for its activities once a year to a plenum of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan;
- confirms the appointments of senior editors assigned to the print media under the direction of the Central Committee;
- directs operations in compliance with the decisions of congresses and conferences of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Kazakhstan;
- acting upon the consensus of party organizations and labor collectives, drafts proposals on matters of internal and external republic policy and submits them in the form of legislation, or in some other form of initiative, to the KaSSR Supreme Soviet;
- drafts and approves normative documents with respect to altering the Party Rules;
- works with members of other parties (factions) in the KaSSR Supreme Soviet and other republic bodies;
- implements party cadre policy;
- directs the activities of oblast, city, and rayon party committees and primary party organizations;
- represents the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in its relations with other political and public organizations;
- determines and reviews major aspects involved in the formation and use of the party budget, while informing communists of the republic on a regular basis with regard to financial matters.

A plenum is convened by decision of the Politburo of the Central committee of Kazakhstan or upon demand of not less than one third of the members of the Central committee.

21. The Auditing Commission of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan elects the Presidium and the chairman of the commission, monitors the handling of the party budget, including the payment of party dues, and reviews citizen appeals.

22. The Central Committee and Auditing Commission of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan hold their meetings not less than twice a year, and they meet in joint session as the need arises.

Members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan can take part in the work of the Auditing Commission of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, and members of the Auditing Commission can take part in work of the plenum of the Central Committee with the right of a consultative voice;

23. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan creates the Party Control Commission. This commission plays a role in monitoring compliance with actions called for by the policy and regulatory documents of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. It also serves to strengthen party ranks and party comradeship. It defends the interests of primary party organizations as

defined by the Party Rules, and it defends the rights, the honor, and the dignity of communists. It also reviews their appeals.

The Party Control Commission of the Central Committee is vested with a right to act independently in arbitrating communist appeals and in submitting proposals to the appropriate party committees and organizations regarding penalization by the party of communists who have violated the requirements of the Party Rules or the tenets of social ethics. The Party Control Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is formed at a plenum of the Central Committee. It consists of members of the Central Committee and staff workers of the Party Control Commission as well as other communists. It is guided in its activities by the views endorsed by the plenum.

#### **Communists in the Soviets, State Bodies, and Public Associations**

24. In the soviets, state bodies, industries, and public associations, the Communist Party of Kazakhstan pursues its policy objectives through the efforts of the communists in them.

25. The Communist Party of Kazakhstan struggles for political leadership in the elections to the soviets of people's deputies and through by other means available for citizens to express their will. The party organizations work out and publicize their election platforms; they recommend communists as candidates for election as people's deputies, and they assist them in conducting their election campaigns.

Party organizations may enter into election agreements with other public political organizations and coalitions in support of their candidates for the office of People's Deputy.

26. While the soviets of people's deputies are in session, communist people's deputies may unite to form party coalitions (communist factions) to coordinate their activities for the purpose of carrying out the will and the instructions of the voters. Party coalitions (communist factions) may also work on a cooperative basis with the committees of other parties to gain their help and support.

The formation by communists of factions or groups in the soviets which are not affiliated with party bodies but which act in the name of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is prohibited.

27. The Communist Party builds its relations with unions and other public organizations and mass movements on the basis of reciprocity, mutual cooperation, and respect for one another's point of view.

At congresses and conferences convened by public organizations, groups of party members (communist factions) may be formed along the same lines as such groups are formed in the soviets.

28. In working with young people, party bodies and primary party organizations rely on the Komsomol of Kazakhstan, and they work with other youth organizations with a socialist orientation, assisting in every way possible their activities, while encouraging them to adopt and develop the youth policies of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. The close relations between Communist Party and Komsomol organizations are built upon the principles of political partnership and a common ideology, while acknowledging the independence of the Komsomol as an organization, together with mutual trust and respect. The party looks upon the Komsomol of Kazakhstan as a reserve corps for the replenishment of its ranks.

29. The primary party organizations and party committees may recommend communists as well as nonparty members for specific assignments in various fields of state, economic, and public affairs. They may use political means at their disposal to have them elected or appointed to official positions; they may support them, listen to reports by communists on their performance, and make public their findings, proposals, and recommendations.

#### **Party Monetary Assets and Property**

30. The activities of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan are provided for financially and materially through their own sources of income.

The monetary assets of the party are derived from party membership dues; income from publishing and other economic activities; voluntary contributions from individual citizens, enterprises, organizations, and societies; and other sources of income not forbidden by law.

Membership dues, which are established on the basis of income, are as follows:

<b>Party Membership Dues per month</b>	
<b>Income</b>	<b>Dues</b>
Under R70	10 kopecks
R71-R100	20 kopecks
R101-R150	30 kopecks
R151-R250	1 percent
Above R250	Not less than 2 percent

Working communist pensioners pay party dues separately from their pensions or wages.

Party members released to work with the Komsomol and paying Komsomol dues may be exempted from paying party membership dues.

31. The budget of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan and the structure of its balance sheet—the amounts derived from the incomes of local party organizations and the subsidies made from it—are reported to and

subject to approval by a Central Committee plenum of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, and they are also brought to the attention of the membership.

Party organizations are independently responsible for the development, replenishment, and disposition of their budgets. They have the right to address structural, staff, and economic questions, and they may create, revise, or eliminate periodical publications. The budgets and accounting reports are subject to the approval of appropriate party committee plenums with the cognizance of party members.

32. To provide for its activities the Communist Party of Kazakhstan has at its disposal buildings, installations, and equipment; stocks of items in storage; property in support of educational, medical, and cultural needs; monetary assets; publishing facilities, including periodical publications and printing plants; as well as other property belonging to the CPSU. It also has property of its own. It has its own financial resources as well as small, joint, and subsidiary enterprises, transport facilities, and property of other kinds.

The party committees exercise operational control (the possession, use, and disposition) of party organization property. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, party committees locally, and the institutions and organizations of the Communist party enjoy the rights of juridical persons [corporate bodies], and they may delegate these rights to subordinate organizations in the political hierarchy, including primary party organizations.

In the event that activities of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan should be terminated, its property is to be placed at the disposal of activities functioning in furtherance of party objectives. The corporate body to which the property is to be transferred is to be determined by the party congress.

To finance the activities of the primary party organizations, including the maintenance of members who have been released from duty, these organizations are to receive up to 50 percent of the total amount of membership dues collected.

To resolve questions pertaining to the financing of party organization activities, and to the distribution or redistribution of funds among rayon and city party committees, finance commissions are established with the participation of primary party organization secretaries, and invested with the powers of rayon committees.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan is located in the city of Alma-Ata.

### **New Tajik Cabinet of Ministers Deputy Chairman Appointed**

91P50180A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST  
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 10 Apr 91 p 1

[Ukase of the President of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic on the appointment of comrade S. Khayrulloev as deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Cabinet of Ministers]

[Text] Comrade Saydullo Khayrulloev is appointed deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Cabinet of Ministers.

[signed] K. Makhkamov, President of the Tajik SSR, 8 April 1991, Dushanbe

Deputy Chairman of the Tajik SSR Cabinet of Ministers Saydullo Khayrulloev:

Comrade Saydullo Khayrulloev was born on 10 August 1945 in the Garmskiy Rayon of the Tajik SSR. A Tajik, he has been a member of the Communist Party since 1972. In 1969 he graduated from the Tajik Agricultural Institute. He started his career in 1969 as the chief engineer of the Garm Irrigation System Administration, where he worked until 1970. From 1971 to 1972 he was chief of the Garm Irrigation System Administration.

From 1971 through 1972 he headed the Dushanbevodstroy Trust PMK-21 [Mobile Mechanized Column-21] in the Dzhirgatal'skiy Rayon of the Tajik SSR. From 1972 through 1975 he headed Dushanbevodstroy Trust PMK-23 in Garmskiy Rayon. From 1975 to 1977 he worked as deputy chairman of the Tajik SSR Garmskiy Rayon Council of People's Deputies Ispolkom.

From 1977 to 1979 he audited the Tashkent Higher Party School. Then he worked as chairman of the Tajik SSR Garmskiy Rayon Council of People's Deputies Ispolkom.

In 1985 he was elected first secretary of the Tajik SSR Communist Party's Sovetskiy Raykom and worked there in this capacity until 1988. In 1988 he was elected secretary of the Khatlon Obkom, where he worked until 1990.

From 1990 up to the present time he has been chairman of the Tajik SSR Kurgan-Tyube Oblast Council People's Deputies Ispolkom.

Comrade S. Khayrulloev is a Tajik SSR People's Deputy who has been awarded the Medal of Honor.

### **Niyazov on Turkmen Republic Policy**

91US0491A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 18,  
29 Apr 91 p 9

[Interview with Saparmurad Niyazov, member of the Federation Council and president of the Turkmen SSR, by Viktor Vodolazhskiy and Vladimir Kuleshov; place and date not given: "The Ills Cannot Be Dealt With in Isolation"]

[Text] Ashkhabad-Moscow— The crisis in our society continues to deepen; this was noted recently in the joint statement issued by the president of the USSR and the leaders of the highest state organs from nine of the Union republics. Society is torn by social and interethnic conflicts. The decline in production is increasing, the standard of living is falling... Law and order and discipline have been seriously disrupted in the country. These ills cannot be dealt with in isolation, or the danger warned off. This is what Saparmurad Niyazov, Federation Council member and president of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] believes. He talks with NEDELYA correspondents.

[NEDELYA] Today many people are talking about the so-called "parade" of the sovereignties. And often this concept is used in general in a somewhat pejorative way. What is your attitude toward this "parade," Saparmurad Atayevich? For it is one thing to observe particular processes from the sidelines but quite another to be there, and, moreover, guiding them and filling them with practical actions.

[Niyazov] The freedom that we have gained is difficult and dramatic. But let us be fair; life is hastening to bring help, and it would be just the latest unforgivable error to brush it aside without listening to the living steps of history.

What do I have in mind here? First and foremost that organic regrouping—a regrouping that only at first blush seems to be random—of the relationships of ownership and power that has brought us face to face with the fact of the sovereignty of peoples.

To dramatize this process and fail to see in it the vivifying source of the integrity and strength of the state is to call in question the political arrangement and common sense, and even the logic of development. I admit that those sentiments in society that have been dictated by the expectation of the collapse of the Union come essentially from the old proverb "fear makes molehills into mountains." And no matter how such sentiments may be fueled and no matter what the philosophy whence they come, and no matter what idols of public opinion may be championed, life will set everything in its proper place. Even if the grounds for such optimism are still pitifully small, we should not, we have no right to be guided only by a vision of crisis.

I see the real power of the republic, and only this, as the means for and conditions of integrity of the Union, toward whose defense, apart from considerations of common sense, we must direct all the energy of state and legal thinking and all our actions. A federation of republics moving into the 21st century cannot be some amorphous formation existing on the principle of a tug-of-war.

[NEDELYA] You are for full independence for the republics and at the same time the unity and integrity of the Union. Are there not contradictions here?

[Niyazov] There probably are. But from my standpoint it is a normal contradiction that should lead us to the search for optimal, mutually acceptable solutions. Today, however, the contradictions are shifting and become confrontations. And this is not only substitution of concepts but also substitution of action. It is superfluous to explain where this will lead.

The country has reached the peak of its crisis: In the eyes of the people there are constant pain and despair; but is it permissible to deepen these sentiments artificially by creating "wars?" Is it right for a state with many centuries of history to cast doubt on the very fact of its existence because many mistakes, perhaps unforgivable mistakes, have been committed? No.

Should there or should there not be a Union? Even in the postulation of the question I see a secondary factor that distracts us from solving the clamorous, urgent tasks of the day. This is why at one time I personally spoke out against the holding of the referendum.

[NEDELYA] We would be interested in knowing if your attitude toward the referendum has changed since the publication of the results. For Turkmenia set a record in the voting—97.9 percent of the voters in favor of the Union.

[Niyazov] Although I do not see any great benefit in the referendum even now, I admit that its results must be taken into account. As far as the will of the inhabitants of the republic are concerned, there are no great revelations for me here. And it is not just a matter of the specifically peace-loving characteristics of our people, nor of dependence of the starting level of the republic as a function of the Union structures, which, of course, is extremely important. The question is that, having said "yes" to the Union, our people had affirmed their historical right to their existing statehood, seeing in it the only guaranteed condition for further development.

[NEDELYA] One VECHERNIY ASHKHABAD reader writes this: "I am here as the guest of my daughters. I can assess the life of the republic from the sidelines, as it were. And I say with total conviction that there is still power here, a sense of responsibility for their own actions and words."

And in fact, Saparmurad Atayevich, against the backdrop of the interethnic collisions and political storms being played out in the country, Turkmenia appears as a unique oasis of calm...

[Niyazov] Despite perestroyka; is that what you wish to say? I see that you smile, but I hear that question often. However, there is something to smile about. Also, when scanning the newspapers I have run across the assertion that the party-state structures remain, so they say, the place where power is concentrated in Turkmenia. Hence, they say, the support for the system, that is, the Union—in its present form, in an attitude of loyalty to the center—and other sins stemming from our numb conservatism.

Well, let us imagine for a minute that we cast aside all our own affairs and direct our energies toward explaining to our opponents all the relationships and contradictions. There are many. But if we do that, our guest would hardly praise us then, and not just she.

For close to a year we have been living under conditions of independence, and I can say quite definitely that we have in our baggage things that even recently we would not have dared to have, or even dreamed of. We have them without any kind of urging from above, and without any kind of serious opposition from the center to our initiatives.

At the same time we are aware that it is impossible to dismantle a rigidly centralized economic system in just an hour. Things do not happen immediately. Just take the Union enterprises located on republic territory. The central departments responsible for them have always shown an interest, have they not? In the increasing volumes of raw materials that brought pennies to the republic but were profitable for the ministries. Neither social problems nor questions pertaining to improving the life of the people working there were of particular concern to them.

[NEDELYA] The republic was one of the last in the country to introduce the post of president, but it was the first to elect one by popular vote. The presidential form of government is what? The call of the time, or perhaps a tribute to fashion?

[Niyazov] I think that it is the foremost under the conditions of transition from a totalitarian system to the form of power in a democratic society.

We were not any exception in the country when we felt the deficit of executive power. But we did not yield to "legislative stockjobbing" and we did not propagate laws that no one could enforce. Incidentally, we were also the first to create a cabinet of ministers and subordinate it to a presidential council, thus creating a pyramid of executive power that assumes strict mutual accountability.

[NEDELYA] And what place has the Communist Party been assigned in that pyramid? For here it seems that it is not about to surrender its positions...

[Niyazov] And why should it? Because of the dictates of fashion? For if the aims and tasks of the party match the interests of the people, why artificially create new parties and generate a mass of problems? We do not reject the multiparty system; we see prospects both for it and for ourselves. But not now, for the multiparty system is, if you wish, a new level of spirituality and civilization, and we still have to grow up to that level.

As far as the present position of the Communist Party is concerned, it has been brought fully into line with the Constitution. Here, the party does not exercise the functions of power; these have been transferred to the soviets at all levels. But we are not about to disparage the role and importance of the party. We need it as a

political force capable at this stage of the republic of consolidating our multinational society.

[NEDELYA] When one observes the processes taking place in the republic and compares them with what is happening in the country, one involuntarily starts to think about a unique kind of Turkmen model for development. The republic is moving boldly toward rapprochement with countries abroad, and in many of them its own trade and other representations are opening up. What has dictated so extensive a demarche abroad? For foreign partners are showing, to be candid, an unusual interest in the wealth here. But even if you yourselves are none the worse for it, will not these losses accrue for the country?

[Niyazov] Interest in us really is great. Suffice it to refer to the recent international congress in Houston, which announced a competition among the world's major oil companies to carry out search-and-survey work within the territory of Turkmenia. But does this mean that the oil and gas rivers of the republic will be flowing out of the country? Of course not.

Everything that is being undertaken and will be undertaken in terms of foreign trade relations will have as its purpose the development of the republic within the channel of the civilized standards of the world community.

And who in the country will reject this kind of partnership—a partnership that is not only rich and solvent but—the main thing—is able to realize the enormous natural and economic potential?

So that our independence is adequate to dispose of both according to reason and to conscience...

Strictly speaking, no one is planning to take it away from us. No one, moreover, either from the center or from anywhere else, will influence our cadre policy or our investment policy. Somehow we shall sort it out for ourselves, and to our own advantage, and to the country's profit.

Of course, there could have been no talk of this previously. Who, for example, would earlier have allowed us to "open up" a new oblast for ourselves without the agreement of the center? It appeared on our map just recently—Balkanskaya Oblast, to replace Krasnovodsk Oblast, which was thoughtlessly abolished during the period of the feverish campaign to cut back the administration apparatus.

Or take the question of ecology. Our informal organizations have yelled themselves hoarse about the misfortunes of the Aral region. And that was it—just shouting, but nothing was done. But we have adopted a program for the Aral region, and step by step we are implementing it. We are using hard currency to build a potable water plant for Tashauz. Who previously would have permitted such a thing, especially when there was a budget deficit?

And remember how many loud words were uttered and how much emotion was stirred up about the dominance of cotton? But independence was needed to manage our wealth in a businesslike manner, reduce the number of acres sown to cotton, and use the land thus freed up to grow grain crops. We have calculated that two or three years will be enough provide ourselves fully with grain.

[NEDELYA] Your optimism could be shared and it would be possible to agree with you entirely were it not for the fact of the situation prevailing in the country...

[Niyazov] Yes, the country is in trouble. And today we have no right to isolate ourselves from it with our own independence; nor indeed can we.

And to be honest, it is painful to watch what is happening. For the threads that bind us are being broken.

Today the Ashneftemash plant—the only enterprise in the country delivering its output to the large projects in petrochemicals and metallurgy and the oil and gas industry—is on the verge of closure. The miners' strike has even "reached" us.

It would seem that there is little reason for optimism here! However, there is an affinity between optimism and hope, and hope is the neighbor of good will. Incidentally, in my opinion good will is also present in the joint statement issued by the president of the USSR and the leaders of the nine republics "On Urgent Measures To Stabilize the Situation in the Country and Deal With the Crisis." And indeed, the 23 April meeting of the leaders of the nine republics, in which I participated, was dictated by nothing other than good will. The country has always extricated itself from all its crises. And it has always rested on the will of the people. Knowing my own people as I do, I am sure that not only we, the Turkmens, desire peace and agreement of the mind, and a fine future for our children; everyone wants this! And I know of no force that could overcome the will of the people.

### **New Uzbek Communist Party Charter**

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#### **[Charter of the Uzbek Communist Party]**

[Text] The Uzbek Communist Party is an independent political organization uniting all the republic's Communists on a voluntary basis. Acting as a party of the socialist choice and communist future, it defines its programmatic ideas on the basis of the need to guarantee human rights and social justice and to provide for spiritual renewal and decent living conditions for all of the nations and nationalities inhabiting the republic, and for their internationalist solidarity on the basis of the Uzbek SSR's achievement of political and economic sovereignty. It is independent in developing its own action program and tactics, and in defining and carrying out a political line based on the creative reinterpretation of the theory and practice of socialism, on the principles

of Marxism-Leninism as freed from dogmatic interpretations, and on the development of those principles in light of the accomplishments of progressive world social thought.

In the Communist Party's activities there are no privileged representatives of any one class, social group or nationality. It defends the interests of the republic's working people regardless of their national affiliation and faith. The republic's Communist Party is prepared for cooperation with all of society's progressive forces and for equal partnership with public political organizations that profess universal human values and express the interests of the working people.

The Uzbek Communist Party works for the consolidation of society and establishment of the principles of internationalism in relations among peoples, calls for respect for national traditions and customs of the Uzbek people and all peoples inhabiting the republic, and resolutely rejects racism, nationalism, chauvinism and the kindling of interethnic and social conflicts.

The Uzbek Communist Party belongs to the CPSU on the basis of common programmatic goals and charter principles. Acting within the limits of the Uzbek SSR Constitution and Soviet laws, it bears full political responsibility for the programs it advances for state construction and the republic's socioeconomic development, and for its own practical actions toward their implementation.

### **I. The Uzbek Communist Party and the CPSU**

1. The Uzbek Communist Party is independent in determining the ways to implement the CPSU's strategic goals and fundamental charter principles. It draws up its own program documents and charter, and on the basis of them decides political, ideological, organizational, personnel, publishing, financial and economic, and other questions, and it maintains direct relations with other parties and public movements, including foreign ones.

It bases its relations with other union republics' Communist Parties on common ideology, equality, businesslike cooperation and party comradeship and solidarity.

2. The Uzbek Communist Party recommends its representatives to serve on CPSU central agencies and, when necessary, recalls them from those agencies. Decisions on these matters are made by the congress of the republic Communist Party and, in the period between congresses, by a republic party conference or Central Committee plenum.

3. Members of the CPSU Central Committee, its Politburo and Secretariat, and the CPSU Central Control Commission who are elected from the Uzbek Communist Party are its authorized representatives on those agencies. In the consideration of fundamental questions of the CPSU's life and activities, they are guided by the interests of the republic's working people, the political directives of Uzbek Communist Party congresses, and

republic party conferences and Central Committee plenums in defining their positions.

4. In the event that the CPSU Central Committee adopts decisions that infringe on the independence of the Uzbek Communist Party or are contrary to the republic's interests, a Communist Party Central Committee plenum may decline to accept that decision for implementation and demand that disputed issues be considered at a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, or at a combined plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

5. In the event it becomes necessary to request the convening of a special (emergency) congress of the CPSU, the decision on this matter is made by a congress or all-republic conference of the Uzbek Communist Party.

6. Should the need arise to consider the question of the Uzbek Communist Party's continuation as part of the CPSU, it is decided by a Communist Party congress after a referendum is held among the republic's Communists.

## II. Membership in the Uzbek Communist Party

7. A citizen of the Uzbek SSR who has reached the age of 18, accepts the party's programmatic documents and fulfills the Uzbek Communist Party Charter, works in one of its primary organizations, and regularly makes financial contributions in support of the party may be a member of the Uzbek Communist Party.

A member of the Uzbek Communist Party is simultaneously a member of the CPSU and carries its unified party membership card. Every member of the CPSU who comes into the republic to for work, study or residence becomes a member of the Uzbek Communist Party after being placed on the party records.

Membership in the Uzbek Communist Party is incompatible with membership in other political parties or with factional activity within the party.

8. All members of the Uzbek Communist Party are equal. They have the right:

- to raise and freely discuss question pertaining to the party's domestic and foreign policies and intraparty life, and to participate in the development of decisions on them;
- to elect and be elected to party agencies, and to receive information on their work;
- to offer judgments of and criticize any party agency and any Communist;
- to make statements and proposals to any party office and receive an answer from it;
- to take part in the work of a party agency when it discusses his proposal or a question of his performance or conduct;
- to take part in the work of public organizations and movements whose activities are conducted in accordance with the Uzbek SSR Constitution and are not

in conflict with the party's programmatic goals and charter principles;

- to utilize the services of party institutions and enterprises.

Relations among members of the Uzbek Communist Party are based on the principles of party comradeship. Its organizations and committees do not permit persecution for criticism and opinions expressed, the pitting of Communists against one another, or the restriction of their charter rights on account of national affiliation, type of employment, or other attributes. In every case in which it does not conflict with the programmatic goals and charter principles, every Communist is ensured the political support of party organizations and elective agencies in his public activities and other activities permitted by law, and the defense of his honor and dignity in the event that his constitutional or other rights are infringed upon.

9. A member of the Uzbek Communist Party is required:

- to know the program and charter provisions, observe party discipline, and carry out party decisions;
- to fight to support the Uzbek Communist Party's vanguard positions in society, carry out its political line in practice, and actively contribute to the development of the people's democratic self-government;
- to improve himself politically and culturally;
- to be an official member of a primary party organization, take part in its work, regularly pay party membership dues, and report on his activities;
- to work to strengthen friendship among peoples, and to treat with respect the national traditions, historical and cultural legacy, and language of the representatives of all nations and nationalities inhabiting the republic;
- to observe the law and, through personal example, affirm the norms of public morality and a conscientious attitude toward work.

10. Admission to the Uzbek Communist Party is made on an individual basis on the basis of an application by the applicant, with voucher by two party members. At the discretion of the primary party organization, a trial period of up to one year may be established for a new party member.

**Note:** At the discretion of the primary party organization, voucher by the appropriate Komsomol organization may be required for applicants to the party who are members of the Uzbek Leninist Communist Youth League.

The decision on admission to party membership is made by a meeting of the primary party organization and is considered valid if more than half of the Communists who are members of that organization have voted for it, with the exception of those who on the basis of an application have been relieved of regular work in it for reasons of health or age and, because of that, are absent from the party meeting.

The bureau of a party raykom or gorkom have the right to express disagreement, for cause, with the decision of a primary party organization on admission to party membership. In that event the decision is submitted for reconsideration and takes effect only after the party organization has confirmed it.

Persons who have been expelled from the party or left it voluntarily may be readmitted to the party following a mandatory trial period and the subsequent confirmation of the party meeting's decision in the bureau of the party raykom or gorkom.

A Communist is registered with the party at his place of work or residence, according to his wishes and with the consent of the primary organizations. He also has the right to simultaneously take part in the life of one of those party organizations, combining it with work in the party organization where he is permanently registered.

By decision of a primary party organization, a Communist who has actively served in the party for at least 30 years may have the honorary title "CPSU Veteran" conferred on him.

If a party member for reasons of health or age cannot fully participate in party life, on the basis of his personal application the party organization has the right to relieve him of regular work and payment of membership contributions without removing him from the party records. In such cases, the party organization is required to maintain regular communication with such Communists, take their opinion into account in the discussion of matters of party life, inform them of the decisions it has made, and provide them with necessary assistance and support.

11. For the purposes of strengthening the party's ranks organizationally and politically and monitoring party members' fulfillment of their duties, by the decision of primary party organizations or higher-ranking party organizations and according to procedures defined by them, the certification of communists may be carried out.

Measures of party upbringing and influence in the form of statements of criticism or reprimand may be applied to party members by primary party organizations and party agencies of all levels for violations of party discipline and the norms of public morality.

For actions and conduct incompatible with the requirements of the Uzbek Communist Party Charter, a primary party organization may expel a party member from its ranks. The question of party membership of a Communist against whom criminal charges have been brought is considered only after a court conviction has entered into force.

The question of a party member who has gone more than three months without paying membership dues without a valid reason is subject to consideration in the primary party organization. If such consideration reveals that the

party member has lost contact with it, a decision is made on his continuation in party ranks.

Party membership is also terminated on the basis of a party member's application for voluntarily withdrawal from party ranks, following its consideration by the primary party organization.

The decision to expel a Communist from the party is made by a meeting of the primary party organization and is deemed valid if more than half of the Communists registered with that organization have voted for it, with the exception of those who on the basis of applications have been relieved of regular work in it for reasons of health or age, and in that connection are absent from the party meeting.

**Note:** In the event it is impossible to hold an official party meeting on these matters, they are subject to consideration in the bureau of the appropriate party raykom or gorkom.

A person who has been expelled from the party or received a penalty has the right to make an appeal within six months to party control agencies, starting with the control commission of the rayon or city party organization. The appeal is considered within no more than two months from the date it is received.

### III. Internal Party Democracy

12. The Uzbek Communist Party lives and acts in accordance with the principles of ideological commonality, party comradeship and democratic centralism, which provide for:

- the combination of the interests of the republic Communist Party as a whole and those of all its units and individual Communists;
- the self-government and power of the party masses;
- the election as a rule, on a multicandidate basis, of all party governing bodies and executive and control agencies through secret ballot;
- the accountability of party agencies and their members to the organizations that have elected them;
- openness, availability, collective decisionmaking at the workplace, personal responsibility of every Communist for his actions;
- the freedom of expression of opinions, the comparison of various views and platforms, and open criticism and self-criticism;
- conscious party discipline, the unity of actions in the implementation of collectively developed policy and decisions adopted by a majority;
- the mandatory implementation of the decisions of higher-ranking party governing bodies for lower-ranking agencies, of the decisions of party governing bodies for executive and control agencies, and of the decisions of a primary party organization for the Communists who are registered in it.

Within the context of individual organizations and the Uzbek Communist Party as a whole, debates and referendums may be held on important current issues of public and party life. They are held at the initiative of Communist Party congresses, party conferences, and party committee plenums, as well as at the request of party organizations that include at least one-third of the members of the pertinent organization. General party referendums are also held in the Uzbek Communist Party at the request of three or more oblast party organizations.

13. All organizations of the Uzbek Communist Party, starting with the primary organizations, take part in developing the policies of the CPSU and the republic Communist Party. They are independent in the organization of their internal life and activities. Decisions of party organizations and their elective bodies that are not in conflict with the party's program goals and have been taken within the limits of the powers granted by the Uzbek Communist Party Charter may not be rescinded by higher-ranking bodies, with the exception of decisions on personnel matters.

A higher-ranking party agency has the right to express a disagreement, for good cause, with a decision taken by a lower-ranking party organization, and to appeal for the resolution of the disputed issue to primary party organizations or to Communists directly, to convene a special party meeting or conference, or to hold a referendum. In each such case, the implementation of the decision is suspended until its reconsideration for a period of no more than two months.

14. The work of party organizations and party agencies is based on the principles of collectivism and personal accountability, which preclude subjectivism and autocracy.

The governing bodies in the Uzbek Communist Party are the general meeting, conference and congress. They are official if they are attended by more than half—and for reports and elections, at least two thirds—of the members of the party organization (with the exception of those who on the basis of applications have been relieved of regular work in it for reasons of health or age, and are absent from a party meeting in that connection), or of elected delegates. Governing party bodies elect executive agencies (a bureau or committee) and control agencies (control commissions).

Executive agencies represent the interests of the appropriate party organizations, provide for the implementation of their decisions, and direct the day-to-day activities of party structural units that are accountable to them and beneath them in rank, within the limits of the authority given them by decision of a congress, conference, or party meeting.

Party agencies may form permanent or temporary commissions and working groups for their principal areas of work, and they also utilize other forms of participation by Communists and other citizens in their activities. In

addition to the members of those agencies, the membership of commissions may include other Communists who have been approved as advisers or consultants. The activities of commissions and working groups in executive agencies are coordinated by the bureau of the party committee, while their activities in control agencies are coordinated by the control commission's presidium.

15. Party organizations and elective bodies work publicly and openly and ensure, in accordance with party decisions, the openness of party meetings, conferences and congresses, and of the meetings of executive and control agencies; the participation of the party press in them; and the publication of draft documents, stenographic records, adopted resolutions, and other materials. Party committees and primary party organizations regularly inform Communists and higher-ranking party agencies of their activities. A Communist has the right to be present at a meeting of the bureau or party committee of his primary organization. Members of an elective party agency have free access to meetings of the agencies accountable to them, as well as the right to use documents that are under the control of a party agency and its apparatus.

In the discussion of questions of internal party life, closed party meetings and meetings of party governing bodies and executive and control agencies may be conducted in cases in which it is necessary.

16. The governing bodies and executive and control agencies in the Uzbek Communist Party are elective. They are elected by secret ballot.

The procedures for the election of delegates to conferences and congresses and for elections of party committees and control commissions are determined by the pertinent party committee, meeting, conference, or congress on the basis of party normative and methods documents, taking the decisions of primary and local party organizations into account.

Delegates to rayon, city and oblast conferences, a Karakalpak Republic Conference, a general republic conference, and a congress of the Uzbek Communist Party, and members of corresponding elective party agencies are elected on the basis of the mandatory nomination of candidates by primary party organizations.

In elections party members have the right to nominate candidates, including themselves, and to challenge them, for cause, without restrictions.

In elections of the membership of party committees and control commissions and of the agencies accountable to them (bureaus, secretariats, presidiums), both primary party organizations and party governing bodies and executive and control agencies have the right to submit proposals for candidates. All proposals received are subject to mandatory consideration at the meeting, conference, congress or party committee (or control commission) plenum that form those agencies.

Any number of candidates may be included on the list for voting. Candidates who gain more than half of the votes of the party members participating in the voting at a meeting, conference, congress or plenum of a party committee or control commission are deemed to be elected.

Party committees and control commissions may also be elected through the direct delegation of representatives by lower-ranking organizations, which have the right to recall their representative. When necessary, quotas may be established in the election of members of party committees and control commissions for the purpose ensuring the proportional representation of lower-ranking party organizations on them.

17. The members of elective party agencies on the level of raykom and higher may be elected to the same office for no more than two consecutive terms. A party member may not serve on more than two elective agencies of the Uzbek Communist Party. In exceptional cases, based on the advisability of the representation of individual party organizations, their members may be elected simultaneously to serve on three elective agencies of the Uzbek Communist Party.

The membership of executive and control agencies may be reelected partially or completely prior to the expiration of their term of office. The question is to be considered at the request of party organizations making up at least one-third of the members of the pertinent organization, or upon the application of individual members or all the members of an elective agency for voluntary resignation.

When the service of individual members of a party committee or control commission is terminated early, new members may be chosen to replace them through the direct delegation by lower-ranking party organizations, or co-optation directly at a plenum on the basis of those organizations' recommendations.

The secretaries of party committees at all levels and the chairmen of control commissions are elected, while simultaneously being elected as members of those bodies, at appropriate meetings, conferences or congresses, or under powers granted by a conference or congress or at plenums of party committees and control commissions. They are accountable to the pertinent party committee or control commission and are registered in any party organizations except for the organization of the party apparatus.

The Central Committee, Kara-Kalpak Republic Party Committee, and oblast party committees have the right to recommend and demand the recall of the secretaries of party committees that stand below them in rank, and in the event of disagreement on these questions, to convene a special conference of the pertinent party organization or to hold a referendum in it.

18. Party committees and control commissions are accountable to the party organizations that have formed

them. Every member of an elective agency reports on his work to the party organizations that have elected or recommended him at least once a year.

19. In developing decisions, party organizations and their agencies are required to consider all points of view. A decision taken by the majority is binding on all. The minority has the right to defend its positions in party meetings, conferences and congresses, at the meetings of executive and control agencies, and in the party media, and to present coreports, to record a special opinion in the minutes, and to request a reconsideration of disputed issues in its party organization or in higher-ranking agencies.

In the event that disagreements arise in party committees and control commissions and their bureaus and presidiums, a draft decision is put up for reconsideration and is adopted by a majority of the total number of members of those agencies.

Decisions of congresses, conferences and meetings are binding on party organizations. The decisions of committees and bureaus are discussed at the stage of preparation in the party organizations to which they pertain, and once adopted are binding.

20. Party elective agencies create for the duration of their terms of office a working apparatus, which mainly provides informational, analytical, sociological-forecasting, and consulting services for their activities and cannot issue directive instructions in circumvention of the elective agency. The party apparatus is formed on the recommendation of primary and local party organizations. Labor legislation applies to employees of the party apparatus.

21. Organizations and committees of the Uzbek Communist Party have the right to publish, using their own funds or jointly with other organizations, newspapers and magazines, bulletins, and propaganda, informational and other materials; to form appropriate editorial staffs; and to establish television and radio studios. The party media are agencies of party organizations and committees, and their executives are elected at the pertinent party meeting, conference, congress or party committee plenum. The central media of the Uzbek Communist Party are required to publish statements and appeals at the request of governing bodies and executive and control agencies of the Kara-Kalpak Republic Party Organization and the oblast party organizations, while the local party press is required to publish corresponding documents of city, rayon and primary party organizations.

#### IV. Organizational Structure of the Uzbek Communist Party

22. The Uzbek Communist Party is based on the territorial-production principle. Its basis consists of primary party organizations, which are established at Communists' places of work or residence and are combined by territory into the party's fundamental units—the rayon

and city party organizations, and then the Kara-Kalpak Republic Party Organization and the oblast party organizations. The Tashkent City Party Organization, which operates in the capital of the Uzbek SSR, has the status of an oblast party organization and is directly under the supreme and central agencies of the Uzbek Communist Party.

The Uzbek Communist Party's organizations and committees establish relations and cooperate with the Armed Forces party organizations located within the republic.

The Communists of the Armed forces may elect and be elected members of elective agencies and organizations of the Uzbek Communist Party. Delegates to rayon, city, oblast and republic party conferences and Uzbek Communist Party congresses are elected at party meetings and conferences of military units and associations according to norms of representation defined by pertinent committees of the republic Communist Party.

Councils of the secretaries of party organizations, party clubs, theoretical seminars, political centers, councils of party veterans, and other forms of associations of Communists based on interests and problems may be established at the initiative of Communists or party governing bodies and executive agencies. While not being primary party organizations, but being founded on the basis of the party's programmatic principles, they discuss various questions and develop their own positions on them, and submit proposals and drafts for consideration by party committees of any level.

During the period of the discussion of key problems of party policy and its activities, Communists in organizations of the Uzbek Communist Party may join together into groups for the joint development of their own drafts of the documents (or platforms) under discussion; the formation of such groups into organizational structures with internal discipline (factions) is ruled out. Factions that are created are subject to dissolution, and the party members belonging to them are subsequently to undergo the certification process.

#### **Primary Party Organizations**

23. The foundation of the Uzbek Communist Party consists of primary party organizations, which are formed of at least three party members at their initiative, or at the suggestion of the pertinent party raykom or gorkom by a decision of their meeting. The question of their registration is decided by the bureau of the party raykom or gorkom.

**Production primary party organizations** are created through the association of Communists employed in the same labor collective or in a production or other association of labor collectives located within the boundaries of a single city or rayon.

**Territorial primary party organizations** may be formed both through the association of Communists residing within a given territory, and through the merger of the

party organizations of communities, villages, or microrayons within the boundaries of a single territory.

A primary party organization may create party groups and shop party organizations from among its members. By decision of the party organization's meeting, the latter may be granted the rights of primary party organizations in questions related to party membership. Shop party organizations not having such rights and party groups operate within the limits of the powers granted to them by decision of the primary party organization's meeting.

In production primary party organizations **territorial shop party organizations or party groups** may be created.

Taking into account their specific objectives and the conditions of their activities, and in accordance with program and charter provisions, primary party organizations independently decide questions pertaining to admission to the party and termination of membership in it; the definition of their own structure, areas and methods of work; the frequency of and procedures for conducting party meetings; political actions; and financial and economic activities; and they form relations with soviet, economic and public organizations.

Primary party organizations publicize and implement party decisions, assist party committees at all levels in carrying out the party's political line, exercise the party's ideological, political and organizational functions in labor collectives and among the public, exert influence on the accomplishment of economic and social tasks, and defend social justice.

Primary party organizations have the right to draw up draft documents in preparation for party congresses and conferences and the plenums of party committees and control commissions, and to express their attitude toward the decision of any party agency, which is required to give a relevant reply. They may submit proposals for the recall from party agencies at all levels of Communists who are registered with them or have been recommended by them to those agencies.

24. The party meeting of a primary party organization is convened when necessary, but at least once every two months. When it is impossible to hold a general party meeting, party conferences may be convened, or meetings may be held with a common agenda by shop party organizations and party groups.

When the membership of a primary party organization includes shop organizations with the powers of primary party organizations, in order to manage current work its meeting (or conference) elects a party committee and its secretary for a term of two or three years; in all other cases the primary party organization elects a party bureau. At the discretion of Communists in primary party organizations numbering 15 or more party members, control commissions may be elected.

Primary and shop party organizations numbering fewer than 15 party members generally do not create internal structural units. In order to manage current work in them, a party organization secretary and his deputy are elected in them, and a party group organizer is elected in party groups.

#### **Rayon and City Organizations of the Uzbek Communist Party**

25. Rayon and city party organizations, which directly unite primary organizations, are the Uzbek Communist Party's fundamental structural units.

Regular rayon and city party conferences are convened by the pertinent party raykom or gorkom at least once every five years.

By decision of a party raykom or gorkom, at the proposal of the pertinent control commission or higher-ranking party committee, or at the suggestion of party organizations making up at least one-third of the members of the given organization, a special party conference is convened.

A rayon or city party conference elects a rayon or city party committee and also a control commission for five years, hears their reports, presents assessments of their activities, and, taking into account the opinion of primary party organizations, determines the priority areas of the rayon or city party organization's work.

During the period between conferences, within the limits of the powers granted it, a party raykom or gorkom represents the interests of the rayon or city party organization, directs the work of agencies accountable to it and coordinates the activities of primary party organizations, works together with them to organize work on implementing the party's policies and decisions in labor collectives and at citizens' places of residence, works out and submits specific socioeconomic, cultural and other problems for consideration by the public and local bodies of authority, and contributes to dealing with those problems. Together with primary party organizations, the party raykom or gorkom resolves personnel, structural, and budgetary and financial issues within its jurisdiction.

Plenums of the party raykom or gorkom are convened as necessary but no less than once every six months. When necessary, joint plenums of a raykom or gorkom and the respective control commission may be convened.

The plenum of a party raykom or gorkom have the right to take a decision to dissolve a primary party organizations whose activities are in conflict with the requirements of the Uzbek Communist Party Charter, with its members subject to subsequent certification.

Taking the opinions of primary organizations into account, a rayon or city party committee elects, at its plenum, a bureau from among its members, and during the period between conferences, according to powers

granted to it, it elects secretaries, who are simultaneously members of the bureau of the raykom or gorkom.

The bureau organizes implementation of the decisions of the plenums of party raykoms and gorkoms and of higher-ranking party organizations, coordinates for these purposes the activities of primary party organizations and the commissions of rayon and city party committees, and directs the work of its apparatus. It adopts decisions on the registration of primary party organizations and submits proposals with respect to granting the party committees of the largest primary party organizations, with their consent, the powers of a party raykom in matters of registering Communists. The bureau reports annually on its activities at a plenum of the appropriate party committee.

The bureau of a party raykom or gorkom has the right to express disagreement, with cause, with the decision of a primary party organization, and to revoke that decision if it is contrary to the principles of the party's program and charter.

#### **The Kara-Kalpak Republic Organization and Oblast Organizations of the Uzbek Communist Party**

26. The Kara-Kalpak Republic Organization of the Uzbek Communist Party, acting within the framework of the policies of the Uzbek Communist Party, independently determines its political line in matters pertaining to the state construction and economic, social and cultural development of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR. Within the limits of the autonomous republic, it provides for the implementation of the decisions and resolutions of higher-ranking party agencies it has accepted.

In the election of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and Central Control Commission, a quota is set for the Kara-Kalpak Republic Party Organization that ensures its proportional representation on those agencies. The first secretary of the Kara-Kalpak Republic is a member of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and Central Committee Bureau.

Within the limits of their oblasts, oblast party organizations carry out work on implementing party policies and provide for the implementation of the decisions and resolutions of higher-ranking party agencies that they have accepted.

Regular party conferences of the Kara-Kalpak Republic Party Organization and oblast party organizations are convened by the pertinent party committees at least once every five years.

In accordance with a decision of the party committee, proposal by the pertinent control commission or the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, or request by party organizations making up at least one third of the members of the given organization, a special party conference is convened.

The Kara-Kalpak Republic Party Conference and oblast party conferences elect corresponding party committees

and also control commissions for five-year terms, hear their reports, adopt resolutions on them, and provide appraisals of their work.

Conferences and plenums of the pertinent party committees, which are convened when necessary but at least once every six months, draw up and propose to bodies of state authority and the public, with due regard for the opinions of party organizations, programs for the solution of political, nationality, social, economic, environmental, cultural and moral problems in their regions. Questions of internal party life, personnel work, the structure and budget of party organizations, and publishing and financial and economic activities are considered at them. When necessary, joint plenums of the pertinent party committees and control commissions may be convened.

During the period between conferences, the Kara-Kalpak Republic Party Committee and oblast party committees, within the limits of their powers, represent the interests of the corresponding party organizations, direct the work of agencies accountable to them, and coordinate the day-to-day activities of rayon and city party organizations.

At plenums the Kara-Kalpak Republic Party Committee and the oblast party committees elect a bureau from among their membership, and during the period between conferences they elect, according to the powers granted to them, secretaries who are simultaneously members of the party committee bureaus.

The bureau organizes the implementation of the decisions of plenums of the pertinent party committee and of higher-ranking party agencies, coordinates for these purposes the activities of rayon and city party organizations and party committee commissions, and directs the work of its apparatus. It grants to the party committees of the largest primary party organizations, with their consent and also with due regard for the opinion of the pertinent party raykom or gorkom, the powers of a party raykom in matters of registering Communists. The bureau reports annually on its activities at a plenum of the pertinent party committee.

The Kara-Kalpak Republic Party Committee and oblast party committees may, by decision of their plenums, form a secretariat for the purpose of organizing the implementation of decisions that are taken and directing the party committee apparatus.

#### **Control Commissions of Rayon, City and Oblast Organizations and the Kara-Kalpak Republic Organization of the Uzbek Communist Party**

27. The control commission of a rayon, city or oblast party organization, or of the Kara-Kalpak Republic Party Organization is elected from among Communists recommended by primary party organizations. The control commission's members may not serve on the apparatus of the corresponding party committee.

Control commissions exercise oversight over the implementation of program documents and the Charter of the Uzbek Communist Party, and over the decisions of party governing bodies. They check up on observance of the principles of collegiality, glasnost and internal party democracy in the activities of party organizations, combat bureaucratism and voluntarism, and promote the stronger unity of party ranks. They decide questions connected with Communists' observance of party discipline and the norms of public morality, defend the honor and dignity of party members, consider their appeals, impose party penalties on members who are guilty of suppressing criticism and of abuses, and audit the fulfillment of the party budget and the financial and economic activities of party committees and institutions.

The control commission is accountable to the body that has elected it, works independently in accordance with the Uzbek Communist Party Charter and regulations approved by the pertinent party conference, and regularly informs Communists of its activities. Control commission plenums are held as necessary but at least once every six months.

For the purpose of considering and resolving questions pertaining to its day-to-day activities, the control commission elects from its membership a presidium whose work is directed by the commission chairman. The presidium reports annually on its activities at a plenum of its control commission.

Working control groups may be set up in control commissions to deal with their principal areas of activity. They are formed at control commission plenums from among their members and may include other Communists approved as advisers or consultants.

Members of a control commission may take part in the plenums of the pertinent party committees, and members of the party committees—in the plenums of control commissions, with the right to speak but not to vote.

Party committees and control commissions resolve mutual disagreements by forming conciliation commissions, or at joint plenums. The decision of such a plenum is considered to have been adopted if, in separate voting, at least two-thirds of the members of the party committee and the control commission have voted for it. When disagreements that have arisen prove impossible to resolve at a joint plenum, a decision on them is made by the higher-ranking party agency, or a special conference of the pertinent party organization is convened.

#### **The Supreme and Central Bodies of the Uzbek Communist Party**

28. The supreme body of the Uzbek Communist Party is the congress. Regular congresses are convened by the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee at least once every five years. The Central Committee's decision on convening a congress and on the agenda and standard of representation is announced at least three months before the congress. At least one month before the

congress the Central Committee publishes draft documents on the main issues that are being submitted to the congress.

29. A special (extraordinary) congress of the Uzbek Communist Party is convened by the Central Committee at its own initiative or in accordance with a proposal by the Uzbek Communist Party Central Control Commission or request by party organizations constituting at least one-third of the total number of republic Communists, or by three or more oblast party organizations. A congress is convened within a two-month period and is considered official if the majority of oblast party organizations are represented at it.

In the event that the Central Committee fails to convene a special (extraordinary) congress, the organizations that have requested it may form an organizational committee that exercises the powers of the Central Committee in convening a special (extraordinary) congress.

30. The congress of the Uzbek Communist Party:

- hears reports from the Central Committee, Central Control Commission and other agencies and persons elected by the congress, adopts resolutions on them, and gives assessments of their work;
- adopts the program documents and Charter of the Uzbek Communist Party, revises and amends them, and on behalf of the republic Communist Party submits proposals for amendments to the CPSU Program and Charter;
- determines the Uzbek Communist Party's political line in the area of the republic's state construction, socioeconomic and national-cultural development, and the basic areas of its theoretical, ideological and organizational activities;
- develops the position of the Uzbek Communist Party on questions pertaining to the CPSU's domestic and foreign policies and the activities of its supreme and central bodies, and on fundamental questions submitted for discussion by the CPSU Congress;
- adopts decisions on questions pertaining to relations between the Uzbek Communist Party and the CPSU's supreme and central bodies and the Communist Parties of the other union republics, and endows the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee with appropriate powers in these matters;
- elects the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and Central Control Commission;
- elects the first secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, simultaneously electing him as a member of the Central Committee and member of the Central Committee Bureau, and endows the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee with appropriate powers in this connection during the period between congresses and all-republic party conferences;
- elects the chairman of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Control Commission, simultaneously including him on the Central Control Commission and Presidium of the Central Control Commission of

the republic Communist Party, and endows the Uzbek Communist Party Central Control Commission with corresponding powers for the period between congresses and all-republic party conferences;

- in accordance with the proposals of party organizations, nominates and delegates representatives of the Uzbek Communist Party to serve on the CPSU's supreme and central bodies, recalls them from those bodies, and endows the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee with the necessary powers in this connection during the period between congresses.

31. In the period between congresses the Central Committee may convene an all-republic conference of the Uzbek Communist Party to discuss urgent questions of the policies and practical activities of the republic Communist Party. Members of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission participate in a conference's work with the right to vote and must not make up more than half of the conference delegates.

A conference is empowered to hear reports by the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and Central Control Commission on their work, to partially reelect their membership (up to one-third during the period between congresses), and to take other decisions that are binding for the republic Communist Party within the framework of its program documents and the Uzbek Communist Party Charter.

32. In the period between congresses and conferences, the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee:

- organizes implementation of the decisions of Uzbek Communist Party congresses and conferences;
- draws up and submits proposals on matters of state construction and economic, social and national-cultural policy to the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, its committees and commissions, and other state agencies;
- directs the activities of Uzbek Communist Party's party groups in republic representative bodies;
- works out and implements the Uzbek Communist Party's personnel policy;
- creates institutions and enterprises of the republic Communist Party and oversees their work;
- cooperates with public political organizations in the republic and represents the Uzbek Communist Party in relations with CPSU central bodies, the Communist Parties of other union republics, and foreign parties;
- exercises other governing powers with which it is endowed by the Uzbek Communist Party congress or all-republic conference.

33. For the purpose of resolving political and organizational questions during the period between plenums, the Central Committee elects a Central Committee Bureau, and for the purpose of organizing the implementation of party decisions and directing the Central Committee apparatus, it forms a secretariat. The numerical size of

the Bureau and secretariat are determined by a Central Committee plenum. Central Committee secretaries are members of the Bureau of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee. The work of the Bureau and secretariat is directed by the former and, in its absence, by the second secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee.

The Central Committee Bureau sends decisions to the party organizations in its name. The Bureau submits decisions on the most important questions for discussion by the primary party organizations and subsequent approval by a plenum of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee.

The Central Committee Bureau reports annually on its activities at a plenum of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee.

34. The Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee creates standing commissions on the most important areas of its activities. They are formed at a plenum from among the Central Committee's members and other Communists who are approved as advisers or consultants. Commissions are headed by secretaries or members of the Bureau of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee.

35. The Uzbek Communist Party Central Control Commission is guided in its activities by the Uzbek Communist Party Charter and regulations approved by the Uzbek Communist Party congress. For purpose of considering and resolving questions pertaining to its day-to-day activities, it elects from its membership a presidium, whose work is directed by the commission chairman.

The Central Control Commission creates working control groups on the principal areas of its activities. They are formed at a plenum from among its members and other Communists who are approved as advisers or consultants.

A member of the Central Control Commission may not simultaneously serve on the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee or on its apparatus.

36. The Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and Central Control Commission hold at least two plenary meetings a year, and when necessary hold joint meetings. Decisions of joint plenums are considered to have been adopted if, in separate voting, they have received a majority, or when disagreements arise—at least two-thirds of the votes of the members of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

When disagreements that arise prove impossible to resolve at a joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, a decision is made to convene a special Uzbek Communist Party congress.

Members of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee may take part in plenums of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Control Commission, and members of

the Central Control Commission—in plenums of the Central Committee with the right to speak but not to vote.

#### V. Communists in Soviets, State Agencies and Public Organizations

37. The Uzbek Communist Party defends its right to political leadership in free competition with other public political forces, working out its own socioeconomic, political and other programs and proposing them to society, endeavoring to draw the masses to the party's side and into its ranks, and pursuing its political line through Communists serving on Soviet, state and economic agencies and in labor collectives.

It nominates its own candidates in elections of the republic president, Uzbek SSR people's deputies and deputies to local soviets, helps them in organizing their election campaigns, and uses political methods to work for their elections.

Party organizations may enter into pre-election agreements with other public political organizations and formations operating on the basis of and in accordance with the Constitution, and may support candidates nominated by them who are not party members.

38. In soviets of people's deputies the republic Communists elected to them are united for the soviets' terms of office into party groups of the Uzbek Communist Party for the purpose of coordinating their activities and carrying out their constituents' will and directives. The formation by Communists in the soviets of groups or factions that are independent of party governing bodies but act on behalf of the CPSU or Uzbek Communist Party is not permitted.

Party groups are governed by the decisions of party congresses and conferences and the plenums of the pertinent party committees, and they take their recommendations into account. At soviet sessions and in soviet committees and commissions, their members are required to adhere to positions worked out and adopted by the majority at party groups' meetings.

Party groups may elect a bureau or chairman for day-to-day work.

When necessary, party groups in soviets may create within their membership structures that unite Communist deputies in accordance with a region's territorial-administrative divisions, on the basis of their service on committees and commissions, or along other lines. The structures that are created delegate their representatives to the bureau of a soviet's party group.

39. The republic Communist Party cooperates with social forces that acknowledge its constitutional rights, stand for democracy and social justice, and act on the basis of and within the framework of the Uzbek SSR Constitution. It bases its relations with trade unions,

other public organizations and mass movements on political cooperation and partnership and respect for different points of view.

At congresses and conferences convened by public organizations, party groups may be created on the analogy of the same sort of groups in soviets.

40. In work with young people, party agencies and primary party organizations rely on the Uzbek Leninist Communist Youth League, cooperate with other youth organizations of socialist orientation, give them every possible assistance in their activities, and enlist them in drawing up and implementing the Uzbek Communist Party's youth policy. Relations between party and Komsomol organizations are based on the principles of ideological commonality and political partnership, recognition of the independence of the Uzbek Communist Youth League, and mutual respect and trust. The Uzbek Communist Party regards the republic Komsomol as its closest reserve for augmenting its ranks.

Members of the elective bodies of youth organizations of socialist orientation have the right to participate in the consideration of questions of youth policy in the appropriate party committees and commissions established by them.

41. The Uzbek Communist Party's primary organizations and committees may recommend Communists and nonmembers of the party for specific sectors of state, economic-management, and public activity. Using political methods, they promote their election or appointment to the offices in question, provide them support, hear reports by Communists on their work, and publicize the conclusions that are drawn and recommendations that are made in this connection. Party organizations may also raise the question of recalling personnel who have been advanced on their recommendation if they fail to justify the trust placed in them, or their actions are in conflict with the party's political line.

#### **VI. The Moneys and Property of the Uzbek Communist Party**

42. The activities of the Uzbek Communist Party and its organizations are provided with financial and material and technical resources out of its revenues.

The moneys of the Uzbek Communist Party are formed from party membership dues; income from publishing, production and economic, and entrepreneurial activities; voluntary contributions by Communists, individual citizens, and the labor collectives of enterprises and other organizations; and other receipts that do not conflict with the interests of political work or with existing legislation.

Monthly party membership dues are paid by members of the Uzbek Communist Party in the following amounts:

for incomes of to 70 rubles—10 kopecks;

for incomes of 71-100 rubles—20 kopecks;

for incomes of 101-150 rubles—30 kopecks;

for incomes of 151-250 rubles—one percent;

for incomes over 250 rubles—two percent.

Employed Communist pensioners pay party membership dues separately on their pensions and wages.

By decision of their primary party organization, Communists employed in the Komsomol pay their party membership dues to the Komsomol.

43. The Uzbek Communist Party's budget; its structure; the amounts of deductions to it from the revenues of the Kara-Kalpak Republic Party Organization, oblast party organizations, and the enterprises and organizations of the republic Communist Party, and the amounts of subsidies paid to them; and the report on the fulfillment of the party budget are approved annually by a plenum of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and reported to Communists.

Moneys for the maintenance of the Central Control Commission and other control agencies of the Uzbek Communist Party are determined at joint plenums of the pertinent party committees and control commissions.

The Kara-Kalpak Republic Party Organization and the oblast, city and rayon party organizations are independent in the control of their own budgets; the resolution of all structural, staffing, and production and economic questions; and the establishment, reorganization and liquidation of enterprises, organizations and periodicals publications with a view to their financial potential. Those party organizations' budgets and reports on their fulfillment are approved at plenums of the pertinent party committees and reported to Communists. Profitable economic and financial activities on the part of party organizations that are not in conflict with the party's programmatic goals and Charter are encouraged.

44. The Uzbek Communist Party is the co-owner of the CPSU's property as common party property. The objects of the Uzbek Communist Party's right of ownership that it controls independently include buildings, structures, equipment, supplies, property related to cultural, educational and sanatorium institutions, moneys, enterprises and farms, party publishing houses and the periodicals and printing facilities belonging to them, and other property acquired or created using its funds.

Party committees exercise the day-to-day management (possession, utilization and disposal) of the property entrusted to them. They may decide questions involving the sale or other alienation of party property only with the sanction of a higher-ranking party agency to which a congress, conference or Central Committee plenum of the Uzbek Communist Party has granted appropriate powers, or on the basis of a referendum among Communists.

The Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee, the Kara-Kalpak Republic Party Committee and the oblast,

city and rayon party committees, and party enterprises, institutions and organizations exercise the rights of a juristic person and may delegate those rights to their structural subdivisions. Primary party organizations may exercise the rights of juristic persons with the guarantee of their material backing in accordance with existing legislation.

Up to 50 percent of the money derived from party dues is allocated for financing the activities of primary party organizations. In this connection, half of the money is placed at the direct disposal of the primary party organizations, while the remainder is pooled in a centralized fund for the primary party organizations of a rayon or city, with the right to dispose of it granted, by their joint decision, to a council of the secretaries of party organizations, or, with their consent, to the pertinent party raykom or gorkom. Primary party organizations may also utilize moneys contributed to them voluntarily by labor collectives or individual citizens in order to carry out mass political actions and upbringing work among working people and the public, and for other purposes specified in the party Charter.

In order to decide questions pertaining to the financing of party organizations' activities and to the allocation and reallocation of moneys, financial commissions including the secretaries of primary party organizations are established under party raykoms, gorkoms and other party committees having the powers of a raykom.

Party committees and control commissions at all levels inform Communists annually of the state of the party budget and expenditure of funds.

#### **VII. The Location of the Uzbek Communist Party's Central Bodies**

45. The location of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and Central Control Commission is the city of Tashkent.

#### **VIII. Procedures for Terminating the Activities of the Uzbek Communist Party**

46. The activities of the Uzbek Communist Party may be terminated as a result of its uniting or merger with other political organizations, its division, or its self-dissolution. The decision on this matter is taken by an Uzbek Communist Party congress on the basis of the results of an all-republic party referendum, if more than two-thirds of the republic's Communists have voted for that decision.

#### **Appendix**

All normative and methods documents that are general for the CPSU are operative in the Uzbek Communist Party. When necessary, the conditions for their application in republic party organizations may be determined by a decision of a combined plenum of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

On the basis of the Uzbek Communist Party Charter and at the suggestion of commissions of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, the Karakalpak Republic Party Organization and oblast party organizations, the Uzbek Communist Party's own normative and methods documents may be drawn up and approved at a combined plenum of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

**SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Mari**

91UN1346A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 7,  
Feb 91 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Dr. of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr. of Historical Sciences Yu. Simchenko: "Mari"]

[Text] Self-designation: **Mariy, Mari and Mar.** Former designation: **Cheremiss.**

According to the 1989 census, there are 670,868 Mari in the USSR.

The Mari language belongs to the eastern branch of the Finno-Ugric languages of the Uralic linguistic family. The language has three basic dialects: meadow, eastern, and highland. Mari literature is bilingual: meadow-eastern and highland-Mari. These languages are distinguished by their number of vowels (the first has eight and the second 10) and some other characteristic features.

Most Mari live in the area of the Middle Volga. More than half of them are concentrated in the Mari Republic, which is also inhabited by Russians, Tatars, Chuvash, Mordvinians, Udmurts, and Bashkir. Small groups of Mari may also be found outside the Republic, in Bashkiria, Tataria, and Udmurtia, and in Kirov, Nizhegorod, Sverdlovsk, Perm, and Orenburg Oblasts.

The Mari are subdivided into three main groups: highland—"Kuryk Mari," meadow or "Olyk Mari," or forest "Kozhla Mari," and eastern or "Upo Mari." The highland Mari live essentially on the right high bank of the Volga. The meadow or forest Mari live in the forests along the left bank. The eastern Mari are settled in Bashkiria, Sverdlovsk Oblast, and Tataria. This division is traditional.

The Mari are the aborigines of this area. Their ancestors have left a number of archaeological monuments along both banks of the Volga, the so-called Pyanoborskaya and Latter Gorodetskaya cultures.

As early as the 10th century, the Khazar King Joseph mentions among tribes under his rule the "Tseremis," a name which can easily be identified with the former designation of these people—the Cheremiss.

The Russian chronicle "*Tale of Time Annals*" notes that the Cheremiss live in the area where the Oka and the Volga merge. This fact allows us to assume that the Mari predecessors did not live exclusively in the area between the Volga and the Vyatka. As early as the end of the first millennium and the start of the second, the Mari fell under the rule of the Bulgar state. In the 13th century, the Bulgar state was defeated by the Tatar-Mongol nomads.

The Mari found themselves under the rule of the Golden Horde, which was replaced by the Kazan Khannate in the 15th century. After the defeat of the Kazan Khannate in 1552, the Mari lands became part of the Russian state. It is since then that more or less close contacts between Mari and Russians were established.

The Mari were converted to Christianity as of the 16th century. However, the Mari population has preserved its former beliefs in Yumo, the good god in heaven, and Keremet, the master of all evils. These deities were prayed to more fervently than to the Christian God. Sacrifices were made in special "Keremet groves," etc. The Mari have preserved the so-called "Chi Mariy" or "true Mari," who avoided baptism and professed their traditional set of cults. In the 20th century, the Mari included a particular sect known as "Kugu Sorta," which protected national beliefs and a national way of life.

The Mari have long engaged in farming, which was their main occupation. In the past they were familiar with three-field crop rotation and in some areas practiced reseeded. Until the 20th century they collected the honey of wild bees. Today apiculture is developed among the Mari.

As a rule, the Mari villages are located along routes, and consist of log cabins with double roofs. The cabins were richly decorated with wood cuttings. In areas without trees, their huts were made of clay. Until the beginning of the 20th century their huts had stoves without chimneys.

### Changes in Moscow Drug Trafficking Patterns

91WD0625A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 19 Feb 91 p 6

[Article by Vladimir Tverskoy: "Drug Traffickers Are Leaving the City": "The Militia Think That the Drug 'Farmers' Are the Ones To Be Punished"]

[Text] Drug addicts have lost their peace of mind: pushers keep changing, prices are going up, places where one may buy hashish or other drugs are closing. A number of successful operations conducted by experts on fighting drug trafficking have contributed to this upset. The Cheremushki farmers market, the motel on Varshavskoye Highway, Kolkhoznaya Square, and other familiar areas of Moscow were bothered by the militia visits. The pushers got the drift of things and retreated to the country.

One evening a week ago a Zhiguli car with "grass" in it was stopped at the entrance to the city on Volgogradskiy Avenue. The next day there was a militia raid in Lyuberskiy Rayon. Six people were detained in an ordinary-looking house. They had a big batch of processed poppies in their possession. Four of them were visitors from Georgia, two from Moscow.

"We have already arrested twice as many pushers and confiscated twice as much drugs as last year," V. Roshchin, head of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] interregional drug prevention department, told us. "Typically we did not manage to simply arrest them but were also able to prove their involvement in the drug trade. They react to any changes. The moment all tobacco products disappeared, the accused came out with a story that they had tobacco in their possession and not poppies. They are trying to arrange for an alibi already in advance. But we cannot be caught unprepared by such tricks anymore. However, if we take a more serious look at the problem, it must be time to fight not only traffickers but primarily those who grow these "gifts of nature." Hashish and marijuana are made from wild hemp. As recently as four years ago it grew on 4.5 million hectares of land in the south of Kazakhstan. How much more has grown since then we do not know. But according to the Kazakhstan Agricultural Research Institute, over a period of 25 years hemp can increase its volume 25 times.

In the Chu Valley and its two adjacent oblasts alone hemp has spread over 1,500,000 hectares of fertile land. There is a story that the people of Leningrad are partially to blame for this wilderness. It seems that a cord-making factory was evacuated to the Chu Valley and it needed hemp as raw material for the cord. The war ended long time ago, the factory is back in Leningrad, but the hemp remained and multiplied. It seems that no cord factories went as far as the Far East, but there also more than a million and a half hectares are covered with wild hemp.

Incidentally, people from cities other than Moscow make up the majority of drug traffickers—69 percent of them.

### Moscow Airport Viewed as Trafficking Transit Point

91WD0625B Moscow TORGOVAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 26 Mar 91 p 4

[Article by A. Potanin, official of the USSR Main Administration for State Customs Control press service: "Transit of Drugs," under the rubric: "From Knowledgeable Sources"]

[Text] If we look into the not-so-distant future we will become convinced that the USSR's new foreign trade and humanitarian relations, a simpler procedure of exiting and entering the country, and, primarily, a possible transition to a convertible ruble will prove to be major factors contributing to the penetration of narcotics into our country and, at the same time, enabling their "export" to other countries. We are already faced with an increase of drug consumption in our country. According to some experts the drug turnover may be estimated at R3 billion. Drug delivery routes are now going through our country.

The first large batch of narcotics was confiscated in 1986 when 1,200 kilos of hashish were found in a container with a load of raisins. The container was on its way from Afghanistan to the FRG. Since that time over 1,500 attempts to smuggle the "white death" have been prevented at USSR state borders. We have uncovered the illegal transportation of over 15 tons of various narcotic agents across USSR territory. That is 50 times more than was found in the previous decade.

The international narcotics mafia uses planes, the fastest type of transportation, more often than any other. One of the transit routes for the contraband of drugs is going through Sheremetyevo-2 airport with its daily traffic of up to 15,000 passengers. On top of that hundreds of thousands of tons of cargo pass through there every year. Smugglers favor double-bottomed suitcases and similar gadgets over any other. That was the device used by a transit passenger flying from Latin America to an East European country. On 2 January customs officials found several kilos of a powerful drug in his suitcase, which had a false bottom.

Here is another example. When our customs officers examined the baggage of transit passengers on a flight from Dakar to Stockholm, they got interested in two ebony statuettes. An X-ray examination showed that one of them was hollowed out inside and the cavity contained some foreign matter. An express analysis of the substance proved it to be heroin!

Recently a Swedish citizen was brought to the Sklifosovsky Institute [emergency clinic]. He was flying as a transit passenger from Bangkok. Two packages of heroin were removed from his rectum. These are not rare incidents. Our customs service has some sophisticated equipment which makes it possible to test someone for drug possession within a period of 90 seconds.

A lot has been done recently to bring electronic equipment to customs. We are setting up a comprehensive system that will allow control over the possible movement of narcotic agents across the state borders. The international experience of fighting drug trafficking has become a national issue, and the national experience is becoming an international one.

### Gdlyan-Ivanov Affair in Uzbekistan Revisited

91US0485A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 9,  
Feb 91 pp 8-9

[Article by A. Sadri, Tashkent, Bukhara, Nizhniy Tagil, Moscow: "A Sacrifice"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] Muin Norov greeted his 65-birthday behind bars. Nothing foretold such a finale when the major-general of the militia went into retirement. What twists of fate and major changes could await this pensioner? However, it did happen. One day his former, pleasant life disappeared as if it had never existed. Another life began, a terrifying nightmare. And the most terrible thing was the loss of hope, which disappeared day by day. But enfeebled, half-blind and with a debilitated nervous system, he found within himself the courage and pride to resist when they proposed that he submit a request for a pardon. No, he had no need for leniency. Let justice triumph. But in Bukhara two public committees, established two years ago to defend Norov, are applying for a pardon. This is very like him. Never in his previous life did he sacrifice his good name for comfort. And if he was broken during the investigation, renouncing himself, it was only due to his children and wife. Fear for their lives and their well-being. But what has happened to all of us and to our society if—during the years of perestroika, begun in the name of man's right to a life worthy of him—such terrible, human sacrifices have become necessary?

#### 'A White Crow'

When Telman Gdlyan and Nikolai Ivanov first pressed the starter button of a mechanism designed to crush the rattlesnake of bribery, many people in Uzbekistan rejoiced. The system of bribes had ensnared a considerable number of people in the republic and throughout the country. There were people who voluntarily helped the investigators of the USSR Procurator's Office, who began their work in Bukhara. It was here that party magnate Abduvakhid Karimov settled down before he was appointed deputy minister of land reclamation; according to rumors, he had money boxes in which he kept easy money accumulated by dishonest means. You have to give Nikolai Ivanov his due: at that time the arrest of such a figure was considered by everyone to be a very brave gesture, especially by Bukhara residents, who are perennial patriots of their kray, one of the wealthiest in Uzbekistan. Certain effective economic reforms, started by the oblast leader, coexisted with a very real feudal dependence, which developed here and

which encompassed virtually every resident of the region. People no longer asked questions; it was perfectly clear why the prices quoted by the sales clerks for food and other items did not agree at all with the prices indicated on the labels. Other forms of vassal taxation, well described by journalists, were also used.

Representatives of the USSR Procurator's Office began to summon a retired major general of the militia, Muin Sirachevich Norov, formerly head of the Internal Affairs Administration of the Bukhara Oblispolkom. They remembered him after they had been in Bukhara for five months. And, indeed, who knew better than he the scandalous things which were going on here. After all, he had tried—unsuccessfully—to fight the mafia.

The fact that Karimov and his clique hated Norov was no secret in Bukhara. This manifested itself soon after Karimov's appointment to the Bukhara Obkom. The disagreements were large and small, but the most significant of them concerned Norov's categorical refusal to appoint A. Muzaffarov, with whom Karimov had worked before his arrival in Bukhara, as head of the oblast BKHSS (Struggle Against the Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation). It had been assumed that another colleague, who been specially sent to study at the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Academy, was to be appointed to this position. It was at that time that Karimov first noted that the general was too intractable and proud; he would not please the oblast leadership, and what was most unpleasant, he was not disposed to hide his own opinion on any subject. With that type one had to be on the alert, and it would be better to get rid of him altogether.

However, Muzaffarov was appointed and the graduate of the academy was sent somewhere else. Putting Norov "in his place" was a matter of technique. For this there are conferences and party aktivs; for example, if one so wishes, anybody can be made to blush and become nervous in front of a large group. After one such conversation at an expanded session of the obkom buro, at which Norov had dared to argue with the "first" leader, immediate anathema followed. Karimov called Norov a "white crow," a thorn in the flesh, "adding that personally he would shoot ones like that.

However, he did not have occasion to shoot the disgraced general. Norov had a massive infarct, and after he came out of the hospital, he voluntarily left his position (the fact that he went to work at the oblast ispolkom provides evidence that the illness he suffered was only a pretext for his departure).

When the investigation of criminal activity by Karimov and Muzaffarov began and the investigators wanted to meet with Muin Norov, he did not refuse the meeting. Moreover, he told them what he knew.

"America is a country of lawyers," said the main character in a movie. "We are not," one would like to add. Our people are not familiar with elementary legal norms, and, it goes without saying, they do not have personal

advocates available for consultation as people do in other civilizations. In Central Asia these questions are resolved in an even more complex way. And for this reason those who visited or were called to the investigators considered it necessary to consult with M. Norov, not only as a respected, experienced person but also as a lawyer. He did not refuse these visits; he advised people to speak the truth and not conceal it, but also to slander no one.

During his contact with the investigators the former general discovered some incongruities: from the outside everything went correctly at first; the investigators looked for the cause of the anomalies in the republic, but at the same time a spate of arrests began. The relatives of those arrested began to talk, at first quietly, secretly, in a whisper, then more angrily about the terrible things that were happening in the investigators' offices. By that time it had become known that a whole rash of suicides had taken place among employees of the law-enforcement system, while in Bukhara, Makhmud Mirzabayev, who had been to the Norovs' home, died under mysterious circumstances, supposedly having thrown himself out of a (second-floor!) window. For a long time the "reasonable" investigators did not turn his body over to his relatives, and when the latter finally began to wash him for burial, they discovered numerous marks from blows to the body. People were told that he (M. Mirzabayev) was being kept all night for a confrontation with his brother! And at the brother's place they were looking for evidence about some important state figure.

That is how the investigation went: the apparent and the actual, lies and truth skillfully combined in the actions of the investigators, but there was no one to check up on them.

Norov's arrest on 14 March 1985 was most unexpected for everyone, and above all for Norov himself, who was being treated in hospital. It came like a bolt out of the blue, although maybe the sky was already not so blue.

From a conversation with M.S. Norov in the strict regime colony:

"From the very day of my arrest Gdlyan and Ivanov demanded that I admit to receiving bribes from my subordinates and giving bribes to Karimov and other leaders of the Uzbekistan MVD and the USSR MVD, specifically to Churbanov, Yakhyayev, Davydov, Kakhramanov, and others, who were held up to me as examples of people who had confessed their guilt."

"For the most part these were not interrogations but rather persistent demands for confession. Everything was set into motion. It was indicated that no procurator was anybody or anything in comparison with them; in general, they had unlimited rights. They talked about the arrest of Karimov's family: 'We will do the same with your relatives; you will sit next door and hear their voices.' Gdlyan and Ivanov found, through the investigators Kalinin and Ibragimov, witnesses whom they frightened into giving false testimony against me."

Norov is not exaggerating: during the court trial of the criminal case by the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court, the charges fell away one by one, and the witnesses also dropped away: out of 50 episodes listed by the investigation, the court recognized 44 as fabricated, and out of 17 "witnesses," five remained. But let us not jump ahead, let us return to the investigation.

What kind of admissions were the investigators demanding from Muin Norov? No matter how strange it seems, primarily about the giving of bribes to Abduvakhid Karimov, his opponent. The question of why arises. The answer here is simple: it was essential for Karimov to "hang" the valuables confiscated from him on someone, concealing the true channels for the bribes he was receiving. The roles were reversed: Karimov recalled his enemy. They had probably told him that Norov was talking frankly to the investigator about the oblast's weak points.

But why did the investigators seize on this version with such willingness and demand that Norov claim that the gold coins and money which he was supposedly keeping belonged to Karimov?

In vain did Norov, brought straight from the hospital, call on logic for help: how could these valuables be at his place if even before Karimov's arrest, he had told the investigator about the hostility of the "first," and about his own forced retirement.

But the point is that it was not ordinary human logic which was in operation here, but something completely different—the logic of the large political game, which was forcing them to reject professional requirements and to arrive at a pre-determined answer rather than solve the problem.

The investigators put into operation a cunning mechanism: without an abundance of sympathy they helped first one and then another to fabricate information about each other. All this was done with lightning speed, beneficial for them at the new political moment. And many people, knowing their own guilt, fell into this trap, after listening long enough to the promises to reduce the length of the inevitable punishment and improve the conditions of confinement.

But some people, such as M. Norov, V. Izzatov and others, categorically refused to confirm the information which was being offered, despite the "fatherly" appeal of the investigators.

A very attractive key component of the Norov-Karimov connection disintegrated; the "unreasonable" ex-general did not accept the "reasonable" advice, continuing to remain a "white crow" here, as well.

And this was beginning to drive the investigators out of their wits.

**'The Kremlin Pyramid'**

From a conversation with the convict D. Dzhamalov in a strict regime colony:

"The new theory about the obligation of the accused to prove his own guilt has been put at the service of lawlessness. They force the accused to slander the 'higher ups' (the investigative group's term), and then in order to justify the existence of major financial sources, the 'lower downs,' their subordinates, of receiving bribes from them."

The main rule which the investigators ignored is to verify the source of information because the quality of the actual information depends on the source.

Crime has the ability to resist, especially professional crime, which is worth millions of rubles. The criminal never gives information about his accomplices; everyone who works for the law-enforcement organs knows that well, for this reason the main criminal figures deflected the investigators' attention off to one side. That is why the criminals turned out to include Muin Norov, who himself had participated very actively in exposing those who later slandered him. Karimov and Muzaffarov could not fail to know that they could protect their own lives only at the cost of providing testimony. And testimony was demanded of them; this testimony, which consisted of data on anybody, suited the investigators. After all, there were others victims, many victims waiting in line.

Neither Gdlyan nor Ivanov was interested in where Karimov and Muzaffarov's colossal valuables, fabulous amounts of money and other things actually came from? And is their testimony reliable?

The top of the criminal pyramid built by T. Gdlyan (this is what he himself called the structure he had created) reaches up to the Kremlin apparatus, and the apparatus of the law-enforcement organs was at its base. When Karimov and Muzaffarov began to give the first testimony, including that about Norov, it was beneficial not only to them but it also satisfied the investigators, who had to fill out the secondary blocks of their pyramid with specific people.

D. Dzhamalov, a former head of the Tashkent Oblispolkom Administration of Internal Affairs:

"They said to me: 'We will not give you much. Your quota is 60,000. We will give you the framework, and you will write how much you received and from whom. This you determine yourself, your norm is 10 people, who these people are—we will say'."

If you had seen the diagram!

N. Norov: "They were constantly showing me a diagram of the case: on top was Churbanov (Shchelokov had already died), then the heads of the central directorates of the USSR MVD, then Uzbekistan's minister of internal affairs and his deputies—the leaders of the

administrations. I was there on the 10th level, in the last spot. They put a cross on Churbanov and drew in terms of incarceration; they moved down to me and promised a prison term less than the maximum, if I was 'obedient.'"

When Gdlyan accepted the Bukhara mafia into the proceedings, he had to consider that criminal capital has its own base, its own sources, so to speak. But he had another enormous task—to go upward rather than inward. Here all means were good. The faster they produced a result, the better. And there was no embarrassment over the fact that the data on more and more new people who were being accused came from the cells—from those who had already been arrested, instead of at the beginning of the investigation. Breaking people was a matter of technique. Psychologists claim that there is no one who cannot be broken.

**'We Will Mark Your Forehead'**

When they arrested Muin Norov, he was more than 60 years old. But age was no barrier to Gdlyan's favorite technique—knock the person down and roll him in mud: "The end justifies the means!"

"Cult of the family" and "code of honor?" These are not for the solitary confinement cell of those under investigation. The investigator is tired, darn it! Time to finish with this stubborn old man. We have suggested a compromise to him, and he balks. Only surgeons do operations with anaesthetic, but there is no infirmary here where you can bother nurses with your whims.

This time Gdlyan presented Norov with testimony which frightened him. And these are people whom the general at time had trusted! He choked with rage and helplessness. His hands clenched into fists, expressing his desire to settle the score—man-to-man—with these insulting characters who could be his sons.

Well now, said Gdlyan, relishing the pornographic details. And you, Norov, what sort are you? See, what these women write about you? What would you say if I showed these to your children and relatives, to your wife?

But these are... prostitutes?

Yes, That's it exactly. Here they write that...

That is how it went, step after step, attack after attack. Without neglecting any of the most vile methods, which absolutely everyone who visited the office of these investigators can confirm, Gdlyan and Ivanov worked to attain their goal.

We should not forget that those under investigation were for the most part middle-aged people, who had experienced serious illness—they were exhausted by hour after hour of questioning and the constant repetition of the same questions, by the fear of liberally-promised harsh repressive measures in the event that they did not comply. For example, they were promised that they

would be put in the same cell with criminals. And, in violation of the law, they put D. Dzhamalov, for example, in a cell with a criminal drug addict, a murderer whom he helped to expose. Any criminal hates a policeman, and in a joint cell this thug did what he wanted. The investigators preferred interrogation by the conveyor method: interrogation during the day and at night the criminal, who had had plenty of sleep, would begin to torture him. A second hell. When Dzhamalov talked about this, the investigators laughed, while Telman Gdlyan, sitting in an armchair and playing with the arm now and again, added: "Do not worry, we will come to mark your forehead with green, when it is time for them to shoot you. Soon we will arrest your wife and hold her here for half a year or so. How we will compromise her and what we shall prove—that we shall have to see."

Or they threatened to arrange a meeting with some "gangling fellows" who would help "to change them into women."

Threats to disgrace their wives and daughters were made to many people. They showed Karimov a videotape of his wife and daughter being insulted. Or Khadzhimuradov, whose death-bed letter contains these lines: "I could not bear the insults—they called all Uzbeks sheep, bandits and fascists. Kartashyan, in particular, said: I will (what comes next is a perversion) your wife and daughter. In addition, he spit in my face."

Those who saw Khadzhimuradov in the last days of his life were struck by his appearance: he became unrecognizable, this very serious man, the most terrifying of the rayon department heads, was terribly shaken by something. He was sent to the hospital. And he died with the hospital admitting slip in his possession. In the morning he got into his car, went to the bazaar and bought a rope, went to his son's where no one was home, wrote the letter and did away with himself.

Yes, the investigators were indiscriminating, but only at first glance; in reality, they had thought through everything, taking into account national characteristics, the special attitude of Asiatics toward children, to public opinion, to the authority of the elders in the family. They carefully chose the most undefended spots and attacked them without mercy. Women, children and old people were their points of attack.

For example, in October 1986 a woman named P. Matchanova was arrested; she is the mother of 10 children, five of whom are minors. For nine months she was incarcerated, but the information was concealed, and this fact came to light only at the trial of her husband, who was, incidentally, acquitted.

A woman named Kamalova, the mother of a six-month old infant was taken in for interrogation at 2400 on 2 June, and released only at 1400 hours on 3 June. The crying breast-fed infant was left only with two older children, aged six and eight, who did not how to feed it. A day later the infant became ill.

And here is evidence from the wife of a former convict, I.G. Sattarov:

"The numerous interrogations of all members of the family, including very old and sick women, the confrontations, the difficulties at work—all that had an effect on my health. The grandchildren, previously healthy, immediately became sick. The youngest ended up in hospital. The oldest grandchild began to fear going outside, and the pediatric neuropathologist stated that it was nervous disease. I was sent to an oncologist. In essence not a single one of my mother's official complaints was considered. Gdlyan and Ivanov answered the letters about their own infractions. My mother lost hope and died. We sent a telegram to the Congress of People's Deputies asking for my husband to be given permission to attend my mother's funeral. There was no answer. Desperate with grief my husband's mother, Narzi Sattarova, who became an invalid without her son, died recently. Irremediable physical and moral trauma has been caused to the entire family."

A postscript: they tortured Karimov's wife and daughter in front of the videocamera; later they showed him the tape and demanded a confession of crimes. Norov's wife was threatened with arrest and prison; she suffered a medical insult and was forced to stop working. Dzhamalov's wife was threatened with prison; she was morally tortured and insulted, and for many years she was seriously ill. Khaitov's wife died during the investigation. Norbutayev's wife, formerly a teacher, went insane.

This gloomy martyrology contains the names of more than 200 women.

### Self-Renunciation

The efforts of the investigators with regard to Norov reached their highest point only after he had been kept in an investigation cell by himself for eight months. Twice during this period he had issued a challenge to the investigator Ivanov. In only two cases out of 10 complaints were short replies—containing no reasons—received; they carried the signature of G. Karakozov, a senior assistant of the USSR procurator general, and stated—without providing any reasons—that there were grounds for bringing Norov to justice. A hunger strike did not help. Meanwhile Gdlyan and Ivanov began to emphasize that they considered Norov to be their enemy, saying that they would convert him into a "steam engine" to which they would "couple" a number of subordinates. The punishment, they said, would be set at no less than 15 years loss of freedom. By this time the efforts of the investigators had resulted in the loss of jobs for two of Norov's sons; his wife had left her party post, having suffered a medical insult. The last method remained, and the investigators made use of it. They organized an almost complete blockade of Norov's oldest son, supervisor of a house-building combine. When they recalled those days, people would talk about the constant watch kept at the gates of the combine by people who were waiting for and openly accompanying

D. Norov. This disturbed and unnerved the entire collective. And the investigators tried to ensure that Muin Norov himself found out about this.

In 1947 a young militia man, sent to participate in the struggle against banditism, did not fear death, which waited around the corner. Now he feared for his son.

From M.S. Norov's complaint to the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet:

"At the cost of self-slander I saved my son and wife from arrest. After a forced 'confession of guilt' Ivanov several times emphasized that it was good that I had come to my senses in time—just a tiny bit longer and they would have arrested my son."

"With Ivanov dictating, I wrote a 'confession of guilt' antedated for all episodes indicated in the testimony of the witnesses. This was required in order to justify the time when no records were being kept, when the investigators, who were trying to frighten me, did not compile any documents."

"When I told Ivanov and Gdlyan that it was difficult for me to come up with the circumstances under which I had received or given bribes, they promised me that investigators would come to help me with this question. And, indeed, in approximately 15-20 days Kalinin and Ibragimov, investigators in his investigative group arrived; they began to read to me protocols of witnesses' interrogations and the text of what was supposed to be my testimony, and I mechanically corroborated it."

### In Line for Rights

Everyone knows the expression that the way to the truth is through the court. I would not want to say that the idea of the court in our country has become devalued in general. But the sentence handed down by the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court in the Churbanov criminal case as it pertains to M.S. Norov contains many passages which are, to put it mildly, perplexing.

Take, for example, the charge that Norov acted as an intermediary in passing on a bribe of R50,000 from Muzaffarov to Karimov. Muzaffarov is Karimov's fellow countryman and protege. And it was Karimov himself who, despite Norov's resistance, succeeded in getting Muzaffarov transferred to the Bukhara UVD (Administration of Internal Affairs) through the ministry without Norov's agreement. What reason would Muzaffarov have to give a bribe to Karimov through Norov?

At the session of the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Norov at first acknowledged passing on some kind of package which he had received from Muzaffarov, the contents of which he supposedly did not know. Later he began to claim that he had not passed on anything at all. In none of the versions did Norov

acknowledge his own guilt as an intermediary. Muzaffarov also stated that he had passed nothing to Karimov through Norov.

All this means that the court did not have at its disposal any evidence of Norov's guilt as an intermediary in bribe taking. Nonetheless, Norov was convicted of this crime. Here is a paragraph from the court's sentence: "Taking into account the firm criminal ties which existed over an extended period of time among Karimov and Muzaffarov, who have been convicted in other cases, and Norov, the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Soviet finds Norov's initial testimony on these episodes to be reliable and to correspond to the factual circumstances of the case."

What was the basis for the court's reference to "firm criminal ties?" Perhaps it was this court testimony by Yakhayev, the republic's former minister of internal affairs: "I have known Norov since 1961. I consider him to be an objective and honest person. There were no close ties between Norov and Karimov, nor could there have been any. Norov is a very cautious person; I will never believe that he took R50,000 from Muzaffarov and passed them on to Karimov."

And, indeed, how can one explain Norov's appearance at the "Churbanov trial?" After all, only one circumstance in the sentence links them: Norov's acknowledgement that during an inspection tour of the city, Gazli Churbanov expressed to Karimov in sharp form a number of comments on the organization of the supply system for residents of the city, which had suffered from an earthquake. That is all!

Thus, Norov's position in the criminal case of Churbanov and others was also extremely difficult because the groundless division permitted by the investigators had resulted in most of the accusation proving to be outside the given case. It would appear that the division of the cases was one of the ways in which pressure was exerted on Norov. The main threat was to send to the court a case dealing with him alone, which was a guarantee of the most severe punishment.

In 1986 the case of the Bukhara UVD workers went before the Uzbek SSR Supreme Court. During the trial the passing of bribes to Norov was considered, as well as the passing of bribes to Karimov from Muzaffarov (through Norov). Norov had been in custody since March 1985, but in this case he did not figure as a defendant.

In 1987 the USSR Supreme Court examined the case of the former first secretary of the Bukhara CPSU Obkom, A. Karimov, who was charged, among other things, with receiving two bribes totaling R40,600 rubles, but Norov once again did not figure as a defendant in this case. It turned out that Norov's guilt in passing on bribes, in acting as an intermediary in bribery and in taking bribes worth R15,620 had been established by the sentences, which had the force of res judicata, of the above-mentioned courts even before his case was considered!

But this, it seems is not juridical nonsense and was in no way accidental; it was instead an intentional machination: the "Churbanov trial" had to have enough "ready" defendants, and Norov was one of the most undefended (he was refused the assistance of a lawyer from the moment the charge was laid against him; G.P. Karakozov also responded to this with a denial).

T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov's activities will remain for many years a vivid symbol of despotic arbitrariness, similar to the Beria lawlessness, from which many of us clearly did not learn any lessons. How else can one interpret the evil conclusions drawn by other representatives of our society, who say that if many people were committing suicide during investigations conducted by Gdlyan, the reason for this was obvious. Why do we, who even without this, have all been deprived of rights still have this cruel aggressiveness with regard to one another? Is it wise for us to forget about the returning effect of a boomerang?

Without infringing on the convictions of my fellow countrymen, I would like to note that a majority of the people who praise the activities of T. Gdlyan and N. Ivanov and who justify "high-class professionals" have ill-considered ideas about what has become known commonly as the "Uzbek case." And the most disturbing thing is that society, while claiming to be civilized, not only justifies violence but also does not tire of swinging the censer about them. While performing the democratic rites and rituals one after another, this society has forgotten to extend its hand to those fellow citizens who have become victims of a great arbitrariness which is again repeating itself. After all, during the years of the Stalin and Beria terror our people also applauded at meetings every lawless decision, which cost lives. And now many people do not want to hear about the details of investigative arbitrariness in Uzbekistan; they do not want to depress themselves. Periodicals refuse to print articles on this subject, some journalists, think what you will, are afraid of physical reprisals over this.

And now the Supreme Soviet, which knows about the arbitrariness and lawlessness, has ignored the issue of how to deal with the people who were the victims of Ivanov and Gdlyan; it has not raised the question of re-examining the illegal sentences.

How can this society, when the time has come, fail to take its place in the long line asking for justice; after all, it says in Ecclesiastes: "A single fate will overtake us all." The trap may prove to be for everyone.

#### **Fanatics or Politicians?**

The more I reflect on why the courts, which are obliged to reveal mistakes and faults of an investigation, stubbornly refuse to take note of them, the more I come to the conclusion that the judges have been blinded by the political coloration of the "Uzbek case." Its many volumes contain evidence that a great game of a serious political force lies at the basis of the actions by representatives of the USSR Procurator's Office, specifically T.

Gdlyan and N. Ivanov. The actions of the investigators must have exerted a real influence on the events and the political situation in the country. The chair occupied by the country's party leader did not give peace and quiet to many politicians; and in the early 80's it became vacant more than once with unusual speed.

A new vacancy was expected; the figure of Mikhail Gorbachev, then a CPSU Central Committee secretary, as a possible leader of the country began to come in view. And here Gdlyan and Ivanov begin to work hard, and they did not conceal their special interest in this figure; they wanted to see a compromise reached on Gorbachev no matter what, at any cost, by truth or untruth. Let us recall that it was 1984. Everywhere investigators were emphasizing their "special role." Testimony on other Central Committee secretaries was beginning to emerge. And at a convenient moment one of the cards, which seemed (to whom?) to be a winning one was being played.

All the same, the specific political circumstances and political canvas can be seen behind the actions of the investigators in Uzbekistan. As a result, we have seen very serious perversion of legal policy and a dangerous distortion in the public awareness of the law in the Uzbek republic, many of whose residents now are absolutely certain that "if necessary" the law will burn on the same fire the righteous and the guilty, the "black crows" and the "white crows."

But this great problem is still only half the problem. The main point remains that the true roots of the criminality remain untouched.

In fact, it is worth thinking seriously about why the investigators of the USSR Procurator's Office in Uzbekistan worked so persistently to decapitate all levels of the leadership—and what is especially notable—the leadership of the law-enforcement organs. It is indisputable that a considerable number of serious mistakes and unforgivable lapses were permitted, and that these ulcers should be uncovered, the abscesses removed and the guilty parties punished. But after all, the system of false reporting of plan results gripped with its tentacles the country's entire economic system, and especially the agricultural system. The situation was no less serious in a number of Russian oblasts, Moldavia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, where they have now draped in the toga of deputies' immunity two former investigators of the USSR Procurator's Office. But having pulled the Uzbek thread, they soon dropped it, leaving the mess undisturbed.

But the very worst part is that we, who hear every day the beautiful words about a law-based state, common human values and socialism with a human face, are increasingly becoming used to human life, blood and honor becoming the small change in large and small political games. Does the fact of violence against the wife of one of the Omonovtsy in Riga not remind us of anything? And the murdered in Vilnius?

The words from an interview published in a Zelenograd newspaper in October of last year resound with a kind of devilish sneer: "...there arises the very danger of which I frequently warned—violence, blood and bloodshed. I fear this above all."

To whom do these quoted words belong, to which humanist? To Telman Khorenovich Gdlyan.

The author is donating the honorarium for this article to the Save Aral Fund.

### Baltfax News Agency Described

91UN1434A Tallinn VECHERNIY TALLINN  
in Russian 17 Apr 91 p 1

[Article by Tynis Erilayd: "Baltfax—An Information Agency"]

[Text] "This would be a spectacular beginning: 'It dawned on me on Red Square...' But this was a year ago at the end of March in Moscow, but not on Red Square," says Allan Martinson. "Together with a fellow who also studied there, we pondered how to make some money. I submitted articles to the newspaper PAEVALEHT; this was something we knew, and we decided to compile reviews of the Estonian press for foreign journalists. We produced them for one month in the faint hope of getting someone interested. But it turned out that apparently nobody needed them."

Naturally, the young men were hurt, but did not give up. They began to look for something that could be of interest to foreign journalists after all. It turned out that the latter wanted to receive daily news, and only the latest, because they counted time in minutes rather than days or hours.

It is hard for a reporter in the news department to earn a reputation because his reports are usually left anonymous. But only those who sense the fleeting of time are suited for this work. A journalist feels proud when he manages to beat his competitor by even a minute.

Five people—three Estonians, a Lithuanian, and a Muscovite—organized a mini-information agency, the Estonian News Service, which engaged in disseminating the latest information abroad. Subsequently, it was transformed into the joint-stock company Baltic News Service.

"A year ago, news from Estonia was valued highly. At the time, negotiations were looming and our statesmen were visiting Moscow all the time. As early as August, we became a well-known company (with some aid from the joint enterprise Info). We had almost 50 clients. I think that at the time we were the most efficient agency of the Baltic states in terms of per capita productivity.

"We acquired automated systems for information processing. We employed Americans to polish texts. We confidently moved up step by step. Subsequently, our research indicated that interest in the Baltic area had waned. It was expected that one-quarter, or even three-quarters of our consumers, would discontinue cooperation. Within the Union, powerful competitors appeared: Interfax and Postfactum. Following the logic of business, we came to the conclusion that we should sign an agreement with one of them. We reached an agreement with Interfax.

"The January events were still to happen. The birth of Baltfax [Baltfaks] coincided with them, and this is why the agency became famous. At present, there are about 120 to 130 permanent clients (they include even the

Embassy of Zimbabwe in Moscow, Paraguayan newspapers, and, thanks to cooperation with Interfax, the influential information agency of Japan KYODO).

"According to its contract with Interfax, the Baltic News Service has exclusive rights to disseminate news from the Baltic states through its agency and vice versa. That is, the Interfax agency does not itself engage in information gathering in the Baltic states, but merely disseminates information acquired by the Baltic News Service. We have our own bureaus in Tallinn, Riga (using the facilities of the information department of the former DIENA), and Moscow; we are completing the establishment of a bureau in Vilnius."

Allan Martinson said: "We are quoted very frequently. The joint-stock company Baltic News Service which, along with Interfax, owns Baltfax, is beginning to establish contacts with the press of Estonia (for two months, all potential consumers received information free of charge; by now, contracts have already been signed with PAEVALEHT and POSTIMEES). However, the company takes a realistic view of things. It believes that for now it is unable to compete with the Estonian Telegraph Agency in the domestic market of Estonia."

The Baltic News Service's executive director, Valeriy Kharlamov, believes that so far it is on the periphery of the information market. Four times a day Baltfax disseminates four to five sheets of the latest information containing the most complete data on events in the USSR.

### USSR: Rado Vedo To Begin Broadcasts 20 May

LD0805165191 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program  
Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 7 May 91

[Text] We have often reported numerous new newspapers and magazines, and today there are celebrations on our streets. A new radio station, Vedo, is coming on the air on the short wave and a little later on the medium wave. I'm reporting this gladly, since Mayak was involved in its appearance. I would recall that approximately six months ago I did a report from the so-called Protivodeystviye [Opposition] radio station, called simply "Glushilka" ["the jammer"] by the people. I lamented on the fact that the potential that had been released was not being used, yet there was a marvellous opportunity to open, say, a commercial radio station, from which both the state and, most importantly, the listeners, would benefit.

And here we are—a joint small enterprise of communications workers and journalists. At 1900 [1600 GMT] on 20 May, for the first time the station identification will sound of Radio Vedo, which will be functioning in accordance with the principle of the private radio stations which are widespread in the West, in the 42- 50 meter band. This will be a station bringing together the interests of peoples of all nationalities living between the Volga and the Don: Russians, Germans, Kazakhs, Jews, Tatars, Ukrainians, as well as all religious beliefs. There

are more than 100 denominations in this area of good religious tolerance. A place is being found for sermons and for programs in German made specially by Deutsche Welle in Cologne, and for philosophical thought sent by the Voice of America. There are special programs for women, representatives of small businesses, young people—an extraordinarily broad range, because in the long term the radio station will be broadcasting for 20 hours a day. The radio station has prizes ready for its very first listeners—radio receivers. You only have to write in to a very simple address to say what the first program was about, on a postcard, to: Volgograd, Radio station Vedo.

### **Bulk of Leningrad TV Shares To Be Held Locally**

PM0905145791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 91  
Second Edition p 2

[Correspondent N. Volynskiy report: "Who Owns the 'Block' of Shares?"]

[Text] Leningrad—The Leningrad City Soviet Presidium recently decided to set up an independent state Leningrad Television and Radio Company on a constituent and joint-stock basis. A. Sobchak, Leningrad City Soviet chairman, explained that this means that the All-Union Television and Radio Company and the RSFSR Ministry of the Press and Mass Media are entitled to hold a certain proportion of the shares—33 and 10 percent respectively. The Leningrad City Soviet, the Leningrad Oblast Soviet, and the Leningrad Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting collective are to share the remaining stock among themselves. An issue of shares for the population is also planned. So, Leningraders can have three votes on the constituent council and their shareholding is to be the largest. What is more, it has been decided to attract as shareholders the Baltic Maritime Steamship Company, the USSR Academy of Sciences "Scientific Instruments" Joint-Stock Association, and the Leningrad Association of Industrial Enterprises, along with certain oblast sovkhoz associations.

The following question remains: Will the all-union company leadership agree to such a modest share? A. Sobchak gave assurances that there have been lengthy talks on this subject with L. Kravchenko, leader of the All-Union Television and Radio Company, who pressed for 51 percent at first. However, according to the Leningrad City Soviet chairman, the upshot was that it proved possible to reach a preliminary agreement to the effect that Leningrad organizations will nonetheless hold the controlling block of shares.

### **Turkmen Decree on Registration of Mass Media**

91UN1309A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA  
in Russian 20 Mar 91 p 1

[Decree of the president of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic; date not given: "On the Procedure for Registration, Collection, and Amounts of Fees for Issuance of

Certificates of Registration of Mass Media Intended for the Republic and Local Audiences"]

[Text] In keeping with the law of the Turkmen SSR "On the Press and Other Mass Media in the Turkmen SSR," I decree:

1. To establish that the mass media intended for republic and local audiences is registered by the Turkmen SSR State Committee for the Press, the Turkmen SSR State Committee for Television and Radio under the Turkmen SSR Presidential Council, the Turkmenkino Production Association of the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture, with the agreement of the Committee for Protection of State Secrets in the Press and Other Mass Media under the Turkmen SSR government, in keeping with the functions assigned to them and according to the procedure established by the Turkmen SSR Law "On the Press and Other Mass Media in the Turkmen SSR."

2. The Turkmen SSR State Committee for the Press is to provide for the manufacture of standard forms of certificates of registration of mass media and blank application forms in the Turkmen and Russian languages for their own needs and those of the Turkmen SSR State Committee for Television and Radio under the Turkmen SSR Presidential Council and the Turkmenkino Production Association of the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Culture, on orders from them.

The Turkmen SSR Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] is to allot the resources necessary for this to the Turkmen SSR State Committee for the Press.

Expenditures involved in the manufacture of standard forms for certificates of registration of mass media and blank forms for application for registration are to be charged to the reserve fund of the Turkmen SSR government.

3. To establish the following amounts of fees for issuance of certificates of registration of mass media intended for republic and local audiences:

1500 rubles [R]—for newspapers, journals, and supplements to them and publications of the newspaper and journal type;

R2000—for television and radio programs, movie documentaries, and other periodical forms of public dissemination of mass information.

For issuance of certificates of registration of mass media intended for children, the aforementioned amounts are reduced by 50 percent.

If necessary, suggestions are to be made to the republic government concerning changes in the amounts of the fees for the issuance of certificates of the registration of mass media intended for republic and local audiences.

Fees for the issuance of certificates are added to the income of the republic budget according to the procedure established by the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Finance.

4. The Turkmen SSR State Committee for the Press, the Turkmen SSR State Committee for Television and Radio under the Turkmen SSR Presidential Council, the Turkmenkino Production Association of the Turkmen

SSR Ministry of Culture, and the Committee for Protection of State Secrets in the Press and Other Mass Media under the Turkmen SSR Government, with the agreement of the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Finance, is to approve the provisions on the policy and conditions for registration of mass media before 25 March 1991.

5. To declare invalid Decree No. 260 of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers of 6 September 1990.

S. Niyazov, president,  
Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic.

### **Chernobyl Clean-Up Workers From Internal Affairs Ministry Form Association**

*91WN0438A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
18 Apr 91 p 4*

[Article by Vadim Feldman: "Baptised by the Atom...."]

[Text] An association of staff members from the Ukrainian SSR Internal Affairs organs has been founded. It consists of those persons who have participated in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station].

This new public organization, as well as its goals and tasks, was reported on at a briefing which was held in the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs after the constituent conference had been completed. The delegates to this conference represented those persons who have worked to eliminate the consequences of the catastrophe at the Chernobyl AES; they are from all the UVD's [Internal Affairs Administrations] of the Ukrainian oblasts and the city of Kiev.

"We now have about 33,000 such persons," said the Ukrainian SSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, Police Major General V.M. Korneychuk, who was elected chairman of the association. "Among them are the firemen who were the first to go in to battle the fire at Bloc No. 4; they did not allow the flames to spread, and by this action they prevented a more terrible tragedy from occurring. Our association also includes their colleagues who, day after day, supplied water for the concrete work, and who pumped out other water—radioactive water—from the drum [?] of the sub-reactor section. It likewise encompasses the following: the personnel of the duty details and patrols, who maintained order on the approaches to the AES, in the city of Pripyat and its environs, the staff members of the BKhSS [Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation], who safeguarded the monetary funds and valuables of the enterprises, organizations, and farms situated within the zone from which people were being resettled, those who participated in evacuating the population from the contaminated areas and in deactivating the territory of the station itself, medical personnel, who were sent into the zone from all the preventive-treatment institutions of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the oblast-level UVD's, staff members of the inquiry-and-information service, who registered the evacuees and helped people to search for and find relatives who had been lost, inspectors of the GAI [State Motor-Vehicle Inspectorate], who were on duty beginning with the very first hours after the accident on highways and guardposts, as well as those persons on duty at the dosimetric, health-monitoring centers. Furthermore, even now police staff members are also working within the 30-kilometer zone."

By the way, Association Chairman V.M. Korneychuk knows—and not just by hearsay—about the events that happened five years ago. At that time Vladimir Mikhaylovich [Korneychuk] was chief of the Kiev Oblast UVD,

and on 26 April 1986 he had already arrived at the accident site by 0415 hours.

The association unites not only the staff members of those organs, subdivisions, and services which have participated in various stages of the struggle against the Chernobyl disaster, along with members of their families, but also the families and parents of those persons who perished there or who have died because of exposure to radioactivity. Operating under the motto of "Humanism and Mercy," this association will render to the eliminators and their families material, financial, medical, social, day-to-day, and other assistance, accumulate and systematize information concerning those helped by these measures and those who have suffered from the effects of radiation. They will also ensure that monitoring controls will continue to be exercised on their medical service and care. Because, after all, 3,200 staff members of the Ukraine's internal affairs organs have received a dose of radiation exceeding 25 REMs [Roentgen Equivalent Man], whereas acute radiation sickness has been set at 72 REMs. Among those persons working in the zone of radioactive contamination there has been a tripling in the number of oncological, i.e., cancer-type, illness, and increases by a factor of 1.5-2 in diseases of the stomach and intestinal tract, cardiovascular and endocrine systems, and the incidence of injuries has increased. Approximately 7,000 persons have now been registered as having diseases connected, in one way or another, with the consequences of the Chernobyl accident.

The chief of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Medical Administration, Internal Service Lieutenant Colonel O.V. Petrash told us that, whereas previously the eliminators could obtain a conclusion concerning health disorders only in the republic-level expert council under the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, nowadays an additional 11 territorial expert councils have been formed for them. These councils have analogous functions and rights and are located in Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zhitomir, Lugansk, Lvov, Rovno, Kharkov, Kherson, and Cherkassy oblasts, as well as in the Crimea, and in the city of Kiev. The operational zone of such councils is also being extended to the adjacent oblasts.

### **Ukrainian Official on Chernobyl Victim Resettlement**

*91WN0438B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
12 Apr 91 p 2*

[Interview with Georgiy Aleksandrovich Gotovchits, chairman, Ukrainian SSR State Committee for Protecting the Population from the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES, by Aleksandr Sokol, correspondent: "By the Whole World"]

[Text] The Chernobyl accident was an unprecedented ecological disaster which affected not only the Ukraine, but also Belorussia and Russia. At the end of last year a

State Committee for protecting the population from this disaster was set up in this republic. Its principal concern nowadays is resettling people from areas having radiation contamination. This work and its scope comprise the topic of our correspondent's interview with G.A. GOTOVCHITS—chairman of the Ukrainian SSR State Committee for Protecting the Population from the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station].

[Sokol] Georgiy Aleksandrovich, to what extent will the problems of resettling people from the areas which have suffered be solved during the present year?

[Gotovchits] As we have studied and evaluated the radiation situation and accumulated the necessary scientific and practical data, we have come to the conclusion that small doses of radiation change the socioeconomic conditions of people's lives. Therefore, a decision has been adopted to revise the criteria for resettlement. As you know, last year it was carried out in places where the level of soil contamination by cesium exceeded 40 Curie units per square kilometer. This year we are resettling people if the contamination is 15 Curie units or higher.

[Sokol] How many people will be resettled, and who are they—city people or rural inhabitants? And from what regions will they come?

[Gotovchits] As to the regions, they are primarily the most contaminated ones—Kiev and Zhitomir oblasts; the principal mass of people will come from here. They will be joined by certain villages of the Chernigov region and the northern portion of the Rovno area. These are new regions from which people will be resettled.

During the course of the present year we plan to resettle 66 population centers. Some 17,000 families live in them, which amounts to approximately 35,000 persons. For the sake of comparison, let me say that last year we resettled 12,000. The work has become extremely complicated. The builders must utilize some 1.5 billion rubles. This total amount speaks for itself.

[Sokol] From what budget will the money come?

[Gotovchits] From the Union budget. On that score we foresee no particular needs or difficulties. The complications lie elsewhere—in the area of material resources.

[Sokol] At high-level conferences people have been uttering calm, reassuring noises such as the following: The Chernobyl matter will be handled by a special, separate line item in the national economic plan—everything will be taken care of. Is there already such a line item?

[Gotovchits] There is a line item, but, as you yourself know, the situation is such that there are some deficits and shortages. Many problems have become more acute than they used to be. For example, we have to obtain lumber primarily from outside this republic, and this is now the problems of problems. Furthermore, the situation is not much better with regard to local materials. We

are short of vehicles, machines, and mechanisms. All this complicates our work. Nevertheless, we have to build—there's just no other solution.

[Sokol] In former years many persons attempted to remain in their own localities, in their own oblasts. How do matters stand now in this regard?

[Gotovchits] In most cases that's the way it still is. It's hard for a "field-dweller" to live, let's say, in a steppe zone; he does not want to leave his Polesye. But some people have wished to leave. This applies, in particular, to the Kharkov and Kirovograd regions.

By the way, it is also a matter of some importance for the oblasts where these people being resettled finally do settle down; housing must be built in these localities. Let's say housing has to be built in the Zhitomir region for some people from Kherson—it's a burdensome matter. Furthermore, there's a need for apartments in their own home area. Therefore, many persons are attempting to take the resettlers into their own homes. But the final decision is up to the people being resettled.

[Sokol] Letters now coming into PRAVDA UKRAINY suggest that regions be resettled which have a shortage of manpower. Such regions would include the South and health-resort areas. Should such suggestions be dismissed out of hand?

[Gotovchits] Certainly not. People should have the opportunity to make any a choice. The only thing required for such a step is a common or general agreement.

Misunderstandings arise, it seems to me, from the fact that the persons doing the inviting usually do not invite, but rather impose their own decision or solution. If, however, people met together and looked over the entire locality, they would quickly come to a decision.

[Sokol] Construction is carried on just as it used to be—an oblast receives an assigned task and proceeds to the construction site with its own people, equipment, building materials, and even its own policemen. Isn't that so?

[Gotovchits] Yes, it's the same approach as before. The oblasts' collectives proceed to the construction sites with their own equipment and materials; they set up and arrange their own everyday life, rest, and recreation. They have their own cooks, physicians, and guardians of law and order.

As you can understand, this measure is obligatory. It complicates the process and makes it more expensive. But it does allow maximum use to be made of the local potential and a combination of the efforts of various construction organizations—state, kolkhoz, cooperative, and individual enterprises. As a result, we are solving the principal problem—to erect houses at an accelerated rate and in huge quantities.

[Sokol] At the conference in this republic's Council of Ministers which took place in January it was noted that certain oblasts are, most deplorably, attempting to get out of building house for the victims of Chernobyl. Has all this been specified in the present plan?

[Gotovchits] Not completely. Whereas agreement has virtually been attained with Kharkov and Sumy oblasts, not everything has been fully cleared up in the case of Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye oblasts. They have accepted their assigned tasks but have not yet come up with their lists of organizations which are to carry them out. This disturbs us—time is running out.

There are unsolved problems in the Volyniya region: There are also rayons contaminated by radiation here. But the Volynians ought to help those persons who are living under even worse conditions.

[Sokol] Are some kinds of operations already being carried out directly at the construction projects?

[Gotovchits] Yes. Service cars [?] have already been set up, the building lots are being staked out, and a number of oblasts are finishing up their preparation. But getting fully underway, as the saying goes, still lies ahead of us. Nor have we avoided delays. They have occurred for various reasons. Things have been affected, for example, by the cold weather: February turned out to have an unusually large amount of freezing temperatures. A number of settlements do not yet have full sets of completed documentation. There has been no great haste with regard to investigatory or surveying operations: an attempt has been made to avoid the mistakes of past years.

[Sokol] Do you have in mind the case of the settlement planned to be built "over radon" being moved?

[Gotovchits] Not only that. It happened, you know, that these people had been resettled from a "contaminated" place to one that was less "contaminated." Such cases cannot be allowed to occur. Therefore, in addition to Ukrgidromet [Ukrainian Hydrometeorological Bureau] and the Ministry of Health, the staff members of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences and those of the Nuclear Research Institute have also been involved in studying sites. Several building lots have had to be changed because of radon—a substantial source of radiation—or because of an insufficient reserve supply of drinking water. Extremely careful studies have had an effect on the sources of planning.

[Sokol] Georgiy Aleksandrovich, the following point has been emphasized from the rostrum: "During the year 1991 we shall absorb and utilize 1.5 billion rubles!" The volume is colossal. And all these operations are supplementary, i.e., in addition to the "regular" construction work. Is this task realistic?

[Gotovchits] The program is an extremely difficult one. Speaking frankly, unless our attitude towards it changes,

and if the dawdling and delays which I spoke about continues, we will not achieve success.

We must take the situation into account—it is simply impossible to postpone construction any further. We must do as much as possible.

[Sokol] I don't like to remind you about the unpleasant past, but the fact of the matter is that the plan for 1990 fell short....

[Gotovchits] The task assigned for last year did, indeed, remain unfulfilled. More than 300 farmsteads and a considerable number of apartments in multistory apartment houses were shifted or carried over, as they say, to this year. For the most part, they were well-constructed, but they have not yet solved the problems of water supply and heating. We have also been delayed by the "traditional" poor quality of finishing operations. Work on these incomplete projects is being finished up, and all the planned housing will be put into operation.

This, as people say, is an assumed, usual type of problem. But an unanticipated problem has also arisen: The already erected houses remain vacant. There are significantly more of them than those that remain unfinished. For various reasons people are not moving into them. The principal reason is as follows. In the regions being monitored for radiation people receive monetary bonuses; here they are provided—at least to a certain extent—with foodstuffs, attention to their health, and health care for their children. In the "clean zone" there is none of this. Moreover, there are difficulties with job placement, not enough schools, kindergartens, and poor services; these facilities will be built later. And so many persons are in no great hurry to move to the new settlements.

[Sokol] In that case, is it feasible to have such an extensive construction program for this year?

[Gotovchits] It is feasible. During the present year the situation must change. The Chernobyl laws, which were passed at the end of February by this republic's Supreme Soviet, guarantee the victims social protection regardless of where they live.

The vacant farmsteads and apartments must be occupied and lived in. I'd like to hope that those persons being resettled will understand the situation.

[Sokol] In contrast to the Union plan, the Ukraine has decided to shorten the time period for resettlement by a year. As I understand it, during the present year this portion of the work will be completed. Is that correct?

[Gotovchits] Yes. But from those territories where the contamination amounts to 15 Curie units or higher per square kilometer. And on condition that the outlined program will be fully carried out. The following circumstance must also be borne in mind. The concept of safe residential living, as adopted by this republic's Supreme Soviet, assumes supplementary criteria for resettlement such as, in particular, the impossibility of producing

"clean" farm produce, the condition of health of children with irradiated thyroid glands.... And so, the number of persons being resettled is growing. To what extent, I still cannot say, but there will be an increase. These families will move next year. But the decisive step will take place during the present year.

### **Ukrainian SSR Law on Territory Contaminated by Chernobyl**

91WN0406A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
22 Mar 91 pp 1, 3

[UkSSR Law on the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on the Legal Regulations for Territories Subject to Radioactive Contamination as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe"]

[Text] The Chernobyl catastrophe created an exceptionally dangerous radiation situation in terms of human health and the environment, spread over a significant area of the UkSSR. The Republic was declared a zone of ecological catastrophe. The elimination of the consequences of this catastrophe depends on the legislative determination of the legal system to be applied in the territories with different degrees of radioactive contamination, and the measures to ensure its implementation. The law regulates matters pertaining to the classification of territories into respective zones and the system for their use and protection and for the conditions under which the population can live and work and for engaging in economic, scientific-research, and other activities on such territories. The law secures and guarantees the implementation of the system for the utilization and protection of said territories, with a view to reducing the effect of radioactivity on human health and on ecological systems.

## **Section I**

### **General Stipulations**

#### **Article 1. Defining Territories Subject to Radioactive Contamination as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

Within the UkSSR, such territories include those in which durable contamination of the environment with radioactive substances has occurred as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, in excess of the pre-accident level; taking into consideration the natural-climatic and comprehensive ecological features of the specific territories, this could lead to a radiation of the population in excess of 1.0 millisievert (0.1 rem) annually, requiring that steps be taken to ensure the protection of the population from radiation and other particular interventions aimed at limiting any additional irradiation of the population, caused by the Chernobyl catastrophe, and ensuring the population's pursuit of normal economic activities.

#### **Article 2. Defining the Categories of Zones of Radioactively Contaminated Territories**

Depending on the landscape and geochemical features of the soil, the extent increase in the natural pre-accident level of accumulation of radionuclides in the environment and related degrees of possible adverse effect on the health of the population, the requirements related to providing radiation protection to the population and to taking other special measures, the territory subject of radioactive pollution as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe is classified into several zones.

These zones are the following:

1. Zone of condemnation: a territory from which the population was evacuated in 1986;
2. Zone of unconditional (mandatory) resettlement of the population: a territory subject to intensive contamination with long-life radionuclides, with a compact pollution of the soil with cesium isotopes of 15.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> or higher, strontium of 3.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> or higher or plutonium 0.1 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> or higher, as well as territories with soils which contribute to the high migration of radionuclides in plants, with a density of isotope pollution of cesium between 5.0 and 15.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, strontium from 0.15 to 3.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, or plutonium from 0.01 to 0.1 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, in which the effective equivalent dose of human radiation may exceed 5.0 millisievert (0.5 rem) per year above the dose which the person received in the pre-accident period;
3. Zone of guaranteed voluntary resettlement: a territory showing a soil pollution density with isotopes of cesium from 5.0 to 15.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, strontium from 0.15 to 3.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, or plutonium from 0.01 to 0.1 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, as well as territories with soils which contribute to the high migration of radionuclides in plants with a density of contamination with isotopes of cesium from 1.0 to 5.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, strontium from 0.02 to 0.15 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> or plutonium from 0.005 to 0.01 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> in which the effective equivalent dose of human radiation may exceed 1.0 millisievert (0.1 rem) per year above the dose which the person received in the pre-accident period;
4. Zone of increased radio-ecological control: a territory with a pollution density of the soil with cesium isotopes from 1.0 to 5.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, strontium 0.02 to 0.15 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> or plutonium from 0.005 to 0.01 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> and territory with soils contributing to the high migration of radionuclides in plants, with a pollution density of cesium from 0.2 to 1.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, in which the effective equivalent dose of radiation of a person must not exceed 1.0 millisievert (0.1 rem) per year above the dose to which he was exposed in the pre-accident period.

Additional criteria on the contamination of the soil with radionuclides may be set by the National Commission for the Radiation Protection of the Ukrainian Population.

In determining the level of soil contamination with radionuclides for purposes of zone demarcation categories, a 90-percent indicator is set on the basis of the overall number of measurements of the density of contamination, on an ascending scale.

The boundaries of these zones are set and reviewed by the UkSSR Council of Ministers, on the basis of the expert conclusions of the National Commission for the Radiation Protection of the Ukrainian Population, the UkSSR Academy of Sciences, the UkSSR Ministry of Health, the UkSSR State Committee for the Protection of the Population From the Consequences of the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Power Plant] Accident, the Ukrainian Republic Hydrometeorological Administration, the UkSSR State Agroindustrial Committee, and the UkSSR State Committee for Ecology and Rational Utilization of Nature, on the presentation of the oblast soviets of people's deputies.

The maps of said zones and the list of settlements included in such zones will be published in the republic and local press.

### **Article 3. Determining Radiation Hazardous Land**

Radiationally hazardous land is land on which any further life of the population and the possibility of producing agricultural or other goods, and nutritional substances, consistent with Republic and internationally admissible levels of radioactive substances, or goods the use of which would be inexpedient due to ecological conditions, have become impossible.

Such land must be removed from agricultural use. The land included in this article pertains to territories indicated in points 1 and 2 of Article 2 of this law.

### **Article 4. Determining Radioactively Contaminated Land**

Radioactively contaminated land is land which requires taking measures for radiation protection and other special intervention, aimed at limiting any additional radiation caused by the Chernobyl catastrophe and ensuring normal economic activities.

The land referred to in this article includes the territories listed in points 3 and 4, Article 2, of this law.

### **Article 5. Jurisdiction of the UkSSR Concerning Zones Subject to Radioactive Contamination As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

In accordance with the Declaration on Ukrainian State Sovereignty, the UkSSR defines the legal system of the zones, and concludes contracts for work with the state organs of the USSR, Soviet republics, foreign countries, and international organizations.

The UkSSR Council of Ministers defines all economic international activities in the condemned zone.

Coordination of the work in the zones is provided by the UkSSR State Committee for the Protection of the Population From the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Power Plant].

### **Article 6. Financing Work in Zones Exposed to Radioactive Contamination**

The financing of work to remove the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe shall be provided out of funds appropriated in accordance with the State-Union Republic Program for Eliminating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe, including from the Republic's budget, from which the sums contributed to the Union budget will be deducted in the necessary amount, and from other income.

To this effect, the Chernobyl Credit-Financial Bank is being created as part of the banking system of the UkSSR.

The funds will be handled by the UkSSR Council of Ministers. The planning and material and technical procurements and amounts of financing the works will be determined by the UkSSR Council of Ministers, based on the presentation of the UkSSR State Committee for the Protection of the Population From the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES.

### **Article 7. Securing Economic Activities in the Zones of Guaranteed Voluntary Resettlement and Intensified Radioecological Control**

State enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes, sovkhoses, and other establishments within the zones of guaranteed voluntary resettlement and increased radioecological control shall be exempt from taxation. In their case, the UkSSR Council of Ministers shall establish privileged conditions for financing and guaranteed material and technical support.

### **Article 8. Administration of the Condemned Zone**

The administration of the condemned zone shall be provided by the respective subdivision of the UkSSR State Committee for the Protection of the Population From the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES—the Zonal Administration.

The Zonal Administration shall organize and coordinate all measures on the territory of the condemned zone and solve problems of their financing, maintenance of public order, and health of personnel working within this territory, safeguard the scientific and economic interests of the Republic, and assume responsibility for efficiently, fully, and objectively informing the Republic's population about the ecological situation in the condemned zone.

### **Article 9. Administration of the Zones of Unconditional (Mandatory) Resettlement and of Guaranteed Voluntary Resettlement**

The administration of zones of unconditional (mandatory) resettlement and guaranteed voluntary resettlement shall be provided by the respective oblast soviets of people's deputies.

**Article 10. Providing the Ukrainian Population With Information on the Radiation Status of Territories**

The UkSSR Council of Ministers will provide the population with the necessary information on the radiation condition of the territories.

**Article 11. Ownership Priority Relative to Information and Results of Scientific Research Related to the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

All scientific information and results of scientific studies obtained in the Chernobyl zone shall be the property of the UkSSR and may be used only by permission of the UkSSR Council of Ministers.

**Section II**

**Legal System in the Zones of Condemnation and Unconditional (Mandatory) Resettlement**

**Article 12. Types of Activities Prohibited in the Zones of Condemnation and Unconditional (Mandatory) Resettlement**

The land in the zones of condemnation and unconditional (mandatory) resettlement shall be withdrawn from economic activities and separated from related territories and classified in the categories of radiationally hazardous lands.

The following is prohibited in the condemnation and unconditional (mandatory) resettlement zones:

Permanent residence by the population;

Engaging in activities resulting in commodity output;

Stay by individuals without a special permission to this effect or hiring for work individuals under the age of 35 without their consent;

Hauling outside the limits of the zones, without the special permission of the UkSSR State Committee for the Protection of the Population From the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES of soil, clay, sand, peat, lumber, vegetal feeds, medicinal plants, mushrooms, berries, and other forest by-products, with the exception of samples taken for scientific purposes;

Importing or exporting into and out of the zones construction materials and structures, machines and equipment, household items, and so on, without the special permission of the UkSSR State Committee for the Protection of the Population From the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES and without dosimetric control;

Engaging in farming, forestry, industrial or other activities or construction without special permission;

Grazing cattle, disturbing the habitat of wildlife, and engaging in sports or industrial hunting or fishing activities;

Driving cattle, floating timber, and transit traveling with any type of transportation. Entering or leaving the territory of the zone may be allowed only with special passes with mandatory dosimetric control of people and means of transportation;

Any activity which violates radiation safety regulations.

**Article 13. Mandatory Measures Implemented in the Zones of Condemnation and Unconditional (Mandatory) Resettlement**

Mandatory measures are taken by specialized subunits in the zones of condemnation and unconditional (mandatory) resettlement, as follows:

Preventing the removal of radionuclides from the territories of the zone and the radioactive pollution of the environment;

Monitoring the condition of the natural environment and providing medical-biological monitoring;

Maintaining the territory in a suitable sanitary and fire-safety condition;

Use of methods for securing radionuclides in the localities.

All activities must take place with a limited number of recruited individuals and within an overall collective dose.

**Article 14. Protection of the Territories of the Zones of Condemnation and Unconditional (Mandatory) Resettlement**

A strict environmental protection system and protection of the territories and of natural, historical, and ethnocultural monuments, in accordance with current legislation, shall be maintained in the zones of condemnation and unconditional (mandatory) resettlement.

The maintenance of public order and fire safety on the territory of the zones of condemnation and unconditional (mandatory) resettlement, and the control-permit system in entering or leaving such zones shall be enforced by the specialized organs of the UkSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Control over the implementation of said measures on the territories of the zones of condemnation and unconditional (mandatory) resettlement shall be enforced by the corresponding executive committees of the oblast soviets of people's deputies.

**Section III**

**Legal System in the Zone of Guaranteed Voluntary Resettlement**

**Article 15. Utilization of the Land in the Zones of Guaranteed Voluntary Resettlement**

Land in the zone of guaranteed voluntary resettlement shall be classified as radioactively contaminated and

used in accordance with the procedure stipulated by the UkSSR Council of Ministers.

If for economic or ecological reasons the further utilization of such land is impossible, it shall be classified as radiation hazardous.

**Article 16. Types of Activities Prohibited in the Zone of Guaranteed Voluntary Resettlement**

The following are prohibited in the zone of guaranteed voluntary resettlement:

Construction of new and expanding operating enterprises not directly related to ensuring the radioecological and social protection of the population and its activities;

Any activity which could worsen the radioecological situation;

The utilization of nature inconsistent with the requirements of radiation safety standards;

Introduction of pesticides, herbicides or toxic chemicals without special permission by the UkSSR Council of Ministers;

Recruiting secondary school and university students for work which could adversely affect the state of their health (based on conclusions by the UkSSR Ministry of Health).

**Article 17. Measures To Reduce Risk of Population Morbidity in the Zone of Guaranteed Voluntary Resettlement**

With a view to lowering the risk of population morbidity and lowering the dose of radiation, the state guarantees:

The voluntary resettlement of people from the zone;

Restructuring production facilities with a view to the production of ecologically clean goods;

Constant dosimetric control of the radioactive contamination of the soil, water, air, food products, raw materials, housing and production premises, and medical-biological and radioecological monitoring;

Comprehensive annual medical outpatient treatment of the population and ensuring early disease prevention;

Supplying the population with the necessary quantity and variety of medical preparations, drinking water, and clean nutritional products, including those with radioprotective properties, which contribute to the elimination of radionuclides from the organism;

If expedient, deactivating the territory by specialized units;

Comprehensive gasification of settlements and the construction of roads with asphalt and concrete lining;

Providing citizens living on said territory with benefits and compensations as stipulated in the UkSSR Law on

the Status and Social Protection of Citizens Who Suffered As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe and other current legislation acts.

**Section IV**

**Legal System in the Zone of Intensified Radioecological Control**

**Article 18. Measures To Reduce the Morbidity Risk to the Population in the Zone of Intensified Radioecological Control**

With a view to reducing the population morbidity risk and lowering the dose of radiation, the state guarantees:

Restructuring of production facilities for the production of ecologically clean products;

Constant dosimetric control over the radioactive contamination of the soil, water, air, food products, raw materials, housing and production premises, and medical-biological and radioecological monitoring;

Comprehensive annual medical outpatient treatment of the population and ensuring early disease prevention;

Supplying the population with the necessary quantity and variety of medical preparations, drinking water, and clean nutritional products, including those with radioprotective properties, which contribute to the elimination of radionuclides from the organism;

If expedient, deactivating the territory by specialized units;

Gradual comprehensive gasification of settlements and the construction of roads with asphalt and concrete lining;

Providing citizens living on said territory with benefits and compensations as stipulated in the UkSSR Law on the Status and Social Protection of Citizens Who Suffered As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe and other current legislation acts.

**Article 19. Types of Activities Prohibited in the Zone of Intensified Radioecological Control**

The following is prohibited in the zone of intensified radioecological control:

The construction of sanatoriums, Pioneer camps, bases, and rest homes and the building of new and expansion and reconstruction of existing enterprises which have a harmful effect on the health of the population and on the environment;

Any activity which worsens the radioecological situation;

The use of nature inconsistent with the requirements of radiation safety standards;

Introducing pesticides, herbicides or toxic chemicals without the special permission of the UkSSR Council of Ministers;

Recruiting secondary school and university students for types of work which could adversely affect the condition of their health (based on the conclusions of the UkSSR Ministry of Health).

#### Section V

##### **Control Over the Observance of the Legal System in Zones Subject to Radioactive Contamination as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

###### **Article 20. State Control Over the Observance of the Legal System in Zones Subject to Radioactive Contamination as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

State control over the observance of the legal system in zones subject to radioactive contamination is provided by the oblast soviets of people's deputies, their executive organs, and the state organs so authorized by the state, in accordance with the legislation of the UkSSR.

The UkSSR State Committee for the Protection of the Population From the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES is the organ responsible for the exercise of state control over the observance of the legal system in the zone of condemnation.

###### **Article 21. Organs Responsible for Exercising Radiation Control in Zones Subject to Radioactive Contamination As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

Control and prognostic evaluation of the total dose of radiation of individuals from all sources under their specific living and working conditions is assigned to the UkSSR Ministry of Health.

The overall assessment of the radiation situation on the territory of the zones subject to radioactive contamination, radioecological monitoring of the territories, and methodical guidance and coordination of the work to determine the radiation situation are assigned to the UkSSR State Committee for the Protection of the Population From the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES.

Radiation control of farmland is provided by the UkSSR State Agroindustrial Committee; of forests, regardless of departmental affiliation, by the UkSSR Ministry of Forest Resources; of water resources, by the UkSSR Ministry of Water Resources and Water Economy; ground waters and geological environment, by the Ukrgeologiya Ukrainian Main Coordination-Geological Administration; and the territory of settlements, by the Ukrainian Republic Hydrometeorological Administration.

Radiation control over the level of pollution of agricultural commodities and food products is provided by the UkSSR State Agroindustrial Committee and the UkSSR Ministry of Health.

Radiation control over the levels of pollution of railroad, water, air, and automotive transportation facilities and their structural components, and solving problems of granting permission for moving it outside the zones of condemnation and unconditional (mandatory) resettlement are assigned to the ministries and departments in charge of said transportation facilities, with the participation, in the required cases, of the respective services of the UkSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Granting permission for taking household and consumer items, labor tools, and construction materials outside the limits of the radioactively contaminated territories from which the resettlement of people is planned is assigned to the organs of the state sanitation control and the civil defense staffs; in the case of domestic animals, to the UkSSR State Veterinary Supervision Inspectorate.

Control over the accuracy and objective nature of the data submitted by departmental services in charge of radiation control, regardless of their affiliation, is assigned to the UkSSR state sanitation supervision of the Ministry of Health; metrological control is assigned to the Ukrainian Republic Administration of the USSR Gosstandart.

#### Section VI

##### **Responsibility for Violations of the Legal System in Zones Subject to Radioactive Contamination As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

###### **Article 22. Responsibility for Violating the Legal System in Zones Subject to Radioactive Contamination**

Individuals guilty of:

Violating the legal system established with this law for zones subject to radioactive contamination and failure to execute the orders of the state organs in charge of control in this area;

Nonfulfillment of the radiation safety measures stipulated in this law;

Concealing, falsifying, lateness in or else incompletely informing the population concerning the radioecological situation shall entail criminal, administrative, material or any other liability in accordance with the existing legislation;

Citizens, officials, and other individuals by whose fault enterprises, establishments, and organizations have been harmed as a result of engaging in economic or other activities prohibited in the zones of radioactive contamination shall bear criminal, administrative, or material liability as stipulated in the current legislation;

Citizens guilty of the destruction, damaging or moving radiation safety signs or fences in said zones bear criminal, administrative, material or any other liability in accordance with the current legislation.

L. Kravchuk, chairman, UkSSR Supreme Soviet.

Kiev, 27 February 1991

**Resolution of the UkSSR Supreme Soviet****On the Procedure for the Enactment of the UkSSR Law on the Legal System of Territories Subject to Radioactive Contamination As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic resolves:

1. The enactment of the UkSSR Law on the Legal System in Territories Subject to Radioactive Contamination As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe, as of 1 July 1991.

2. Assigns to the UkSSR Council of Ministers:

To formulate a mechanism for the promulgation of the law and to take immediate measures for its implementation;

To report on the course of the implementation of said resolution to the UkSSR Supreme Soviet in May 1991.

3. Control over the implementation of the present resolution is assigned to the UkSSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Problems of the Chernobyl Catastrophe.

L. Kravchuk, chairman, UkSSR Supreme Soviet.

Kiev, 28 February 1991

**UkSSR Law on Status of Citizens Affected by Chernobyl**

91WN0407A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian  
28 Mar 91 pp 2-4

[Law signed by L. Kravchuk, UkSSR Supreme Soviet chairman, Kiev, 28 February 1991: "On the Status and Social Protection of Citizens Affected by the Chernobyl Catastrophe"]

[Text] The Chernobyl catastrophe affected the lives of millions of people. In many areas and over huge territories new social and economic conditions appeared. The Ukraine was proclaimed a zone of ecological disaster. The establishment of a system for the reliable protection of the people from the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe demands that significant financial, material and scientific resources be obtained.

**Section I****General Regulations****Article 1. Objective and Basic Tasks of the Law**

The objective of this law is to protect the citizens who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe and to solve problems of medical and social nature, which arose as a result of the radioactive contamination of the territory.

**Article 2. Defining the Categories of Zones of Radioactively Contaminated Territories**

Depending on the landscape and geochemical features of the soil, the extent increase in the natural pre-accident level of accumulation of radionuclides in the environment and related degrees of possible adverse effect on the health of the population, the requirements related to providing radiation protection to the population and to taking other special measures, the territory subject of radioactive pollution as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe is classified into several zones.

These zones are the following:

1. Zone of condemnation: a territory from which the population was evacuated in 1986;

2. Zone of unconditional (mandatory) resettlement of the population: a territory subject to intensive contamination with long-life radionuclides, with a compact pollution of the soil with cesium isotopes of 15.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> or higher, strontium of 3.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> or higher or plutonium 0.1 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> or higher, as well as territories with soils which contribute to the high migration of radionuclides in plants, with a density of isotope pollution of cesium between 5.0 and 15.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, strontium from 0.15 to 3.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, or plutonium from 0.01 to 0.1 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, in which the effective equivalent dose of human radiation may exceed 5.0 millisievert (0.5 rem) per year above the dose which the person received in the pre-accident period;

3. Zone of guaranteed voluntary resettlement: a territory showing a soil pollution density with isotopes of cesium from 5.0 to 15.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, strontium from 0.15 to 3.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, or plutonium from 0.01 to 0.1 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, as well as territories with soils which contribute to the high migration of radionuclides in plants with a density of contamination with isotopes of cesium from 1.0 to 5.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, strontium from 0.02 to 0.15 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> or plutonium from 0.005 to 0.01 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> in which the effective equivalent dose of human radiation may exceed 1.0 millisievert (0.1 rem) per year above the dose which the person received in the pre-accident period;

4. Zone of increased radio-ecological control: a territory with a pollution density of the soil with cesium isotopes from 1.0 to 5.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, strontium 0.02 to 0.15 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> or plutonium from 0.005 to 0.01 Ci/km<sup>2</sup> and territory with soils contributing to the high migration of radionuclides in plants, with a pollution density of cesium from 0.2 to 1.0 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>, in which the effective equivalent dose of radiation of a person must not exceed 1.0 millisievert (0.1 rem) per year above the dose to which he was exposed in the pre-accident period.

Additional criteria on the contamination of the soil with radionuclides may be set by the National Commission for the Radiation Protection of the Ukrainian Population.

In determining the level of soil contamination with radionuclides for purposes of zone demarcation categories, a 90-percent indicator is set on the basis of the overall number of measurements of the density of contamination, on an ascending scale.

The boundaries of these zones are set and reviewed by the UkSSR Council of Ministers, on the basis of the expert conclusions of the National Commission for the Radiation Protection of the Ukrainian Population, the UkSSR Academy of Sciences, the UkSSR Ministry of Health, the UkSSR State Committee for the Protection of the Population From the Consequences of the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Power Plant] Accident, the Ukrainian Republic Hydrometeorological Administration, the UkSSR State Agroindustrial Committee, and the UkSSR State Committee for Ecology and Rational Utilization of Nature, on the presentation of the oblast soviets of people's deputies.

The maps of said zones and the list of settlements included in such zones will be published in the republic and local press.

#### **Article 3. Conditions for Residence and Labor Activities of the Population Without Restrictions Based on the Radiation Factor**

A condition for the residential and labor activities of the population without restrictions caused by the radiation factor is an additional dose of radioactive isotopes resulting from the contamination of the territory, not to exceed radiation limits of 1.0 millisievert (0.1 rem) per year.

Entering the condemnation and unconditional (mandatory) resettlement zone for purposes of permanent residence is prohibited. The population may live in such zones only until the resettlement has been completed. The procedure for moving to the permanent place of residence in a zone of guaranteed voluntary resettlement shall be defined by a special resolution of the UkSSR Council of Ministers.

Assigning young specialists under the age of 35, after their graduation from higher and secondary specialized institutions, to work in zones of condemnation and unconditional (mandatory) and guaranteed voluntary resettlement without their agreement is prohibited.

#### **Article 4. Right to Resettlement**

In the case of a possible exposure to an additional dose in excess of 1.0 millisievert (0.1 rem) per year, to be determined by the UkSSR Ministry of Health, individuals have the right to resettle with compensations, as stipulated in this law.

The resettlement stages are regulated by the Concept on the Population Residence in the Territory of the UkSSR

With Increased Levels of Radiation Contamination As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe.

The right to resettlement from the zone of intensified radioecological control is also granted to pregnant women, families with children under 18 and individuals on the basis of medical indications, as determined by the UkSSR Ministry of Health.

The resettlement procedure is formulated by the UkSSR Council of Ministers.

#### **Article 5. Conditions for Population Re-evacuation**

The re-evacuation of the population must take place exclusively on a voluntary basis, after the radioactive contamination of the territory has been reduced to a level which offers safe conditions to residents without restrictions, in accordance with part of Article 1.

3. A decision on the re-evacuation of the population must be made by the UkSSR Council of Ministers, based on the conclusions of the National Commission for the Radiation Safety of the Ukrainian Population.

#### **Article 6. Quality of Food Products**

Food products in which the content of radionuclides does not exceed the stipulated standards are considered clean and suitable for marketing and consumption.

The production of farm goods the radioactive contamination of which exceeds the established standards is prohibited.

The rates of content of radionuclides in food products and agricultural produce are set by the National Commission for the Radiation Safety of the Ukrainian Population.

Goods produced in the zones of unconditional (mandatory) resettlement and guaranteed voluntary resettlement and intensified radioecological control must have a certificate indicating the place of production, the content of radionuclides, the producer responsible for the commodity and the controller who has tested it for radionuclide content.

Goods contaminated with radionuclides, received for production purposes or marketing through the commercial network must be confiscated and buried or else utilized in accordance with the procedure established by the UkSSR Council of Ministers, with compensation to the state for the outlays paid by individuals responsible for their production.

#### **Article 7. Prohibiting the Production, Processing and Marketing of Goods With Radioactive Contamination**

The production, processing and marketing of radioactively contaminated goods, including the use of such goods as additives to clean raw materials, with the exception of goods of a scientific-production and research nature, are prohibited.

**Article 8. Information on the Levels of Radioactive Contamination**

The UkSSR Council of Ministers shall provide citizens of the UkSSR with full, prompt and accurate information on the levels of contamination with radioactive substances of the areas in which they live or work, on the level of contamination with radionuclides of food products and property, and regarding all requirements and conditions needed for observing a radiation safety regime and the right to public control over the state of pollution.

**Section II****Status of Individuals Who Are Victims of the Chernobyl Catastrophe****Article 9. Definition of Individuals Who Have Suffered As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

Individuals who have suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe include the following:

1. Participants in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES—citizens who directly participated in liquidating the accident and its consequences.
2. Victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe: citizens, including children, who were subject to the effect of radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

**Article 10. Defining Individuals as Participants in the Liquidation of the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES**

Participants in the liquidation of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES shall include citizens who directly participated in any work related to the elimination of the accident itself, its consequences in the zone of condemnation, and the organization of the evacuation from this zone, or who were temporarily assigned or directed to carry out work in said zone, including military personnel, which includes reservists, personnel of state and public organizations, regardless of departmental affiliation, as well as those who worked at the centers for the medical treatment of the population and for deactivation of the equipment, both within the zone and outside its limits.

Also classified as participants in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES are citizens who participated in eliminating the consequences of other nuclear accidents and tests and in military exercises involving the use of nuclear weapons.

**Article 11. Defining Individuals Classified as Victims of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

The following are classified as victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe:

1. Those evacuated from the zone of condemnation and resettled out of the zone of the unconditional (mandatory) and guaranteed voluntary resettlement and those who left these zones on their own after the accident;
2. Individuals who moved out of the territory of radioactive contamination, stipulated in Point 3 and 4 of Article 2, based on medical indications, pregnant women and families with minor children;
3. Permanent residents or individuals working in the zones of unconditional (mandatory) and guaranteed voluntary resettlement;
4. Individuals who are permanent residents or work on the territory of zones of intensified radioecological control;
5. Children born after 26 April 1986, who are the offspring of either parent who participated in eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl AES accident or who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe under conditions in which they could have directly been exposed to the effect of radioactive radiation;
6. Other individuals whose illnesses have been acknowledged as related to the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

In addition to the individuals listed in Part 1 of this article, also classified as victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe are citizens, including children, in whose thyroid gland the radiation doses exceed the levels set by the UkSSR Ministry of Health and approved by the National Commission for the Radiation Safety of the Ukrainian Population.

**Article 12. Establishing Causal Relation Between Worsened Health and the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

The causal relation between the worsened state of health, diseases and partial or total disability of citizens, who were victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe, is considered established (regardless of the existence of dosimetric indicators or their absence) if the authorized medical institution has not confirmed the lack of such a connection.

**Article 13. Responsibility of the State for the Harm Caused to the Citizens as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

The state assumes full responsibility for:

1. Any harm to the health or loss of work fitness of citizens and their children, who have suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe;

2. The loss of the breadwinner, if his death is related to the Chernobyl catastrophe;

3. Material damage caused to the citizens and their families as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, in accordance with the present law and existing legislation;

4. Promptness of medical examination and determination of the doses of radiation of the participants in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES and of the victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

**Article 14. Defining the Categories of Individuals Who Suffered As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe for the Purpose of Establishing Benefits and Compensations**

The following categories of individuals who have suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe shall be defined for purposes of establishing benefits and compensations:

1. Participants in the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES and victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe, who are fully or partially disabled as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, people suffering from radiation disease, and individuals whose illness is related to the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe: category 1;

2. Participants in the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES working in the condemnation zone in 1986-1987, and victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe who were evacuated from the condemned zone: category 2;

3. Participants in the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, who worked in the condemned zone in 1988-1990 and victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe who are permanently at work or worked or else live or lived on the territories of zones of unconditional (mandatory) and guaranteed voluntary resettlement: category 3;

4. Individuals permanently working or living on the territories of zones of intensified radioecological control: category 4.

Participants in the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES in 1988 and subsequent years, who worked or are working in the most heavily contaminated sectors of the zones of radioactive contamination may be classified in category 2 or 3 by decision of the UkSSR State Committee for the Protection of the Population from the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES.

Citizens who have participated in the elimination of other nuclear accidents and tests, and in military exercises involving the use of nuclear weapons, are classified in categories, 1, 2 or 3, as defined by the UkSSR Council of Ministers.

**Article 15. Grounds for Granting Benefits and Compensations to Citizens Who Are Victims of the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

Grounds for granting benefits and compensations to citizens who were victims of the consequence of the Chernobyl catastrophe are the levels of contamination with radionuclides of the territory or the dose of radiation exceeding the maximal rates established by the National Commission for Radiation Safety of the Ukrainian Population, or their maximally possible value established on the basis of computations, and the period of work for eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES and degree of disability.

The determination of the conditions of pollution and radiation doses through computations will be done by the UkSSR Council of Ministers on the basis of the presentations of the respective state organs and executive committees of oblast soviets of people's deputies.

**Section III**

**Uniform System for the Registration and Medical Coverage of Individuals Victim of the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

**Article 16. Organization of the Uniform State Registration of Individuals Who Have Suffered As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

In order to ensure the systematic examination of individuals who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, the UkSSR Ministry of Health will organize the uniform registration of individuals (a republic register).

Ministries, departments, public organizations and executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies shall submit to the UkSSR Ministry of Health full and exhaustive information concerning individuals who participated in the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, evacuees, the resettled and those who left by themselves the zones of condemnation and unconditional (mandatory) and guaranteed voluntary resettlement and of intensified radioecological control, and those who live and work in such zones, for registration in the Republic Register of the necessary information on the calendar length of their work or life in the contaminated territories, their place of work or residence, their radiation doses and the results of their medical examination.

The number of their entry in the republic register shall be reported to the citizens and to the medical establishment at their place of residence or work.

**Article 17. Organization of the Medical Examination and Treatment of Individuals Who Have Suffered as a Consequence of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

The UkSSR Council of Ministers, the UkSSR Ministry of Health, the UkSSR Ministry of Social Security, the UkSSR Ministry of Public Education, the state public organizations and the executive committees of the local

soviets of people's deputies shall organize the annual medical examination (outpatient treatment) and the sanatorium-resort treatment of all individuals who have suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe and shall introduce a system of radiation-ecological, medical-genetic, and medical-demographic monitoring on the territory of the republic. In the areas of the highest concentration of the victims, these authorities shall establish specialized centers, including centers for children, for their examination and treatment and sociopsychological rehabilitating and vocational guidance.

Citizens who have suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe must be subject to mandatory examination in medical establishments.

Citizens who have become disabled as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, and who have reached the age of 44 for women and 49 for men, shall be assigned a permanent disability group classification.

Citizens who have suffered from radiation disease of any degree, as a result of which have been classified in the first or second group of disability, shall retain their disability status permanently, regardless of age. An examination of such disabled individuals by the medical-labor expert commission shall be made at their request.

#### **Article 18. Nutrition Standards in Specialized Treatment, Treatment-Sanatorium and Resort Establishments**

In the case of victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe, on the recommendations of the UkSSR Ministry of Health the UkSSR Council of Ministers shall set additional standards for rational nutrition in specialized treatment, treatment-sanatorium and resort establishments.

### **Section IV**

#### **Social Protection of Citizens Who Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe, General Compensations and Benefits**

##### **Article 19. Granting Compensations and Benefits to Citizens Who Suffered As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

The compensations and benefits described in this section shall be extended to all citizens who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, including children, in accordance with the established categories.

##### **Article 20. Compensations and Benefits to Citizens Classified in Category 1**

Individuals classified in category 1 (Point 1, Article 14) shall be granted the following compensations and benefits:

1. Free prescription drugs;
2. Free dental prostheses on a priority basis;

3. Service in medical-prophylactic establishments and pharmacies on a priority basis;

4. Free annual sanatorium-resort treatment on a priority basis and compensation for the cost of independent sanatorium treatment;

5. Admission in polyclinics to which they were assigned while employed, after their retirement or change of work place;

6. Right to annual medical examination and outpatient treatment including the services of the required specialists;

7. Priority right of employment should there be personnel reductions or reductions in the number of workers, and in job placement.

In the case of layoffs, including the closing down of enterprises, the citizens will receive aid amounting to three monthly wages and, if they so desire, retain their salary, and rate (salary) at their new place of work. They are also guaranteed job placement in accordance with their wishes or the possibility of learning new skills (specialties) while retaining, in accordance with the established procedures, their average wage for the entire period of retraining, not to exceed one year.

In transferring to lower-paid work because of their state of health, the difference between the previous salary and the wages at the new job shall be paid to them, for the entire period;

8. Aid for temporary disability, in the amount of 100 percent of the average wage, regardless of the length of labor seniority;

9. Aid shall be paid to working disabled for temporary disability for up to four consecutive months or 5 months per calendar year;

10. Priority housing to individuals who need improvements in their housing conditions (including the families of citizens who perished or died). Entitled individuals shall be ensured housing within the year from the day of submission of their petition.

The right to improved housing conditions and apartments is granted to individuals who have a living area below the average availability to citizens in a given settlement or else who live in communal housing facilities.

Individuals who have suffered from radiation disease to any degree and who have become disabled as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe shall be granted additional housing area in the form of a separate room.

Families who have lost their breadwinner as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe have the right to additional housing area the size of which shall be determined by the UkSSR Council of Ministers;

11. Reduced payments for housing area within the rates stipulated by the existing legislation and for the use of communal services, electric power and gas by 50 percent to said individuals and members of the families living with them, as well as to families to have lost their breadwinner, who was victim of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

Individuals living in houses without central heating shall be compensated for 50 percent of the cost of fuel based on the rates for sale of said fuel to the population;

12. The right to assigning to individuals belonging to this category, free of charge and as their personal property, the housing premises occupied by them and their families, within the average range of availability;

13. The right to a priority free acquisition of a car of the ZAZ-986 model (in the presence of corresponding medical indications or first and second group disability). If the disabled so wishes, he may purchase on a priority basis a different model automobile by paying the difference in the cost;

14. The right to obtaining food products based on physiological standards, with assignment to corresponding stores, with a 50 percent discount;

15. Free use of all modes of urban and suburban transportation (other than taxicabs) and public use automotive transportation (other than taxicabs) in rural areas on republic territory;

16. The right to be issued a medical certificate for the entire period of treatment in sanatoriums and specialized medical establishments, including the commuting time to said establishments, with a payment of aid based on social security, regardless of who has issued the travel voucher or on whose account it was issued;

17. Priority mandatory placement of their children in preschool establishments, regardless of departmental affiliation;

18. Exemption from the payment of taxes and fees of all kinds;

19. Right to a free annual round trip anywhere in the country by air or rail, water or automobile, with the right of priority in obtaining tickets;

20. Priority in the allocation of plots for individual housing construction, truck gardening and market-gardening;

21. Obtaining interest-free loans for individual housing (cooperative) construction, 50 percent of it to be paid by the state budget, as well as interest-free loans for building dachas;

22. Use of regular leave at times convenient to them, and obtaining additional leave with pay for 14 days annually;

23. Priority right to join housing construction (housing cooperatives, cooperatives for the construction and

operation of collective garages and parking areas and their technical servicing, joining commercial gardening cooperatives, purchasing garden houses or materials for their construction and for individual house building;

24. Obtaining immediate services in establishments, enterprises, communications organizations, consumer services, public catering, housing-communal facilities and interurban transportation;

25. Immediate right to top priority in purchasing industrial goods in greater demand, including a passenger car, motorcycle, motorboat, television set, refrigerator, furniture, washing machine or vacuum cleaner;

26. Right to enroll without competition in a higher or secondary specialized educational institution or vocational-technical school or in courses for vocational training, with mandatory right to community housing for the duration of the training, and guaranteed scholarship increased by one half. Graduates of secondary educational institutions with excellent grades (excellent rating) shall be accepted in higher educational institutions, based on the results of an interview, without examination;

27. Right to out of turn residency in social security establishments and to social security services at home if the patient has no close relatives living with him or her.

If the organization of such services is impossible, the social security establishments shall compensate for the cost of taking care of the sick;

28. Right to priority installation of telephone facilities;

29. Right to interest-free credit or loan for engaging in private labor activities or setting up a farm;

30. Right to cancel the unpaid part of the interest-free loan for equipping the residence of families for up to 5,000 rubles, obtained by those evacuated from the 30-kilometer zone at the expense of the state;

31. Payments based on medical certificates for temporary disability of individuals, who participated in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES may be computed, in accordance with their wish, on the basis of the average actual earnings which they received during the work on eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES, without being restricted to double the wage or salary rate.

The same procedure shall apply in payments based on medical certificates for individuals whose temporary disability has been caused by any disease.

#### **Article 21. Compensation and Benefits to Citizens Classified in Category 2**

Individuals classified in category 2 (Point 2, Article 14) are entitled to the following compensations and benefits:

1. The right to the benefits stipulated in points 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, and 31, Article 20;

2. Priority annual free travel vouchers to sanatoriums and resorts, issued at their place of work, and compensation of the cost of individual sanatorium-resort treatment;

3. Priority in acquiring housing area to individuals who need improvements in their housing condition.

The right to improved housing conditions and to apartments is granted to individuals whose housing space is below the level of the average space available to citizens in a given settlement or who live in communal apartments.

Families who have lost their breadwinner as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe have the right to additional housing area the size of which shall be determined by the UkSSR Council of Ministers;

4. Retaining the average wage of the previous job for workers transferred on the basis of medical indications to a lighter work, for the entire period of their employment;

5. The right to a 50 percent reduction in the cost of an round-trip anywhere in the country and back by air or rail or by water or automobile;

6. The right of telephone service on a priority basis;

7. The right to obtaining food products according to medical standards, assigned to the proper stores, with a 25 percent discount;

8. Obtaining an interest-free loan for individual housing (cooperative) building, 25 percent of which to be repaid with a loan from the state budget, and an interest-free loan for the construction of a dacha;

9. Receiving for one year their average wage for workers who participated in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES in 1986-1987 and who, on the basis of medical indications, were removed from the condemned zone (Point 1, Article 2) and transferred to lower paid jobs or assigned to retraining;

10. Priority services to participants in the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES in 1986-1987 at establishments, enterprises, communications organizations, consumer services, public catering, housing-communal facilities and interurban transportation;

11. Free use of all types of urban and suburban transportation (other than taxicabs) and public use automotive transportation on the territory of the republic to participants in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES in 1986-1987.

#### Article 22. Compensations and Benefits to Citizens Classified in Category 3

Individuals classified in category 3 (Point 3, Article 14) are granted the following compensations and benefits:

1. The right to the benefits stipulated in points 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17, 20, and 27 of Article 20;

2. Privileged priority acquisition of travel vouchers for sanatorium-resorts at their place of work, and partial compensation for the cost of individual sanatorium-resort treatment;

3. The right to up to 14 days unpaid leave to either parent of minor children living on the territory of the radioactive contamination zones;

4. Priority right to join a housing-construction (housing) cooperative (in Kiev City and in resort areas providing that a residential permit has been granted);

5. Obtaining an interest-free loan for individual housing construction;

6. Noncompetitive status for those who have scored positive entrance grades for enrollment in educational establishments is granted to individuals who live on radioactively contaminated territories and have been assigned to training in accordance with the plan for target training with mandatory hostel facilities and a guaranteed scholarship, increased by 50 percent;

7. The right to food products in accordance with physiological standards and to food products with radiation protection agents;

8. Right to priority in obtaining industrial durable goods;

9. Right to apartments for citizens living in communal premises, regardless of the size of their housing area;

10. Citizens with privately owned housing, resettled in 1986-1990 in state apartments are granted the right to ownership of such apartments free of charge, within the range of average availability standards;

11. Citizens who worked on the territory of zones of unconditional (mandatory) and guaranteed voluntary resettlement for no less than 3 years have the right to full ownership of the housing they occupied in those zones;

12. Right to preferential terms for obtaining credit or loans for setting themselves up in private business or farming;

13. Individuals who lived, prior to their resettlement, on zones of unconditional (mandatory) and guaranteed voluntary resettlement are granted the benefits stipulated in points 1, 2 and 18 of Article 20 and the right to priority free sanatorium-resort vouchers from their place of work;

14. Individuals who lived, prior to resettlement, in houses without central heating are repaid 50 percent of the cost of the fuel purchased within the limits stipulated for sale to the population.

**Article 23. Rights of Individuals Classified in Category 4**

Individuals classified in category 4 (Point 4, Article 14) are granted the following compensations and benefits:

1. The right to benefits stipulated in points 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 18, Article 20, and points 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 12, Article 22;
2. The right to priority dental prostheses at 50 percent discount;
3. Preferential supply of sanatorium-resort travel vouchers issued by their place of work, as well as partial compensation of the cost of individual sanatorium-resort treatment;
4. Right to free of charge ownership of housing of citizens who worked in the zone of increased radioecological control for no less than five years;
5. Compensation of 50 percent of the cost of fuel purchased within the range of the established norms for individuals living in homes lacking central heating.

**Article 24. Military Service Requirements for Individuals Who Have Suffered As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

1. Individuals of draft age who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe shall not be assigned to perform military service on a territory with increased levels of radioactive contamination or in military units with nuclear systems or which use other sources of ionizing radiation, superhigh frequencies and missile fuel components.
2. Drafted military servicemen who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe shall be mandatorily granted annual leave no less than 30 days, excluding travel time.
3. Drafted military personnel who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe shall undergo a mandatory annual medical examination.

**Section V**

**Protection of Children Who Suffered From the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

**Article 25. Identifying Children Who Suffered From the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

Children who suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe include minor children who:

Were evacuated from the condemned zone;

Live or lived in the zone of the unconditional (mandatory) resettlement;

Live or lived in the zone of guaranteed voluntary resettlement;

Live or lived in the zone of intensified radioecological control;

Were born after 26 April 1986 if either parent participated in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES or suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe, under conditions in which they may have been indirectly exposed to the influence of radioactivity;

Received a dose of radiation of the thyroid gland exceeding the level determined by the UkSSR Ministry of Health and ratified by the National Commission for Radiation Safety of the Ukrainian Population, or else whose illnesses have been acknowledged as related to the influence of the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

**Article 26. Treatment of the Affected Children**

The rescuing, treatment and rehabilitation (including psychological) of preschool and school-age children who were affected is a priority in all medical programs and steps related to eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

The treatment of the affected children is organized on the basis of the best domestic sanatorium-resort establishments and specialized medical centers, equipped with modern diagnostic and treatment equipment, and supplied with modern medicines, administered by the most experienced domestic and foreign specialists using their own methods, equipment and medicines.

**Article 27. Ensuring Food Products for the Affected Children**

The affected children are ensured, in accordance with physiological standards, as stipulated by the UkSSR Ministry of Health, with food products and food supplements which help to eliminating radionuclides from the body. Children of parents classified as first and second category victims, undergoing outpatient treatment (as established by the medical consultation commission) shall be refunded 50 percent of the cost of the food products they receive.

**Article 28. Benefits and Compensations to Affected Children and Their Parents**

The affected children and their parents have the right to the following:

1. Full state support of the children until they reach school age;
2. Paid medical leave to one of the parents or to individuals replacing them for caring for a sick child under 14—100 percent—regardless of the length of job service, covering the entire period of the illness, including sanatorium-resort treatment;
3. Free transportation, using all types of transport (other than taxicabs) for the child and the individual who accompanies the sick child to the place of treatment

(rehabilitation), care, and back (as assigned by the medical establishments), with the right to priority ticket purchase;

4. Free prescription drugs;

5. Annual free travel voucher to the affected children for health recovery purposes for no more than 2 months.

The affected children under 10 shall be ensured travel vouchers together with their parents or with the individuals taking care of the child;

6. Monthly payment of 50 percent of the minimal wage in the republic, regardless of any other payments, per child of school age evacuated from the condemned zone or born after 26 April 1986 to one of the parents classified in categories 1 or 2, under conditions in which the child may have been indirectly exposed to the radioactivity;

7. Annual payment to families raising children, who have become disabled as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe (confirmed by an authorized medical institution), and compensation for the damage to the health of any disabled child, totaling three minimal wages paid in the republic;

8. Monthly payment to the families of children who have become disabled or are undergoing outpatient treatment for any illness resulting from the Chernobyl catastrophe (as confirmed by a medical consultation commission) and to the children of parents classified as first or second group disabled or who died as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, to the amount of the minimal wage in the republic, per child, instead of the payments stipulated in Point 6 of this article;

9. A separate room by a child who has become disabled as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe and who needs special care;

10. Increased pregnancy and maternity leave to women victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe, of up to 90 days with travel vouchers granted during the pregnancy period, for treatment in specialized health recovery establishments.

Payments in cases of partial paid leave to take care of a child shall be double the amount of aid stipulated by the current legislation. Pregnant women shall be ensured additional nutrition based on standards established by the UkSSR Ministry of Health;

11. Free food to school students attending secondary educational institutions and vocational-technical schools, who live in territories with radioactive contamination (points 2, 3, and 4, Article 2) and were evacuated from the condemned zone;

12. Ensuring food products to affected children who do not attend children's preschool and school establishments, for the amount of the average cost of nutrition in

such establishments, as set by the local soviets of people's deputies, or monetary compensation to the parents if so desired;

13. In the case of nonworking wives (fathers, guardians) retaining uninterrupted labor seniority for the purpose of the computation and payment of labor pensions, for the time spent in caring for an affected child under 12.

#### **Article 29. Aid to Affected Children of Low-Income Families Living in a Radioactive Contamination Territory**

Aid to affected children of low-income families living in a radioactive contamination territory shall be doubled compared to the respective aid stipulated in the current legislation.

### **Section VI**

#### **Protection of the Population Victimized by the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

##### **Article 30. Providing Housing Premises to Citizens Who Were Evacuated or Resettled (or Are Resettling)**

1. Citizens who were evacuated or resettled (or are resettling) shall be granted housing premises free of charge, as a rule in settlements, houses and apartments especially built to this effect.

2. Citizens who are resettling on their own in other rayons in the republic in a new place of residence (other than Kiev and resort areas) will be included by the enterprises, establishments and organizations in which they have been placed, in separate lists for priority housing without the need to submit documents on surrendering the premises they formerly occupied.

Citizens who, for a variety of reasons, have not been able to find a job and settle in the chosen place of residence, shall be registered in separate lists for priority housing of the executive committees of the city or rayon soviets of people's deputies (other than Kiev and resort areas) on the basis of an assignment issued in accordance with regulations.

The lack of a residency permit or job may not be grounds for refusal to register in any settlement in the UkSSR (other than Kiev and resort areas) and for granting housing. Housing shall be granted within three years.

The UkSSR Council of Ministers shall provide the local soviets of people's deputies specific capital investments for housing construction in accordance with the number of resettled families.

3. In order to secure housing for resettled families, the executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies, enterprises, establishments and organizations, as well as the citizens themselves may purchase in any settlement in the republic (other than in Kiev and resort areas) on the basis of contractual prices, housing and apartments from citizens who are their owners, as well as

vacant houses and apartments belonging to the public housing fund, on the basis of their residual balance-sheet value.

If the housing area of the purchased house (apartment) exceeds the stipulated norm, the cost of the surplus area and the corresponding part of yard premises shall be paid for by the citizens themselves.

The citizens who have built or purchased housing with gardens with outbuildings, or else premises paid out of their own funds shall recover their cost to the amount stipulated by the local soviets of people's deputies.

The executive committees of the local soviets of people's deputies, enterprises, establishments, organizations, kolkhozes and private citizens shall be exempt from paying state taxes in signing a contract for purchase or sale of houses and apartments.

4. The citizens have the right to obtaining on a priority basis plots for individual housing construction (in Kiev and resort areas with a residential permit) with guaranteed availability of the necessary construction materials, and sign contracts with contracting organizations for the building of homes with yards.

The citizens will be compensated for 50 percent of the cost of the housing they have built (within the existing standards) if they move out of the publicly-owned housing.

5. Citizens have the right to priority joining of housing-construction (housing) cooperatives, regardless of the period of residency and residential permits for a given settlement (for Kiev and resort areas, with a residential permit).

The citizens are refunded 50 percent of the cost of the housing they have built (within the limits of the existing standards) should they move out of publicly-owned housing.

6. Citizens resettled in temporary housing premises have the right to subsequent permanent housing with amenities or to be provided with construction facilities.

#### **Article 31. Priority Housing for Individuals Who Are Resettled in Housing Owned by Close Relatives**

Citizens who are disabled or retired, who are resettled in accordance with the present law in the housing of close relatives (parents, children, grandchildren, full brothers and sisters) have the right to priority housing as homeless. Said benefit may be used one time only.

#### **Article 32. Compensation Paid to Citizens for Lost Property in Connection With Evacuation or Resettlement**

Compensation paid to citizens for property lost as a result of the evacuation or resettlement includes the following:

1. The value of buildings (housing, garden and dacha, garage, and farm buildings and installations), paid in

full, based on the appraisal in accordance with insurance documents and the funds obtained from state mandatory and voluntary insurance; in cases of disagreement and of uninsured buildings, based on the appraisal of the Technical Inventory Bureau;

2. The value of livestock subject to mandatory slaughter for reasons of increased radioactive contamination (full amount paid by the state insurance authorities, based on insurance documents);

3. The value of fruit and berry plants, crops and uninsured livestock (at rates set by the UkSSR Council of Ministers);

4. The value of household property which, based on the extent of radioactive contamination, cannot be moved to the new place of residence (in accordance with the actual value minus wear and tear, as defined by the commissions of the respective soviets of people's deputies);

5. Expenditures for setting up in public property areas truck gardening associations, to the extent of the contributed shares or as assessed by the Technical Inventory Bureau;

6. The right to monetary compensation to citizens to have not lived on said territory but were given property either inherited or on a different basis, as stipulated by the current legislation;

7. Citizens who, until the promulgation of this law, obtained loans for the construction of housing, dachas or garages on contaminated territories, will pay no interest on the used portion of the loan.

This article is extended to citizens with dachas, homes with yards, fruit and berry plants in truck gardening associations and other settlements located in contaminated territories from which no clean produce can be obtained.

#### **Article 33. Compensation and Benefits Granted to Citizens Evacuated or Resettled (Resettling) in a New Place of Residence**

Citizens who were evacuated or resettled (or are resettling) in a new residential area have the right to the following:

1. To receive one-time aid amounting to three minimal wages paid in the republic per family member. The same amount will be paid in aid to pensioners (regardless of the type of pension) and to citizens who are assisted from local budget funds and to members of their families;

2. Refunding the cost of the trip, and the cost of moving of the property by rail, water or automotive transportation (other than in cases in which said transportation facilities are provided free of charge);

3. Retaining the average wage for the days of gathering along the way and settling in the new place of residence,

not to exceed 14 days, and for the time spent in traveling, based on the average monthly earnings at the previous work place;

4. The expenditures related to the moving shall be refunded by the local soviets of people's deputies at the previous place of residence out of funds appropriated for the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe;

5. Obtaining interest-free loans for home furnishings, not to exceed 5,000 rubles per family, repayable over a period of 15 years from the time of obtaining the loan;

6. A loan of 10,000 rubles per family member (not to exceed 60,000 rubles) for independent (if so desired) construction of housing (apartment). This loan is granted at the place of residence or the place where the housing will be built, out of funds appropriated for capital construction. The repayment of the loan will be made to the banks on a quarterly basis, depending on the amount of use of funds for construction or of the purchase and sale, but not to exceed the actual expenditures;

7. Priority in job placement by the local soviets of people's deputies, enterprises, establishments and organizations at the new place of residence, taking into consideration the profession, specialty and skill. Should such job placement prove to be impossible, the citizens are guaranteed other work in accordance with their wishes and public needs or the possibility of learning new skills (specialties) while receiving the average wage for the entire period of retraining, but not to exceed one year.

Citizens who have worked in contaminated territories prior to their resettlement will retain in their new job their work seniority and work longevity in their specialty, their acquired qualifications and title, in accordance with and under the conditions governed by the current legislation;

8. Priority in purchasing goods for which compensation has been paid in accordance with Point 4, Article 32.

Citizens who have been resettled out of radioactively contaminated territories in accordance with Article 4 of this law to other rural settlements will be exempt from paying the agricultural tax, tax on buildings, tax on land and tax on owners of means of transportation for a period of three years from their resettlement.

#### **Article 34. Compensation for Citizens Living in Radioactively Contaminated Territories**

Citizens who live in radioactively contaminated territories shall be paid, on a monthly basis, a daily allowance related to the limited consumption of food products produced locally and in their private auxiliary farms, in the following amounts:

In the zone of intensified radioecological control, 30 percent of the minimal wage paid in the republic;

In the zone of guaranteed voluntary resettlement, 40 percent of the minimal wage paid in the republic;

In the zone of unconditional (mandatory) resettlement, 50 percent of the minimal wage paid in the republic.

#### **Article 35. Reserved Housing for Individuals Either Assigned or Voluntarily Going to Work in Zones of Condemnation or Unconditional (Mandatory) and Guaranteed Voluntary Resettlement**

Individuals assigned or voluntarily going to work in zones of condemnation or unconditional (mandatory) resettlement or guaranteed voluntary resettlement will have the right to keep their housing in their previous place of residence.

### **Section VII**

#### **Features in Regulating the Work of Citizens Working in Radioactively Contaminated Territories**

##### **Article 36. Wages of Citizens Working in Radioactively Contaminated Territories**

The wages of citizens working in radioactively contaminated territories shall be based on higher wage rates (piece rates) and salaries, taking into consideration the level of radioactive pollution with cesium isotopes, the difficulty of the work and working conditions, as follows:

From 1 to 5 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>: 20-30 percent;

From 5 to 10 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>: 30-40 percent;

From 10 to 15 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>: 40-60 percent;

From 15 to 30 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>: 60-80 percent;

Over 30 Ci/km<sup>2</sup>: 80-100 percent.

The list of the types of work and specific amounts of percentage supplements, depending on the difficulty of the work and the working conditions, shall be established by the UkSSR Council of Ministers.

The same rate of increase shall apply to pensions, scholarships, and aid to citizens living in radioactively contaminated territories.

Pensioners and disabled, whose disability was caused by the Chernobyl catastrophe, may receive higher payments computed on the basis of the average wage which they earned prior to their retirement or disability.

##### **Article 37. Payment for the Labor of Military Servicemen, Military Reservists, or Civilians in the Military, Serving in Territories With Radioactive Contamination**

1. Military servicemen, military reservists or civilians working for the military, summoned to assemblies and assigned to eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe, as well as those who perform their service on territories with radioactive contamination, where benefits in wages to the population living and working in those areas are contemplated, shall be paid,

over and above their average payment, increased payments as per Article 36 of this law, for all the calendar days of work, on the basis of a pay certificate submitted to the military unit.

2. Military servicemen in military units and command and private members of the organs of internal affairs and state security of the UkSSR shall receive higher wages based on their salaries and military or special rank.

**Article 38. Wages of Workers Assigned to Work in Radioactively Contaminated Territories**

Workers temporarily transferred or assigned to work in radioactively contaminated territories shall retain their average wage at their basic place of work and receive daily allowances in accordance with the current legislation. In the condemned zone daily allowances shall be paid in an increased amount as set by the UkSSR Council of Ministers. The increased wages in said territories for work shall be based on Article 36 of this law.

Workers assigned to the construction of projects related to eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe shall receive, instead of daily allowances, 75 percent of their average wage at their basic place of work.

The wages of workers of enterprises, establishments and organizations engaged in the construction of projects in accordance with the program for eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe outside the limits of zones of radioactive contamination, shall receive a 20 percent supplement to the wage rates (salaries), which shall be included in the cost of the projects.

**Article 39. Seniority Payments to First, Second, Third, and Fourth Category Workers**

Workers in the first, second, third, and fourth category have the right to an annual one-time payment for length of service, regardless of the departmental affiliation of enterprises, establishments, and organizations or their place of work and military service. The amount of the payment shall be determined by the respective enterprises and organizations, but shall be no less than:

**Table 1.**

Total Length of Service	Amount of Annual Payment Based on the Monthly Wage Rate (Salary, Cash Allowance)
From 1 to 3 Years	0.8
3 to 5 Years	1.0
5 to 10 Years	1.2
10 to 15 Years	1.5
Over 15 Years	2.0

Pensioners shall receive an annual payment equivalent to two monthly pension payments.

**Article 40. Wages to Personnel of Health Care, Public Education and Culture Establishments**

Workers employed in the specialized establishments of the UkSSR Ministry of Health, who are permanently employed in providing medical aid to victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe, shall have their salaries increased by 25 percent; those providing medical services and working in public education and culture on contaminated territories shall be paid in accordance with their contract.

Problems related to ensuring contractual conditions shall be resolved by the UkSSR Council of Ministers.

**Article 41. Wages of Workers Engaged in the Special Processing, Utilization, and Study of Raw and Other Materials With Increased Radioactivity, and in Controlling, Repairing and Specialized Processing of Technical Facilities With Radioactive Pollution**

The wages of personnel engaged in the special processing, utilization and study of raw and other materials with increased radioactivity will be increased by 25 percent compared to the regular wage (piece rate) and salary, providing that the enterprises are located outside the zones of radioactive contamination and the permanent external radiation dose at the work place is in excess of 50 microroentgen per hour.

A 25 percent increase in the wage rates (piece rates) and salaries shall be paid for repairing and servicing technical facilities and equipment and their special processing and dosimetric control, providing that the surface contamination exceeds the stipulated standards.

**Article 42. Payments for Days Off and Holidays in Radioactively Contaminated Territories**

During days off and holidays in territories with radioactive contamination, in accordance with the current legislation, double wages shall be paid, taking into consideration the additional wages paid in accordance with Article 36 of this law.

**Article 43. Retention of the Average Wage and Labor Seniority of the Workers in the Case of Dismissal as a Result of Resettlement**

Workers who are laid off by enterprises, establishments and organizations due to cancellation of the labor contract because of resettling out of radioactively contaminated zones (items 2, 3, and 4, Article 2), shall retain their wage and labor seniority for the job placement period but not to exceed 3 months from the day of dismissal.

The average wage and labor seniority shall be retained during the job placement period for the fourth month following the dismissal as well, providing that the worker has applied within the proper time (within 1 month after the layoff) to the job placement authority but was not found a job.

**Article 44. Compensation For the Time of Forced Waiting by Citizens Who Should Have Been Resettled Out of the Radioactive Contamination Zones**

Citizens who must be resettled out of the radioactive contamination zones (points 2, 3, and 4, Article 2) will be paid at their place of work the average monthly earnings until the time that housing has been granted, should they have to idle as a result of the termination of their labor activities due to the prohibited production and processing of goods.

**Article 45. Annual Leave to Workers Who Are at Work in (or Assigned to) a Radioactively Contaminated Territory**

1. Individuals who work in (who are assigned to) territories with radioactive contamination shall be granted an annual leave depending on the length of their work, as follows:

In areas of condemnation and unquestionable (mandatory) resettlement, 44 calendar days for each year of work, not counting the additional leave. The overall length of the leave should not exceed 56 calendar days;

In the zone of guaranteed voluntary resettlement: 37 calendar days per year of work excluding the additional leave. The total length of the leave should not exceed 49 calendar days;

In the zone of intensified radioecological control: 30 calendar days per year of work excluding the additional leave. The overall duration of the leave should not exceed 42 calendar days.

2. In all cases, the length of the annual leave should not be less than the one stipulated by the current legislation for any worker category.

**Section VIII****Pensions and Compensations to Individuals Classified in Categories One, Two, Three, and Four****Article 46. Compensations for the Damage Caused to the Health of Individuals Who Became Disabled As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe, to Participants in Eliminating the Damage Caused at the Chernobyl AES, and to Families for the Loss of the Breadwinner**

The following one-time compensation shall be paid to individuals who became disabled and to the families who lost their breadwinner as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe:

First group disabled, 10,000 rubles;

Second group disabled, 7,000 rubles;

Third group disabled, 5,000 rubles;

Families who lost the breadwinner as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, 10,000 rubles;

Parents of those who died, 5,000 rubles.

Annual aid for recovery shall be paid in the following amounts:

First and second group disabled: three minimal wages paid in the republic;

Third group disabled: two minimal wages paid in the republic;

Participants in the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES:

1986-1987: Three minimal wages paid in the republic;

1988: Two minimal wages paid in the republic;

1989-1990: A minimal work wage paid in the republic;

To each child of a family which has lost its breadwinner: the minimal wage paid in the republic.

**Article 47. Pensions to Individuals Classified in the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Categories**

Pensions paid to individuals classified in the first, second, third and fourth categories shall be as follows:

a. A state pension;

b. An additional pension for the damage caused to their health.

**Article 48. Additional pension for damage caused to the health of Category One individuals**

Category one individuals shall receive a monthly additional pension for the damage caused to their health, as follows:

First group disabled: 100 percent of the minimal pension for old age;

Second group disabled: 75 percent of the minimal pension for old age;

Third group disabled and individuals who have suffered from radiation disease of all grades and whose illness is related to the influence of radioactivity: 50 percent of the minimal pension for old age.

**Article 49. Additional Pension for Damage Caused to the Health of Individuals of Categories Two, Three and Four**

1. Category two individuals shall receive a monthly additional pension for the damage caused to their health of 30 percent of the minimal pension for old age;

2. Category three individuals shall be paid an additional pension for damage caused to their health of 25 percent of the minimal old age pension;

3. Category four individuals shall be paid an additional pension for the damage caused to their health of 15 percent of the minimal old age pension.

**Article 50. Multiple Compensation to Families for the Loss of the Breadwinner As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

Incapacitated members of the family of a breadwinner, supported by the latter, have the right to a monthly compensation for the loss of the breadwinner as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe. In the case of children, the monthly compensation shall be paid regardless of whether or not they were supported by the breadwinner.

Family members, who are considered incapacitated and dependent, shall be so defined in accordance with the USSR Law on Pensions to Citizens in the USSR.

Students attending vocational-technical schools or secondary specialized and higher educational institutions have the right to a monthly compensation for the loss of the breadwinner for the duration of their training in the schools but not past the age of 23.

A monthly compensation for the loss of the breadwinner shall be paid to each incapacitated member of the family supported by him, in the amount of 50 percent of the minimal pension for old age, regardless of any other pension stipulated in the current legislation.

**Article 51. Payment of Additional Pension for the Damage Caused to the Health and Monthly Compensation to the Families for the Loss of the Breadwinner**

Additional pension for the harm caused to the health and monthly compensation to families for the loss of the breadwinner as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe shall be paid in full, regardless of earnings, other pensions or any other income.

**Article 52. State Pension to Category One Individuals and in Connection With the Loss of the Breadwinner**

Pensions for disability incurred as a result of crippling or illness, as well as pensions related to the loss of breadwinner as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe shall be appointed to the amount of the restoration of the actual damage but no less than the amount stipulated by the USSR Law on Pensions to Citizens in the USSR.

**Article 53. Granting State Pensions to Individuals Who Work or Reside in Radioactively Contaminated Territories**

Individuals who work on reside in radioactively contaminated territories shall be granted pensions based on a lowering of the age of pensioning, as follows:

**Table 2.**

Number	Victim Category	Lowered Age
1	Participants in Eliminating the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES:	

Participants in Eliminating the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES Who Worked in 1986 in the Zone of Condemnation, Regardless of the Number of Working Days	10 Years
Participants in Eliminating the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES Who Worked in 1987 in the Condemnation Zone No Less Than 10 Working Days	8 Years
Participants in Eliminating the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES Who Worked in 1988 in the Condemnation Zone No Less Than 14 Working Days	5 Years

Note: Participants in the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES who did work underground under particularly harmful and particularly difficult working conditions (according to list No. 1 of types of production, work, profession, position and indicators approved by the USSR Council of Ministers) for 10 years or more shall have their retirement age reduced additionally by 1 year over and above the stipulations in this article.

2	Victims of the Chernobyl Catastrophe:	
	Evacuated From the 10 Kilometer Territory of the Condemned Area in 1986:	10 Years
	Evacuated From Other Territories of the Zone of Condemnation in 1986	8 Years
	Individuals Who Lived or Live or Worked or Work in the Zone of Unconditional (Mandatory) Resettlement	4 Years (See Note) and Additionally 1 Year Per Each Year of Living and Working There But No More than 9 Years
	Individuals Who Lived or Live or Worked or Else Work in the Zone of Guaranteed Voluntary Resettlement	3 Years (See Note) and Additionally 1 Year for Each 2 Years of Living and Working There But No More than 6 Years
	Individuals Who Lived or Live or Else Worked or Work in the Zone of Intensified Radioecological Control	2 Years (See Note) and Additionally 1 Year for Each Three Years of Living or Working There But No More than 5 Years

Note: The initial amount of lowering the pensioning age is established only for individuals who lived or worked in said zones from the time of the accident to 31 July 1986, regardless of the length of their stay within that period of time.

The assignment and payment of the pensions of said categories shall be based on the USSR Law on Pensions to Citizens in the USSR and this law.

**Article 54. Benefits Based on Length of Work (Service)**

The length of work (service) for eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES shall be

included in the labor seniority as years worked until 1 January 1988—triple—and, from 1 January 1988 to 1 January 1991—augmented by one-half (including according to list No. 1). As of 1 January 1991 and subsequent years, benefits in computing the length of work in the condemnation zone shall be determined by the UkSSR Council of Ministers.

The right to a full pension is granted to citizens classified in categories one, two, three and four, providing that their length of work is no less than:

For men: 20 years;

For women: 15 years.

#### **Article 55. Benefits in Computing the Average Monthly Earnings**

The computation of the average monthly earnings shall be based on the USSR Law on Pensions to Citizens in the USSR.

If so preferred by those who request a pension, the average monthly actual earnings, for purposes of computing the pension, could be selected for any period from the 12 months of work on the territory with radioactive pollution. If the individual requesting a pension has worked less than 12 months, the average monthly earnings shall be determined by dividing the overall amount of earnings during the calendar months of work by the number of such months.

#### **Article 56. Benefits in the payment of Pensions to Working Pensioners**

Pensions to individuals who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe shall be paid in their full amount, regardless of their other earnings (income).

Pensioners who work in zones of radioactive contamination shall be paid pensions increased by 25 percent of the amount of the minimal wage paid in the republic.

#### **Article 57. Pensions to Military Personnel Who Participated in Eliminating the Consequences of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

The pensions of military servicemen, mobilized reservists, and commanders and privates in the organs of internal affairs and state security of the UkSSR shall be assigned in accordance with this law.

The pension shall be assigned according to their choice from earnings (upkeep) which they received during the period of work for the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

If so preferred, military personnel, drafted reservists, commanders and privates in the internal affairs and state security organs of the UkSSR may be granted pensions

for disability, and members of their families pensions for the loss of the breadwinner as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe under the conditions of and according to the procedures defined in the current legislation for individuals who became disabled as a result of wounds, shell-shock or maiming in the course of performing their duties and their military service (official duties).

If so desired, military servicemen in active service may receive a disability pension consisting of the quintuple minimal wage in the republic.

#### **Article 58. Procedure for the Enactment of the USSR Law on Pensions to Citizens in the USSR for People Who Suffered As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

In accordance with this law, the USSR Law on Pensions to Citizens in the USSR, as pertaining to individuals who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe shall be enacted in full as of 1 April 1991.

#### **Article 59. Other Benefits and Compensations to Individuals Who Suffered As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

Individuals who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe may be granted other benefits and compensations as stipulated by the current legislation.

### **Section IX**

#### **Social Associations of Individuals Who Suffered As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

##### **Article 60. Social Associations of Individuals Who Suffered As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

Social associations of individuals who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe shall be exempt from taxation and their enterprises and organizations from tax on profits to the amount which such social associations use for the exercise of their statutory activities. Such social organizations, their branches and enterprises shall be exempt from taxes on imports, exports and fees for goods imported and exported in accordance with their statutory activities.

### **Section X**

#### **Concluding Stipulations**

##### **Article 61. Interpretation of the Procedure for the Application of This Law**

Interpretation of the procedure for the application of this law shall be provided by the UkSSR Council of Ministers, whose resolutions shall be mandatory for execution by ministries, departments in the republic, local organs of state management and enterprises, establishments, organizations, and kolkhozes located on republic territory, regardless of departmental affiliation.

**Article 62. Financing Expenditures Related to the Application of This Law**

The costs related to the application of the present law shall be financed out of funds appropriated for the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

**Article 63. Responsibility of Individuals For Violations of This Law**

Individuals guilty of violating the stipulations of this law shall be held liable in accordance with the current legislation.

**Article 64. Procedure for Issuing Certificates to Individuals Who Suffered As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

1. Participants in eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES shall be issued certificates and badges manufactured in accordance with a model approved by the UkSSR Council of Ministers for each category of citizens.

2. Victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe shall be issued certificates drafted in accordance with models approved by the UkSSR Council of Ministers for each category of citizens.

Minor children shall be issued certificates on general grounds, which shall be given to their parents.

3. Certificates shall be changed in accordance with category changes.

4. The "Participant in Eliminating the Consequences of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES" and "Victim of the Chernobyl Catastrophe" certificates shall be documents which shall confirm the status of the citizens who have suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe and given the right to the benefits stipulated in this law.

5. The certificates and badges shall be issued by ministries, departments, or oblast executive committees (Kiev and Sebastopol City) soviets of people's deputies.

The procedure for their issuance shall be determined by the UkSSR Council of Ministers.

**Article 65. Extending the Effect of This Law to Citizens of Other Republics Who Suffered As a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe**

Citizens of other republics who suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe shall enjoy all the benefits stipulated by this law should they become permanent residents of the UkSSR.

**Article 66. Changes in the Amount of Additional Payments, Pensions and Compensations Stipulated in This Law**

All specific amounts of supplements, pensions and compensations shall be increased annually in accordance with changes in the cost of living index and the increased minimal wage as determined by the UkSSR Council of Ministers.

**Article 67. Grounds for Terminating the Payment of Compensations for Living in the Territories of Condemnation and Unconditional (Mandatory) Resettlement Zone**

The payment of compensations stipulated in this law for residing in the territories of the zone of condemnation and unconditional (mandatory) resettlement shall be terminated by decision of the local soviets of people's deputies in the following cases:

Granting to individuals who should have been resettled housing in homes belonging to the state or public housing fund, the fund of housing-construction (housing) cooperatives, within the standards stipulated in the current legislation;

In the case of refusal of official offers (no less than three options) to resettle in another area or in another housing premise;

As of the moment of acquisition of housing or completion (in the course of the month) of an individual housing premise on a territory not contaminated with radioactive substances.

**Official on New VUZ Admission Rules**

91US0499A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 91  
Union Edition p 8

[Article by A. Zverev: "New VUZ Admission Rules"]

[Text] G. Yagodin, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Public Education, has signed an order outlining the new admission rules to the higher education institutions [VUZ] of our country.

The unusual volume of the new rules (one and a half pages, 11 maximally concise items), as well as the absence of instructions, appendices, comments, etc., traditional for that kind of document—all this, openly speaking, tells a lot already. The new rules are based on the USSR Constitution and on the International Declaration of Human Rights, and state just the basic principles of organizing admission to VUZ's. Enrollment quota plans, the selection of entrance examination subjects and methods of conducting the examinations, as well as the selection of a particular system of grading are left to the VUZ's themselves. The key concept of the document is to make higher education accessible to every citizen depending on his personal abilities. This concept has been supported by the cancellation of a whole number of outdated limitations. An IZVESTIYA correspondent asked V. Noskov, deputy head of the Main Administration of the USSR State Committee for Public Education, to tell us about them:

"Here is what might be considered the main novelty: There will be general competition in all the institutes, including medical ones. It will be the same for those who

have just graduated from school and for those who already have some work experience.

"The new rules did away with the limitation that existed for many years until 1990, according to which only people under 35 could be admitted to full-time departments of VUZ's. It is obvious that for many years the desire to provide the maximum rights and care for people's educational needs was nothing but advertising for a lot of people. In reality the government was mostly interested in having enough time to recover the money spent on every graduate's education.

"As you know, at certain times the share of students enrolled on preferential terms could make up almost a quarter of the entire number. Now the range of people given preference at admission has been extremely narrowed. As before, admission without competition will be extended only to orphans, to those who are not supported by their parents, to Group I and II invalids, and to servicemen transferred to the reserve.

"The number of papers necessary for admission has been reduced to the minimum. According to the new rules, applicants this year can submit to the selection commission an application and an education certificate or its notarized copy only. This, in essence, will allow them to apply to several VUZ's simultaneously and, moreover, study at several. However, such students will have the right to receive a stipend and enjoy all the rights and privileges of a student only at the institute they choose as their "main" one, having submitted there the original of their high school diploma. An amendment to this effect was issued by the RSFSR State Committee for Science and Higher Education Establishments.

"For the first time the rules will also enable those who already have higher education to enroll in a VUZ again."

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